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Introduction
With growing frequency, Presidents have asserted that they have
the power to disregard any law that they believe to be unconstitu-
tional. Ronald Reagan, during his two terms in the White House, ob-
jected to almost 90 statutes on these grounds.' In his four years in
office, President Bush asserted such claims against 116 acts of Con-
gress, 2 an annual rate almost three times that of his predecessor. The
Justice Department, seeking to defend the Reagan Administration's
refusal to comply with the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984,3
told a federal court in January, 1989 that the "President has the au-
thority to decline, in the absence of a judicial resolution of the matter,
to implement a statute that is patently unconstitutional or that he rea-
sonably believes undermines his powers under the Constitution."4
To the extent that Presidents make good on their constitutional
objections to statutes by refusing to enforce them, they are in effect
asserting an absolute item veto-"absolute" because Congress gets no
opportunity to override the President's action, and an "item veto" be-
cause it operates surgically against only those parts of a statute that
the White House finds objectionable. 5 This is an alarming develop-
ment, for it threatens to further enhance the power of what already
has many of the trappings of an Imperial Presidency.6 That this emerg-
ing presidential claim to an absolute item veto is limited to allegedly
1. See infra Table 2.
2. See infra Table 2.
3. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175.
4. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 21, Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ball, 863 F.2d 693
(9th Cir. 1988), quoted in Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies and
Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of
the Unitary Executive, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 627, 633 (1989).
5. See H.R. REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15-16 (1985).
6. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); ARTHUR
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 277-301 (1986).
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unconstitutional laws offers little comfort, for as Judge Frank Easter-
brook has noted, "[C]onstitutional 'questions' are everywhere-it is
easy to pose questions and occasionally is possible to characterize a
mistaken view of the law or the facts as 'arbitrary,' an 'abuse of
power,' hence unconstitutional.
'7
This Article will examine presidential refusals to enforce alleg-
edly unconstitutional8 laws at several levels. Part I ascertains how
such a practice squares with the scheme of government which the
Founders contemplated in 1787. The evidence on this score rather
convincingly demonstrates that the Framers did not envision that
Presidents would possess the power to suspend laws, even where a
President thought that the law was unconstitutional. Part II examines
the historical record-from George Washington through Jimmy
7. Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1490 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Easter-
brook, Coffey & Manion, JJ., dissenting).
8. This Article does not directly address the issue of how much autonomy the Execu-
tive has when it interprets the Constitution; i.e., must a President follow the Supreme
Court's constitutional interpretations, does the Executive have complete autonomy to con-
strue the Constitution for itself, or does the answer lie somewhere in between? While the
issues are related, the question of presidential autonomy in construing the Constitution is
distinct from that of whether the Executive may~decline to honor a law that it believes,
using whatever standard, to be unconstitutional. Regardless of how one resolves the issue
of executive autonomy, there remains the separate question of whether the President may
refuse to comply with an assertedly unconstitutional law. See David A. Strauss, Presiden-
tial Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 117-19 (1993) ("In every
case ... the question whether the President may refuse to comply with an act of Congress
is distinct from the question whether he must treat Supreme Court precedent as binding.").
For discussion of the executive autonomy issue, see Strauss, supra; Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDozo L.
Rv. 43 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Auton-
omous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993); Michael Rosen-
feld, Executive Autonomy,, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on
Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 137
(1993).
Part III of this Article suggests that a President might justifiably refuse to comply with
a law that is "clearly unconstitutional" if such defiance is the only means of securing judi-
cial review of the law in question. While the "clearly unconstitutional" requirement might
in theory be applicable even if the Executive were free to employ its own constitutional
standards rather than the Court's, such complete autonomy would strip the requirement of
all practical force. A President, relying solely on his own view of the Constitution, could
condemn virtually any provision of law. The Executive must not have total interpretive
autonomy in the context of refusing to comply with an allegedly unconstitutional law. If a
federal court holds a particular law to be constitutional, the Executive must comply with
the court's judgment. See Merrill, supra, at 46-47; Paulsen, supra, at 82 & n.2; Strauss,
supra, at 123-24; Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. REs. L. Rnv. 905,
926 (1989-90). In other words, there is no legitimacy to the so-called "Merryman power",
under which a President may "decline to enforce judicial decrees that he believes rest on
an unsound interpretation of the law.. . ." Paulsen, supra, at 109.
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Carter-to determine the extent to which Presidents have actually re-
fused to comply with laws on constitutional grounds.9 The evidence
shows that while Presidents from time to time have failed to honor or
comply with laws because they thought them unconstitutional, this has
occurred relatively infrequently. Part III identifies the very limited
circumstances under which a President might legitimately disregard an
"unconstitutional" law, and suggests a number of steps that Congress
might take to both discourage and redress the Executive's unwar-
ranted resort to an absolute item veto.
I. The Framers' Conception
A. The Prerogative Power of Suspending the Laws
Presidential nonenforcement of "unconstitutional" laws is
equivalent to giving the Chief Executive a suspending power, one of
the royal prerogatives exercised by the kings of England, which was
wrested from the crown less than a century before the American
Revolution.
In 14th century England, the lawmaking power belonged solely to
the king. The king acted as legislator in response to grievances sub-
mitted by petition, usually from Parliament. If the king chose to re-
dress a grievance, he could do so by issuing either an ordinance or a
statute. The king preferred using ordinances, for these could be with-
drawn at any time; by contrast, statutes could not be revoked. With
growing frequency, however, Parliament conditioned grants of money
sought by the king on his redressing grievances by statute. This effec-
tively neutralized the king's prerogatives of rejecting a petition or of
9. This Article focuses solely on presidential refusals to comply with laws due to their
alleged unconstitutionality. It does not deal with nonenforcement resulting from the rou-
tine exercise of prosecutorial discretion, nor does it deal with presidential refusals to honor
a law where the Executive's action rested entirely on policy grounds. For example, Rich-
ard Nixon's impoundment of funds is not discussed here because Nixon did not claim that
the expenditures were unconstitutional. See HOWARD E. SHUMAN, POLITICS AND THE
BUDrET 184-216 (2d ed. 1988); Constitutionality of GAO's Bid Protest Function: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 338
(1985) [hereinafter GAO Bid Protest Hearings] (testimony of D. Lowell Jensen, Deputy
Att'y General). Harry Truman's effort to avert a nationwide strike by seizing the steel
mills, rather than using the "cooling off" provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, is likewise
beyond the scope of this piece, for Truman's conduct was based on policy rather than
constitutional objections to the Act. See MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL
SEIZURE CASE (1977); J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto:
A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 445-60 (1990) (noting that some
presidential refusals to execute parts of a law do not rest on constitutional grounds).
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granting it by ordinance, for if the crown took either of those routes it
would receive no funds.'
0
From the 14th century through the late 17th century, relations
between the king and Parliament were characterized by a host of
stratagems designed by the crown to obtain funds from Parliament
without satisfying the conditions on which the grant was made.'1 A
common ploy was for the king to issue the statute sought by Parlia-
ment; after he had received the money, the king would then exercise
his prerogative to suspend the statute, or to dispense with its applica-
tion as to specific individuals. 2
By the late 15th century, Parliament's legislative supremacy was
accepted in theory, though it was difficult to reconcile this with "the
undoubted power which the crown possessed of dispensing from or
10. 2 WILLIAM A. STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 570-78, 585-
87 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 4th ed. 1896). Under the ancient royal prerogative of revoca-
tion, the king could even revoke statutes, but by the late 13th century this was deemed
unconstitutional. 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 308,437 (4th
ed. 1936). Thus, when Edward III revoked an act of Parliament in 1341, he insisted that
Parliament repeal the measure, acknowledging that his purported revocation was ineffec-
tual. Even though Edward's action arose from a belief that the law unconstitutionally im-
paired the royal prerogative, this still did not justify the king's revoking the statute. 2
STUBBS, supra, at 389-92, 582.
11. An early tactic was for the king to agree to the petition but draft the statute so that
it differed in key respects from what he had agreed to or so that it included a "saving
clause" giving him discretion not to fulfill his promises. Parliament later foreclosed this
device by presenting the king with a proposed statute, rather than a mere petition, and by
carefully monitoring the bill until it became law. Another ploy was for the king simply not
to issue the statute, the matter eventually to be forgotten by Parliament. The king might
instead issue the statute but arrange for someone to submit a petition which he would
grant by ordinance that effectively nullified the earlier statute. Or the king might ignore
the statute, forcing Parliament to request that he honor the laws. 2 STUBBS, supra note 10,
at 570-90; ALBERT B. WHrrE, THE MAKING OF ThE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 449-1485, at
374 (1908). "The constant complaints, recorded in the petitions on the Rolls of Parliament,
show that resort was had to each of these means of evading the fulfillment of the royal
promises even when the grants of money were made conditional upon their performances
." 2 STUBBS, supra note 10, at 575.
12. 2 HOLDSwORTH, supra note 10, at 437. The suspending power was sometimes in-
voked on a temporary basis. See 6 id. at 221-22 (2d ed. 1927); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNE'r,
TASWELL-LANGMEAD'S ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 426-27 (11th ed. 1960);
Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and Strategies: Parliament's Attack Upon the Royal Dispensing
Power 1597-1689, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 222-24 (1985). It could be applied to an
entire law or to only a portion of it. Edie, supra, at 222-23. Suspension had the effect of
abrogating a law across the board, in contrast to the royal dispensing power which ex-
empted only those who had been granted a dispensation. PLUCKNETr, supra, at 190-91.
Unlike the royal pardoning power which merely relieved a person from the consequences
of having violated a law, the effect of suspending a law was to legalize the conduct in
question. Edie, supra, at 198-99.
suspending the operation of statutes ... ."' The matter came to a
head under the Stuarts who claimed that the prerogative powers were
matters of "divine right" rather than common law and thus could not
be restricted by Parliament.' 4
During the reign of Charles II, Parliament appeared to gain the
upper hand. In 1662 and 1672, Charles issued Declarations of Indul-
gence suspending all penal laws aimed at Protestant and Catholic non-
conformists. On each occasion, the House of Commons so vigorously
protested these exercises of the suspending power that Charles was
forced to withdraw the Declarations.'
When James II assumed the throne in 1685, he resolved to be less
yielding than Charles had been. James was strengthened by a 1686
King's Bench decision which upheld his exercise of the dispensing
power in terms so sweeping as to suggest that none of the royal pre-
rogatives were subject to parliamentary control.' 6 Emboldened by
this decision, James in 1687 issued a Declaration of Indulgence pro-
claiming it the "royal will and pleasure that from henceforth the exe-
cution of... all manner of penal laws, in matters ecclesiastical ... be
immediately suspended .... "'1' When the Archbishop of Canterbury
and six other prelates objected to James's order that the Declaration
be read in all churches, they were charged with seditious libel.'" At
the trial before King's Bench, the principal issue was the legality of
the suspending power. The judges, disagreeing on the question, sent
the case to the jury. The jurors may have been moved by the words of
Justice Powell, who warned that if such a suspension "be once allowed
of, there will need no parliament; all the legislature will be in the king,
which is a thing worth considering.' 19 The verdict of acquittal dealt a
fatal blow to the suspending power.2 °
13. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 10, at 443.
14. JACK HARVEY & L. BATHER, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 193 (2d ed. 1968).
15. COLIN R. LOVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 371-72
(1962); J. R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CEN-
TURY, 1603-1689, at 230 (1966); PLUCKNETr, supra note 12, at 426-27; 6 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 10, at 221-22.
16. Godden v. Hales, 89 Eng. Rep. 1050, 2 Show. K.B. 475 (K.B. 1686). The Lord
Chief Justice declared that because "the Kings of England were absolute Sovereigns," it
followed "that the King had a power to dispense with any of the laws of Government as he
saw necessity for it; that he was sole judge of that necessity; that no Act of Parliament
could take away that power .... " 89 Eng. Rep. at 1051, 2 Show. K.B. at 478.
17. PLUCKNETT, supra note 12, at 442.
18. PLUCKNETr, supra note 12, at 442-43; see also LOVELL, supra note 15, at 391-92,
406-07; F. W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 305-06 (1926).
19. Trial of the Seven Bishops, 12 State Trials 1831, 427 (K.B. 1688).
20. LOVELL, supra note 15, at 407.
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James's abuse of the prerogative led to his abdication in the Glo-
rious Revolution of 1688. The verdict in Trial of the Seven Bishops was
constitutionalized in the first article of the Bill of Rights of 1689,
which declared: "[t]hat the pretended power of suspending of laws, or
the execution of laws, by regal authority, without consent of Parlia-
ment, is illegal."'21 The suspending power which kings had employed
for nearly 400 years to avoid implementing the law was never again
exercised by the English crown 22
B. The Suspending Power and the United States Constitution of 1787
The drafters of the United States Constitution were closely ac-
quainted with English constitutional history. They "felt themselves
the heirs of the Revolution, of the glory derived from 1688. Ameri-
cans of the 1770s felt they were approaching a 'centennial' of their
own, reliving memories of the English Bill of Rights."'  A critical
piece of that legacy was the hard won principle that the Executive did
not possess the authority to suspend a law. As William Blackstone,
one of the "standard authorities" for the Framers' generation,24 put it:
An act of parliament, thus made, is the exercise of the highest
authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth.... And
it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended, or re-
pealed, but in the same forms, and by the same authority of par-
liament .... It is true, it was formerly held, that the king might,
in many cases, dispense with penal statutes: but now, by statute
... it is declared that the suspending or dispensing with laws by
regal authority, without consent of parliament, is illegal.'
21. I William and Mary sess. 2 c. 2 § i I. Though the Bill of Rights condemned the
dispensing power only "as it hath been assumed and exercised of late," the power was
effectively abolished and could be exercised only as allowed by statute. 1 Win. and M. sess.
2 c. 2 § i II; Edie, supra note 12, at 234 n.86.
22. Edie, supra note 12, at 234 n.86.
23. GARY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE 64 (Vintage ed. 1979).
24. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
30-31 (1967); David A. Lockmiller, Sir William Blackstone 169-74 (1938); GRANT GIL-
MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 113-14 n.4 (1977); see also Robert L. Berg, Presiden-
tial Power and the Royal Prerogative 90-92 (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Minnesota). Blackstone was cited in the Constitutional Convention, The
Federalist Papers, and state ratifying conventions. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 472 (Max Farrand ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand]; THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 69,84 (Alexander Hamilton); 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPION OF THE FEDERAL CONsrrrtrriON 544 (Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott and Co., 2d ed. 1881) (remarks of Patrick Henry in the Virginia ratifying con-
vention); 4 id. at 278 (remarks of Charles C. Pinckney in the South Carolina ratifying
convention).
25. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, Ch. 2, at 185 (1765).
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The text of the Federal Constitution does not specifically bar the
President from exercising a suspending power.26 Yet, while there is no
explicit rejection of a presidential suspending power, there is convinc-
ing evidence in the text of the Constitution and in the debates sur-
rounding its adoption that most of the Founders endorsed the English
Bill of Rights' principle that a statute may be suspended only by the
lawmaking authority, and not by the Executive acting alone.27
1. The "Take Care" Clause
Article II, section 3 declares that the President "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed .... ." Today, these words seem
self-evident if not entirely superfluous. But the clause acquires a
richer and more specific meaning if we view it against the historical
backdrop with which the Framers were familiar-the four hundred
year struggle of the English people to limit the king's prerogative and
achieve a government under law rather than royal flat. That struggle
culminated in the Bill of Rights of 1689, which made it illegal for the
king to suspend or dispense with the laws or refuse their execution
without Parliament's consent. The effect was to transfer the sus-
pending power from the executive branch to the legislature.
Read in the light of history, the requirement that the President
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" is a succinct and all-
inclusive command through which the Framers sought to prevent the
Executive from resorting to the panoply of devices employed by Eng-
lish kings to evade the will of Parliament. The duty to execute the
laws faithfully means that the President may not-whether by revoca-
tion, suspension, dispensation, inaction, or otherwise-fail to honor
26. See FREDERICK J. STIMSON, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 52 (1908) ("English constitutional history clearly establishes
... [t]hat the king can neither make laws, nor suspend laws, nor grant pardons in advance
for a crime or breach of the law, nor ever in cases of impeachment. The first and the last
are expressed clearly in the Federal Constitution, and it might be wished that the other two
were also.").
27. In referring to the intent of the Founders or Framers, I recognize that those who
drafted and ratified the Constitution disagreed on virtually every issue that came before
them. Nor is it possible, given the paucity of the surviving records, to identify the view
held by a majority of the individual Founders. In speaking of the intent of the Founders, I
am attempting only "to identify those founding arguments that offer the most coherent
interpretation of the ratified arrangements." JEFFREY K. TuLis, THE RHETORICAL PRESI-
DENCY 8 n.9 (1987).
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and enforce statutes to which he2 " or his predecessors have assented,
or which may have been enacted over his objection.2 9
2. Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The Constitution's text provides further evidence that in the
Framers' eyes the suspending power could legitimately be exercised
only by Congress, not by the Executive. Article I, section 9, clause 2
provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the pub-
lic Safety may require it." As first introduced in the Convention, the
power to suspend the writ was explicitly vested in "the Legislature."30
Though in its final form the clause was less specific,31 nothing in the
debates suggests that the revision was meant to abandon the English
Bill of Rights' principle reserving the suspending power to the
legislature.
The clause's placement within Article I, section 9 is telling. While
there are two clauses in section 9 that restrict the President's powers
rather than those of Congress, the presidential limitations appear at
the very end of the section, as clauses 7 and 8. Clauses 1 and 3
through 6 all clearly pertain to Congress, strongly suggesting that
clause 2 was so intended as well. If the Framers had thought that the
suspending power generally belonged to the President, one would
have expected the restriction on suspending habeas corpus to appear
28. This historical study uses the male pronoun in referring to the President. The us-
age merely reflects the fact that all of our Presidents to date have been males.
29. For similar views that the "Take Care" Clause was intended to limit the President's
power, see Robert J. Reinstein, An Early View of Executive Powers And Privilege: The
Trial of Smith and Ogden, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 309,320-21 n.50 (1975); Charles Tiefer,
The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63
B.U. L. REv. 59, 90 & n.151 (1983); William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation
of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 474,491 n.82 (1989); Rosenberg,
supra note 4, at 627, 693-95; Steven Ross, Presidential Lawmaking Powers: Vetoes, Line
Item Vetoes, Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and Delegations of Rulemaking Author-
ity, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 533, 541 (1990) (panel discussion); In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476,
524 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); HOUSE CoMm. ON GOV'T OPERA-
TIONS, THE EXEcuTIVE's SUSPENSION OF THE COMPETITION IN CoNTRAcrINo AcT IS UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL, H.R. REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 10 (1985); John 0.
McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descrip-
tive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. Rav. 375, 402 (1993). But see Susan L.
Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in our Constitutional Scheme: In the Begin-
ning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 635 n.232 (1989).
30. 2 Farrand, supra note 4, at 341.
31. Id. at 438.
either at the end of section 9, or in Article II along with other restric-
tions on the President's powers.3a
Contemporaries and early commentators on the Constitution
read Article I, section 9 as having given the suspending power to Con-
gress, not to the President. In the Massachusetts ratifying convention,
those who discussed the clause treated the suspending power as be-
longing to Congress.33 In his 1803 edition of Blackstone's Commenta-
ries,34 St. George Tucker explained that "[in England," where the
right was protected by the Habeas Corpus Act,35 "the benefit of this
important writ can only be suspended by authority of parliament ....
In the United States, it can be suspended, only, by the authority of
congress . . " Four years later in Ex parte Bollman,36 John Marshall
expressed the same view that the power to suspend the laws is legisla-
tive in nature. Noting that the first Congress had authorized federal
courts to issue writs of habeas corpus, Marshall surmised that Con-
gress had done so in order to assure that Article I, section 9 was not
violated.
Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they
must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing
efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege
should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in exist-
ence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its
suspension should be enacted.3 7
Similarly, in his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story
noted that "the power is given to congress to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus .... "I Like the suspending power in general, author-
32. See, e.g., U.S. CoNST., art. 11, §2, cl. 1 (President may issue reprieves and pardons
except in cases of impeachment); U.S. CONSsT. art. II, §2, cl. 2 (President may make treaties
provided two thirds of the Senate concurs). See Berg, supra note 24, at 291 (during the
Convention "the power of suspension was taken for granted as pertaining to the law-mak-
ing body. There was no sign whatsoever that the executive was intended to have to do with
this matter.").
33. See 2 ELLIOT, supra note 24, at 108-09 (remarks of Judge Dana and Judge
Sumner).
34. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, App. at 290-92 (reprint 1965) (St. George Tucker
ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803).
35. 31 Car. 2, c.2 (May 27, 1679).
36. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
37. Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
38. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON =n CONsTrrUrION § 1336 (Boston, Hilliard,
Gray & Co. 1833) (emphasis added). See also THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 309-43
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter Kurland & Lerner]. When
Lincoln suspended the privilege on his own initiative during the Civil War, Chief Justice
Taney ruled the action unconstitutional. Ex parte Merryman, 17 Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md.
1861) (No. 9,487). Lincoln later obtained authorization to suspend the privilege from Con-
gress. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETA-
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ity to suspend the writ was universally understood as resting exclu-
sively with the legislative branch.
3. The Rejection of an Absolute Veto
One of the colonists' principal grievances with the crown was the
absolute veto which the king and his American governors could exer-
cise over colonial legislation. 9 The abuse of the absolute veto was so
deeply felt that it constituted the basis for the first article of the Decla-
ration of Independence: "He [the king] has refused his assent to laws
most wholesome and necessary for the public good." When the colo-
nies broke with England and created new governments, most of them
gave the Executive no veto power whatsoever.4 °
The Framers of the Federal Constitution were equally opposed to
giving the President an absolute veto. Attempts to confer such a
power were repeatedly rejected. A motion by James Wilson to that
effect was unanimously defeated by the Committee of the Whole on
June 4, 1787.4 ' Two weeks later, the delegates declined to take up
Alexander Hamilton's plan for an Executive who would possess an
absolute veto.42 And on August 7, the Convention, by a vote of 9 to 1,
rejected a similar motion offered by George Read.43
Even the qualified veto generated doubt and concern. It is telling
that in one of its final acts, the Convention made it easier to override a
presidential veto by reducing from 3/4 to 2/3 the majority needed for
Congress to pass a law over the President's objection." The change
was prompted by fears that a 3/4 requirement "put too much in the
TION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 364-65 (1973); ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED
A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 410-14
(5th ed. 1976). But see Paulsen, supra note 8, at 91-95 (stating that Lincoln's view that the
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus inheres in the Executive "was at least an argua-
ble one," especially if Congress is not in session).
39. EDWARD C. MASON, THE VETo POWER 17-18 (Boston, Ginn 1890); Richard A.
Watson, Origins and Early Development of the Veto Power, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 401,
404 (1987).
40. There were three exceptions. The 1776 South Carolina Constitution gave the gov-
ernor an absolute veto but this proved so unpopular that the veto was abolished two years
later. New York's constitution of 1777 gave a qualified veto to the Council of Revision
composed of the governor, the chancellor, and judges of the Supreme Court. Massachu-
setts's constitution of 1780 gave the Executive a qualified veto. Watson, supra note 39, at
401, 404-05; ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO: ToucHsTONE OF THE AMERI-
CAN PRESIDENCY 8-10 (1988).
41. 1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 98-103.
42. Id. at 292.
43. 2 id. at 200.
44. Id. at 585-87 (Sept. 12, 1787).
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power of the President. ' 45 This decision to ease the override require-
ment would have been pointless if the President had an independent
power to suspend a law anytime he wished.
The Convention in fact rejected a proposal to give the President a
temporary suspending power. On June 4, 1787, after defeating a mo-
tion to grant the President an "absolute negative," the Convention
took up Pierce Butler's motion that a pending resolution providing for
a qualified negative "be altered so as to read-'Resolved that the Na-
tional Executive have a power to suspend any legislative act for the
term of ' The only recorded debate on this motion was El-
bridge Gerry's objection that "a power of suspending might do all the
mischief dreaded from the negative of useful laws; without answering
the salutary purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones." "On the
question 'for giving this suspending power' all the States ... were-
no. ' 46 The states then voted 8-2 to give the President merely a quali-
fied veto.47
That no one ever proposed giving the President a suspending
power in addition to a qualified veto is hardly surprising. As the
Framers well knew, the prerogative of suspending the laws was func-
tionally equivalent to an absolute veto.48 Nor was the suspending
power any less dangerous because it might be used to nullify a law
only temporarily, for the decision as to the length of a suspension
would rest exclusively with the king. Indeed, as we saw earlier, Eng-
lish kings frequently preferred the suspending power to the absolute
veto because it allowed them to obtain funds from Parliament and to
then ignore the statutory promises on which the grant of funds had
been conditioned.
Nor is the case for a presidential suspending power any stronger
if it is confined to laws that are alleged to be unconstitutional. The
veto power that the Framers were willing to confer in only qualified
form was principally designed as a safeguard against unconstitutional
legislation. As Gerry noted at the Convention, "The primary object
45. Id. at 585 (Mr. Williamson); see also id. at 586 (Mr. Pinkney).
46. 1 id. at 103-04 (emphasis in original).
47. Id. at 104.
48. The former was viewed by the crown as executive in nature while the latter is
deemed part of the lawmaking process. See Charles J. Zinn, The Veto Power of the Presi-
dent, 12 F.R.D. 207, 214-15 (1952). Yet both have the immediate effect of blocking meas-
ures approved by the legislature. There is this difference between the suspending power
and an absolute veto: under the former, a President may later choose to honor the law,
while a successfully vetoed bill can never be revived. There is no evidence that the Foun-
ders were impressed by this distinction, for at least in the short run (and probably forever)
the suspending power is just as devastating as an absolute veto.
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of the revisionary check in the President is not to protect the general
interest, but to defend his own department."49 According to Madison,
"the object of the revisionary power is [first] to defend the Executive
Rights[.] "I' In Federalist No. 73, Hamilton explained that "[t]he pri-
mary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Exec-
utive, is to enable him to defend himself .... ,1 To augment the veto
with a power to suspend laws that the President thinks are unconstitu-
tional would render the veto superfluous in the very class of cases for
which it was chiefly designed.
By giving the President a qualified rather than an absolute veto,
the Framers envisioned that there might be occasions when a Presi-
dent's constitutional objections would be overridden by Congress. In
such cases the President is bound to honor and enforce the law despite
his constitutional misgivings. As Professor Westel W. Willoughby
wrote in 1929:
That there is danger that Congress may by a chance majority, or
through the influence of sudden great passion, legislate unwisely
or unconstitutionally, was foreseen by those who framed our
form of government, and the provision was drawn that the Presi-
dent might at his discretion use a veto, but this was the entire
extent to which he was allowed to go in the exercise of a check
upon the legislation. It was expressly provided that if, after his
veto, two-thirds of the legislature should again demand that the
measure become a law, it should thus be, notwithstanding the
objection of the Chief Executive. Surely there is here left no
further constitutional right on the part of the President to hinder
the operation of a law.
Some delegates at the Philadelphia Convention wished to grant
the President an absolute veto, but their views were overwhelmingly
rejected. James Wilson had urged that "[t]he Executive ought to have
an absolute negative. Without such a Self-defence the Legislature can
at any moment sink it into nonexistence. 53 Wilson's motion to this
effect was unanimously defeated. 4 A similar motion by George Read
won support only from Delaware. 5 Yet Wilson continued to press his
views when the Constitution was presented to the Pennsylvania ratify-
49. 2 Farrand, supra note 24, at 586.
50. Id. at 587.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443, 445 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
New American Library 1961); see also SPrrZER, supra note 40, at 17.
52. 3 WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1503-04 (2d ed. 1929).
53. 1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 98.
54. Id.
55. 2 Farrand, supra note 24, at 200.
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ing convention. Addressing that body on December 1, 1787, he con-
tended that the President had the same right as the Judiciary to reject
unconstitutional laws.
[I]t is possible that the legislature, when acting in that capacity,
may transgress the bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass, in
the usual mode, notwithstanding that transgression; but when it
comes to be discussed before the judges,-when they consider
its principles, and find it to be incompatible with the superior
power of the Constitution,-it is their duty to pronounce it void
.... In the same manner, the President of the United States
could shield himself, and refuse to carry into effect an act that
violates the Constitution.
5 6
This is the only suggestion to be found in the debates of the Federal
Convention or the state ratifying conventions to support the proposi-
tion that a President possesses an absolute veto over measures that he
believes to be unconstitutional.
Alexander Hamilton had seconded Wilson's motion to confer an
absolute veto on the President.57 Yet, in contrast to Wilson, Hamilton
acquiesced in the Convention's decision to deny the President a power
to completely block measures approved by the Congress. Writing in
Federalist No. 78, Hamilton noted that once a measure had become
law, the Judiciary is the only branch that can decline to enforce it on
constitutional grounds.
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I
understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to
the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass
no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limita-
tions of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than
through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitu-
tion void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights
or privileges would amount to nothing.
58
Conspicuously absent was any suggestion that the President might re-
fuse to honor such laws, even though all of Hamilton's examples in-
volve criminal statutes uniquely suited to executive inaction.
While James Madison appears to have agreed with Wilson in
principle, he opposed giving the President an absolute veto. Madison
56. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 24, at 446. Wilson later repeated this view in his Lectures on
Law, first published in 1804. See 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 186,300 (Robert G. McClos-
key ed., 1967).
57. 1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 94, 98.
58. Tm FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., New
American Library 1961) (emphasis added).
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believed that, ideally, each branch of government should possess the
ultimate authority to resolve constitutional questions regarding its
own sphere of action, so long as rights of the states or individuals were
not threatened. 9 This might allow the President to disregard a law
that he thought encroached on the executive domain; and the Presi-
dent, not the courts, would have the last word on this constitutional
issue. Though Madison later accepted the principle of judicial
supremacy, 60 at the time the Constitution was being framed he "de-
nied the right of the courts to overrule another department's interpre-
tation of the extent of its constitutional powers.' This meant that
the President would in effect enjoy an absolute veto over many laws
that he believed to be constitutionally objectionable.
Given these views, one might expect Madison to have favored
giving the President an absolute veto in cases where the Chief Execu-
tive's opposition to the law was constitutionally based. Instead,
Madison objected to Wilson's proposal for an absolute veto, believing
that the public would not stand for it. "To give such a prerogative
would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this country; its present
temper at least."'62
Madison might have pressed for a compromise under which con-
stitutionally based vetoes would receive greater protection than those
resting solely on policy grounds. He outlined such a scheme to
Thomas Jefferson, a year after the Federal Convention had adjourned,
as part of a proposed constitution for Kentucky.63 A comparable pro-
vision in the Federal Constitution would have meant that policy-based
vetoes could, as now, immediately be overridden by the House and
Senate.6 4 But if a veto rested on constitutional grounds, the measure
59. EDWARD M. BURNS, JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 157-
61 (1973) (quoting from undated manuscript in Madison's papers).
60. Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 11 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 281, 284-85 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977); Letter
from James Madison to Mr. - , (1834), in 4 LETTERS AND OThER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 349-50 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).
61. BuRNs, supra note 59, at 161.
62. 1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 100.
63. Madison proposed giving the Executive and the Judiciary a qualified veto over
bills passed by the Assembly; but if either branch rested its veto on constitutional grounds,
the law would be suspended until after a new election of the Assembly had occurred; only
then could the Assembly vote to override the veto. Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a
Constitution for Virginia (with reference to its applicability to the District of Kentucky), in
11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 60, at 281, 292-93.
64. Max Farrand mistakenly asserted that Madison's proposed veto provision for the
Kentucky Constitution "[was] identical with the one made in the Federal Convention, on
August 15, which was voted down .. " 4 Farrand, supra note 24, at 81 n.2a. Madison's
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could not become law until both Houses of a newly-elected Congress
had repassed it by the requisite majorities. Such a provision would
have given the Executive a temporary suspending power over bills the
President found constitutionally objectionable.
Instead, the Framers chose not to give special protection to con-
stitutionally based vetoes. Rather than being able to suspend alleg-
edly unconstitutional measures, the President's sole option is to veto
such a bill and hope that Congress will sustain him. If the veto is
overridden the law must be enforced.
4. The Executive Power
In light of the Framers' unbending opposition to an absolute veto
and their concern that even a qualified veto might "put too much in
the power of the President,"'65 it is virtually inconceivable that they
intended the "executive power" conferred by Article II to encompass
a prerogative of suspending the laws. To so construe the executive
power would effectively render Article I's qualification of the veto
meaningless. Such a reading assumes that none of the delegates to the
Federal Convention realized the absurdity of their decision to deny
the President an absolute veto, and that a similar blindness afflicted
the state ratifying conventions. If a suspending power indeed lurked
in the shadows of Article II, it went undetected by all of the federal
and state delegates except James Wilson, whose lone sighting may
have been a case of wishful thinking.
The Framers' conception of the executive power was heavily in-
fluenced by the authority belonging to a constitutional English mon-
arch-one whose prerogatives had been successively curtailed over
the centuries by the Magna Charta (1215), the Petition of Right
(1628), and the Bill of Rights (1689). For 18th century America, this
was a natural starting point and one which Thomas Jefferson explicitly
adopted in his 1776 draft of a constitution for the state of Virginia.
Article II of that proposed constitution described the "executive pow-
ers" as embracing "the powers formerly held by the king save only
that... he shall not possess" certain enumerated "prerogatives" and
powers.6 Since Virginians wished to deny their governor a power to
August 15th motion did not provide that only a newly-elected Congress could override a
veto, nor did it treat constitutionally based vetoes differently than those resting on policy
grounds. See 2 Farrand, supra note 24, at 294-95, 298.
65. 2 Farrand, supra note 24, at 585.
66. Draft of Virginia Constitution, in THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 329, 342, 350 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950); THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 340-41
(Library of America ed., 1984).
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veto bills passed by the assembly, Jefferson had to expressly exclude
this power, for it was a prerogative still wielded by the English king.67
The power to suspend laws, on the other hand, was not among Jeffer-
son's exclusions, for this prerogative had been stripped from the
crown by the Bill of Rights of 1689.68
The authors of the Federal Constitution designed the presidency
against a similar backdrop. When the Convention first took up the
question of the Executive, Charles Pinkney voiced fear that the Presi-
dent would become "a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towit an elective
one." 69 James Wilson agreed, stating that "[h]e did not consider the
Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the
Executive powers." As Wilson noted, "Some of these prerogatives ex-
ercised were of a Legislative nature" and thus properly belonged to
Congress. "The only powers he conceived strictly Executive were
,,70those of executing the laws, and appointing officers ....
Because it was critical to the Framers that the American Execu-
tive not replicate the English Crown, they were careful to specify
those respects in which the President's authority was to vary from the
British model. Thus, when Hamilton discussed the presidency in The
Federalist No. 69, he proceeded by comparing each of the President's
powers with those of "the king of Great Britain," identifying some
areas where the President exercised similar authority, and others
67. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton); Edmund Burke's letter to the
Sheriffs of Bristol (1777), in 2 Kurland & Lerner, supra note 68, at 389 ("The king's nega-
tive to bills is one of the most indisputed of the royal prerogatives .... ).
68. That the drafters of the 1776 Virginia Constitution did not intend this omission to
be construed as giving the governor a suspending power is made clear by the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, §7 of which expressly denied the Executive "all power of suspending
laws." Virginia Constitution (July 5, 1776), in 1 DocUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN
RirI-Ts: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION 205 (Zechariah Chafee, Jr., ed., 1963) [here-
inafter Chafeel. In final form, the 1776 Virginia Constitution abandoned Jefferson's de-
scription of the executive power in favor of language drafted by George Mason. Yet the
governor's authority was still defined by reference to the English king. Instead of provid-
ing that the governor would possess all royal powers not expressly withheld, the constitu-
tion declared that the governor "shall not, under any pretence, exercise any power or
prerogative by virtue of any Law, statute, or Custom, of England'"-with the exception of a
limited power to grant pardons and reprieves. Virginia Constitution, as adopted, in 1 PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 66, at 380.
69. 1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 65. See also Berg, supra note 24, at 90 (noting that in
the Convention, "the Crown and its powers were a constant point of reference" during the
debates concerning the Executive).
70. 1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 65-66. This statement appears inconsistent with Wil-
son's later remark in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention to the effect that the President
has the prerogative of refusing to enforce unconstitutional laws. See 2 ELLIOT, supra note
24, at 445-46.
where the Chief Executive's powers were inferior.71 In most of Ham-
ilton's examples the Constitution restricted the President's authority
vis-a-vis that of his 18th century English counterpart. Many surviving
royal prerogatives were expressly withheld or significantly narrowed,
among them the king's authority to confer titles of nobility; the abso-
lute veto; the ability to make treaties and appointments without the
consent of the legislature; and the power to declare war.72 In no in-
stance was the President deemed to possess greater powers than those
belonging to George III. 71 Bernard Schwartz was thus surely correct
when he wrote:
The Framers of the American Constitution were familiar both
with the repudiation of the Stuart claims to absolute prerogative
and the more limited prerogative which was conceded in the
Crown after the Act of Settlement. It must be presumed that, in
their large outlines at least, the conclusions reached in the Eng-
lish experience were incorporated by them in the organic docu-
ment . . . . Certainly, it was the furthest thing from their
intentions to fashion the Executive which they were creating in
accordance with the claim for which Charles I lost his life and
James II his throne.74
Given the Framers' use of Britain as a model, where the text of
the Constitution is silent as to the scope of "the executive power," we
may seek guidance from those powers still possessed by a late 18th
century English monarch. If we do this concerning the suspending
power, the issue is quickly resolved. For, as Professor Stimson
observed,
The long attempt of the Executive to make laws by orders in
Council or by proclamation, or indirectly by suspending laws al-
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
72. See Gwyn, supra note 29, at 480.
73. Richard Pious has suggested that in Federalist No. 69, Hamilton deliberately mag-
nified the powers of the British Monarch in order to make those of the President appear
modest, and that Hamilton and others who lost the Convention battle for a stronger presi-
dency hoped that in time the vaguely worded "executive power" would expand to royal
proportions. RICHARD M. Pious, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 36-40 (1979). Yet despite
Hamilton's preference for an "elective king," there is no indication that he wished the
President's authority to be greater than that of a constitutional English Monarch, in which
case the Executive would still not possess a power to suspend the laws.
74. 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, PART I: THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 57 (1963); see Henry P. Monaghan, The
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1993) ("[E]ven advocates
of a strong American Chief Executive distanced themselves from the Crown as an accepta-
ble conception of executive authority."). See also STIMSON, supra note 26, at 54 ("Hamil-
ton and others" probably intended the "executive power ... to be given to the president in
much the shape that it was enjoyed by a constitutional English king . . . .") (emphasis
added).
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ready existing, may be traced through the history of the middle
centuries until they ended in the Bill of Rights. It is now an
established constitutional principle that the Executive can
neither suspend a law nor suspend a penalty nor even pardon an
offence in anticipation of trial.7 5
This was also the conclusion reached by the United States Circuit
Court in United States v. Smith,76 an 1806 decision written by Supreme
Court Justice William Paterson. The case involved a prosecution
under the Neutrality Act in which defendants claimed that their con-
duct had been authorized by President Jefferson. In an effort to prove
this, they subpoenaed Secretary of State Madison and several other
Cabinet members. When none of them appeared, the defendants
sought to postpone the trial until the secretaries were made avail-
able.7 7 The court denied the motion on the ground that the President
cannot suspend or dispense with the laws. Even if Jefferson had ap-
proved defendants' conduct, this would not have constituted a defense
to the crime.
Justice Paterson had been a prominent member of the Federal
Convention as a delegate from New Jersey.7' In his opinion for the
circuit court, he noted that the law under which defendants were
charged
imparts no dispensing power to the president. Does the consti-
tution give it? Far from it, for it explicitly directs that he shall
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed."... True, a nolle
prosequi may be entered, a pardon may be granted; but these
presume criminality, presume guilt, presume amenability to ju-
dicial investigation and punishment, which are very different
from a power to dispense with the law.79
In short, said Paterson,
The president of the United States cannot control the statute,
nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he authorize a
person to do what the law forbids. If he could, it would render
the execution of the laws dependent on his will and pleasure;
which is a doctrine that has not been set up, and will not meet
with any supporters in our government."0
75. STIMSON, supra note 26, at 48, 52-53.
76. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
77. See generally Reinstein, supra note 29, at 309.
78. On Paterson's role in the making of the Constitution, see MAx FARRAND, THE
FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrrED STATES 18-19, 200 (1913); Reinstein,
supra note 29, at 325-26 n.70.
79. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1229-30.
80. Id. at 1230.
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The decision in Smith accurately reflected the thinking of the
times. Under the plan created by the Framers, the President was
given other ways to deal with allegedly unconstitutional laws short of
refusing to honor them.
C. The Suspending Power and the Bill of Rights
If the Framers were opposed to giving the President authority to
suspend the laws, one may wonder why they failed to include a prohi-
bition against this power in the Bill of Rights of 1791. Many of the
states, in writing new constitutions after the break with England, cop-
ied the English Bill of Rights by expressly denying the Executive a
power to suspend the laws.81 The Virginia Declaration of Rights of
1776 was typical; it provided: "[t]hat all power of suspending laws, or
the execution of laws, by any authority without consent of the repre-
sentatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to
be exercised. '8 2 Why was no comparable provision placed in the Fed-
eral Bill of Rights? The answer appears to be that not even the most
ardent Antifederalists feared that the Constitution of 1787 had given
the President a power to suspend the laws. As a result, while many of
the other state bill of rights provisions found their way into the Fed-
eral Constitution, a proscription of the suspending power was not
among them.
The various state ratifying conventions proposed more than 200
amendments to the Federal Constitution. These included proposals
from Virginia and North Carolina to expressly deny the President au-
thority to suspend a law.83 In June 1788, the Virginia ratifying conven-
81. See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 7 (1776), reprinted in 1 Chafee, supra note 68,
at 205; DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 7 (1776), reprinted in 1 Chafee, supra note 68, at
206, 208; MD. CONST. § VII, reprinted in 1 Chafee, supra note 68, at 210-11; N.C. CONST.
§ V (1776), reprinted in 1 Chafee, supra note 68, at 216; MASS. BILL OF RIGHTs, pt. I, art.
XX (1780), reprinted in 1 Chafee, supra note 68, at 237, 241; N.H. CONST. § XXIX (1784),
reprinted in 1 Chafee, supra note 68, at 223; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. XVII (1786), reprinted in
9 SOURCES AND DocumENTs OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUIONs 499 (William F. Swindler
ed., 1979); PA. CONST. ART. IX, § XII (1790), reprinted in 1 Chafee, supra note 68, at 225,
229. As of 1908, twenty state constitutions still provided that laws may be suspended only
by the legislature or by authority derived from it. STIMSON, supra note 26, at 291-92.
82. 1 Chafee, supra note 68, at 205.
83. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 164
(1957). In Maryland, a similar provision was proposed but never approved by the ratifica-
tion convention. CONTEXTS OF THE' BILL OF RIGHTS 73, 129 (Stephen L. Schechter &
Richard B. Bernstein eds., 1990); Gregory A. Stiverson, "To Maintain Inviolate Our Liber-
ties": Maryland and the Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: COLONIAL
AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 370,391-94 (Patrick T. Conley &
John P. Kaminski eds., 1992).
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tion recommended that the Constitution be amended to add a Bill of
Rights closely modelled after its Declaration of Rights.8 A short time
later, the North Carolina ratifying convention "adopted, word for
word, the Virginia amendments," including the ban on the suspending
power.85
The Virginia and North Carolina conventions appear to have in-
cluded the suspending power ban only as a formal recitation of Vir-
ginia's Declaration of Rights. After listing virtually all of the rights
contained in the Virginia Declaration, both conventions proposed 20
specific amendments to the body of the Federal Constitution. 6
Thomas Jefferson later wrote that the Virginia delegates had annexed
the state's Bill of Rights to their ratification, "not by way of Condi-
tion, but to announce their attachment to them."'  This perhaps ex-
plains the curious fact that in the Virginia debates, not a single
delegate expressed a belief that the Constitution had given the Presi-
dent a suspending power. No one in the Virginia proceedings de-
fended the need for the ban, and the only delegates who addressed the
matter urged that the provision was unnecessary. In North Carolina
the ban on the suspending power was not discussed at all.
Several Virginia delegates urged that there was no need for a fed-
eral bill of rights or for a specific ban against the suspending power.
The Constitution gave the national government only certain enumer-
ated powers, in contrast to England and Virginia whose governments
possessed all powers not expressly withheld. As George Nicholas ex-
plained, "In England, in all disputes between the king and people, re-
currence is had to the enumerated rights of the people, to determine.
Are the rights in dispute secured? Are they included in Magna
Charta, Bill of Rights, &c.? If not, they are, generally speaking,
within the king's prerogative."88 The same was true under the Vir-
ginia Constitution, for "all powers were given to the government with-
out any exception."89 In such cases, a bill of rights is essential to
placing limits on the authority of government. By contrast, said
Nicholas, at the federal level, "the reverse of the proposition holds. Is
the disputed right enumerated? If not, Congress cannot meddle with
84. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 24, at 657-63.
85. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 24, at 226, 243, 251.
86. See DUMBAULD, supra note 83, at 21, 182-85.
87. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Sept. 20, 1788), in 13 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 619 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1956).
88. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 24, at 246.
89. Id. at 450.
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it."90 In this sense, he continued, the "Constitution itself contains an
English Bill of Rights .... The English Declaration of Rights provides
that no laws shall be suspended. The Constitution provides that no
laws shall be suspended, except one, and that in time of rebellion or
invasion, which is the writ of habeas corpus." 91 While Nicholas did
not specify which branch possessed this limited suspending power,
what is important is his unchallenged assumption that the President
had not been given a general authority to suspend the laws.
John Marshall agreed with Nicholas that the Constitution had not
conferred on the President a power to suspend the laws. In defending
the creation of a federal judiciary, the future Chief Justice anticipated
the decision he would write for the Supreme Court in Marbury v.
Madison92 fifteen years later. Marshall noted that the federal courts
would offer protection should Congress exceed its powers under the
Constitution. "If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the
powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an in-
fringement of the Constitution which they are to guard .... They
would declare it void."'93 Moreover, he said, the federal judiciary is
the only branch that can provide relief in these instances. "To what
quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the Con-
stitution, if you will not give the power to the judiciary? There is no
other body that can afford such a protection."'94 Marshall thus rejected
the idea that the President had authority to prevent the enforcement
of an unconstitutional law.
Despite the objections of Nicholas and Marshall, the suspending
power ban remained part of Virginia's proposed federal bill of rights.
In its closing hours, the Virginia convention enjoined the state's dele-
gation "to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable and legal
methods" to secure adoption of the proposed amendments. 95 Yet the
suspending power provision was one of the few which Virginia's Rep-
resentatives and Senators did not press for when the first Congress
convened in 1789.
The Virginia amendments were of special importance to James
Madison. Not only had he been a member of the Virginia ratifying
convention, but his election to the House of Representatives was due
in large part to his campaign promise to support Virginia's proposed
90. Id. at 246.
91. Id.
92. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
93. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 24, at 553.
94. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 661.
Summer 19941
888 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.21:865
amendments to the Constitiition. 6 In June 1789, Madison fulfilled
this promise by offering Congress a set of proposed amendments that
included many of the changes recommended by his state. However,
Madison excluded "the political generalities set forth in the first seven
articles, and in the Tenth and Twelfth. ' 97 The omission of the sus-
pending power ban strengthens the conclusion that Virginia's ratifying
convention did not really believe the President had been given a sus-
pending power. The ban had been offered as a mere formality. 8
This conclusion draws further support from the conduct of Vir-
ginia's Senators after a proposed federal Bill of Rights had emerged
from the House. According to a contemporary observer, it was "the
Virginians who have been the great movers in amendments."9 9 The
state's Senators, William Grayson and Richard Henry Lee, sought to
add to the amendments approved by the House virtually all of the
Virginia convention recommendations Madison had left out.'00 Yet
they chose to abandon Articles VI and VII, both of which had been
copied from the Virginia Bill of Rights. Article VI declared that the
election of legislators should be free and frequent, that men with suffi-
cient attachment to the community should enjoy the right to vote, and
that there should be no taxation or legislation without representa-
tion.1 1 These political principles were honored by Article I of the
Constitution and were thus superfluous in the federal context. It
seems plausible that Article VII, the suspending power ban, was
96. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Mann Randolph (Jan. 13, 1789), in 12
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 60, at 415-17; 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra note 60, at 301-04; JuLiUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF TE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 425-26 (1971); Kenneth R.
Bowling, "A Tub to the Whale". The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS
AND THE STATES: COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES,
supra note 83, at 46, 48-49.
97. DUMBAULD, supra note 83; at 23.
98. Besides recommending a bill of fights of twenty articles, the Virginia convention
proposed twenty other amendments of which Madison accepted only five. DUMBAULD,
supra note 83, at 47 n.14. All but two of the 40 Virginia recommendations were either
included by Madison or proposed as additional amendments by Virginia's two Senators.
99. Letter from Rep. Benjamin Goodhue to Samuel Phillips (Sept. 13, 1789); in CRE-
ATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 294 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
100. DUMBAULD, supra note 83, at 47 & n.14; Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Pat-
rick Henry (Sept. 14,1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY REc-
ORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 99, at 295-96; Letter from Richard
Henry Lee and William Grayson to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Sept.
28, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY REcoRD FROM THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 99, at 299-300 & n.1.
101. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 24, at 658.
dropped for the same reason. 12 There was simply no perceived need
to bar the President from exercising a suspending power in a Constitu-
tion which granted him only a qualified veto, and which enjoined him
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
In short, the failure of the first Congress to include a prohibition
against the suspending power in the Federal Bill of Rights did not
reflect a belief that such authority rightfully belonged to the President.
Instead, it appears that there was a widespread understanding that the
Constitution had not given the Chief Executive a suspending power of
any kind, and that it was therefore unnecessary "to provide against
the exercise of a power which did not exist."'103
D. The Constitution as Higher Law
Some have nevertheless contended that the President's Article II
duty to execute "the Laws" is qualified by the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI, which provides that only those statutes "made in Pursu-
ance of" the Constitution are "the supreme Law of the Land." A con-
gressional enactment that conflicts with the Constitution is not a
"law," and the President is not obliged-or indeed even permitted-
to execute it.1°4 The argument builds on Marbury v. Madison, where
the Supreme Court held that the federal judiciary may not enforce
those laws which it determines to be violative of the Constitution.
What is good for the Court is good for the President. As Judge Frank
Easterbrook summarized the argument, the lesson of Marbury "was
essentially: 'Every man for himself.' Each official owes the same duty
to the hierarchy and must make his own decision."' 0 Accordingly,
102. While it is theoretically possible that Article VII was dropped because the found-
ing generation secretly wished to give the President a suspending power, there is not a
shred of support for this conclusion. In light of all of the other evidence as to the Framers'
intent, it is far more likely that Article VII was deemed to be superfluous in the federal
setting.
103. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 24, at 600.
104. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, ExEcuTnvE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 308
(1974); Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 919-22; Sidak & Smith, supra note 9, at 452. This
position was adopted by the Reagan and Bush administrations to defend their refusal to
enforce laws the President believed to be unconstitutional. See GAO Bid Protest Hearings,
supra note 9, at 318, 329; William P. Barr, Attorney General's Remarks, Benjamin N. Car-
dozo School of Law, November 15, 1992, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 31, 39 (1993); Edwin
Meese, On Separation of Powers: President's Right to Challenge a Law, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 1985, at A26 (letter to editor). This argument is rejected by others. See, e.g., 3 Wn.-
LOUGrIBY, supra note 54 at 1502-04; EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT. OFFICE AND
PowERs 1787-1957 68-72 (Randal W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984); Arthur S. Miller,
The President and Faithfid Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 397-98 (1987).
105. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 920. See also Theodore Olson, Presidential Lawmak-
ing Powers: Vetoes, Line Item Vetoes, Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and Delegations
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the President can't kowtow to Congress' view any more than the
Court will. Especially given the unique presidential oath to the
Constitution in article II, section 1, clause 7: "I do solemnly
swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the
United States and will, to the best of my Ability, preserve, pro-
tect, and defend the Constitution of the United States." Noth-
ing there about executing laws while ignoring the Constitution!
This argument for "presidential review," as Judge Easterbrook
frankly admits, rests on "arid logic."106 But even as a matter of logic,
the claim that a President's obligation to execute the laws is qualified
by the Supremacy Clause encounters a number of difficulties. First,
the clause is addressed to the states, not to federal officials." 7 The
clause was debated solely in the context of ensuring the supremacy of
federal over state law, without any "discussion of the relationship be-
tween the Constitution and national legislation."'0 8 Therefore, even
when coupled with the oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Con-
stitution," the clause gives the President no warrant to ignore acts of
Congress that he thinks are invalid. Moreover, the clause speaks only
to "the Judges," not to executive branch officials. This narrowness of
focus reflects the prevailing hostility to an executive suspending
power, one which many state constitutions of the era outlawed in ex-
press terms. By addressing the Supremacy Clause solely to judges, the
Framers were careful not to give executive officials a pretext for evad-
ing their duty to honor and enforce the laws.' 0 9
Quite apart from its intrinsic difficulties, the argument from logic
is totally divorced from the scheme which the Founders envisioned
of Rulemaking Authority, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 533, 550 (1990). But see, Strauss, supra note 8,
at 121-22 (The oath argument begs the question as "[i]t is perfectly plausible to say that the
Constitution sometimes requires the President to enforce a law that he considers, on bal-
ance, to be unconstitutional. If that is what the Constitution requires, then the oath re-
quires the President to enforce the law-not to defy the law in pursuit of his own
interpretation of the Constitution.").
106. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 922. Judge Easterbrook's argument from logic is
supplemented with "history," but that history primarily involves events occurring well after
the framing of the Constitution. Id. at 914-16.
107. Judge Easterbrook acknowledges this but suggests that "the clause implies a struc-
ture binding every public officer." Id. at 919.
108. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSrITu-rIoN 40-41
(1990). Judge Easterbrook recognizes this difficulty but maintains that "[a]ll officers take
an oath to that heirarchy." Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 919.
109. In addition, the reference to laws "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution was
probably not intended as an invitation to state judges (or anyone else) to overturn federal
laws they thought unconstitutional, but instead meant only that "statutes must carry the
outer indicia of validity lent them by enactment in accordance with the constitutional
forms. If so enacted, a federal statute is constitutional." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: TH¥E SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 9-10 (1962).
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and created. If we were to examine the Constitution without the light
shed by the records of the Federal Convention, without the input of
the state ratifying conventions, and without even a glance at the Brit-
ish history from which the Founders drew inspiration-in short, if we
were to read the Constitution in a vacuum-the logic of Marbury
might suggest that we are to "equate[ ] the President with the judges
in ability and authority to set the Constitution over a statute."110 Yet
this was not the plan adopted by the Convention. The Framers did
not write on a clean slate, but on one which contained the indelible
traces of four hundred years of English constitutional history. In a
case like this, as Holmes once wrote, "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic.""'1
There is little doubt but that the Founders viewed the Constitu-
tion as a paramount law that would trump measures inconsistent with
it." 2 Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist No. 78, explained that
"every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the com-
mission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, there-
fore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. 1" 3 In the same vein,
John Marshall declared for the Court in Marbury that "a law repug-
nant to the constitution is void.'
14
Given this vision of the Constitution as higher law, the Framers
might have created a structure in which the Executive and Judiciary
would each have a right to ignore acts of Congress that they thought
violative of the Constitution. This was not the plan they adopted.
While the Framers repeatedly recognized that the federal courts could
refuse to honor unconstitutional laws," 5 the record is virtually devoid
of evidence suggesting that the President was to enjoy a similar
110. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 922.
111. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
112. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 453-63 (1969);
SNOWlSS, supra note 108, at 13-44.
113. FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., New
American Library 1961).
114. MARBURY v. MADIsoN, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
115. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 109, at 15-16 ("[I]t is as clear as such matters can be
that the Framers of the Constitution specifically, if tacitly, expected that the federal courts
would assume a power.., to pass on the constitutionality of actions of the Congress and
the President .... Moreover, not even a colorable showing of decisive historical evidence
to the contrary can be made."); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 9 (2d ed. 1973) ("The grant of judicial
power was to include the power, where necessary in the decision of cases, to disregard state
or federal statutes found to be unconstitutional. Despite the curiously persisting myth of
usurpation, the Convention's understanding on this point emerges from its records with
singular clarity."); SNowiss, supra note 108, at 38-40.
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power.116 The authority to void acts of Congress on the ground that
they violate the Constitution was not delegated to the executive
branch.117
This understanding is reflected in the Convention debates sur-
rounding the proposed Council of Revision, on which Supreme Court
Justices would have exercised the veto power jointly with the Presi-
dent. Some thought it inappropriate to give the justices two opportu-
nities to reject a law, first as members of the Council, and then in a
judicial role. Elbridge Gerry, for one, expressed "doubts whether the
Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient check
against encroachments on their own department by their exposition of
the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutional-
ity.""'  Luther Martin likewise objected that "as to the Constitution-
ality of laws, that point will come before the Judges in their proper
official character. In this character they have a negative on the laws.
Join them with the Executive in the Revision and they will have a
double negative."" 9 Colonel Mason was untroubled by the fact that
this would give the judges "a double negative," since as judges
[T]hey could impede in one case only, the operation of laws.
They could declare an unconstitutional law void. But with re-
gard to every law however unjust or pernicious, which did not
come plainly under this description, they would be under the
necessity as Judges to give it a free course .... "I
If the delegates had envisioned that the President, too, could dis-
regard laws he thought unconstitutional, the same "double negative"
argument would surely have been raised as to him. However, no one
suggested that in addition to asserting a qualified veto, the President
could block an allegedly unconstitutional law simply by declining to
enforce it. Instead, under the plan of the Convention, the Executive
and the Judiciary were each given one means of checking measures
116. The only evidence supporting such a presidential prerogative is James Wilson's
statement before the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. 2 ELLIOTr, supra note 24, at 445-
46. As noted earlier, Wilson was one of the prime movers at the Philadelphia Convention
to give the President an absolute veto. The view he expressed in the state convention must
be discounted as containing a measure of wishful thinking, particularly in the absence of
supporting evidence from any other delegates to the Federal Convention.
117. See also FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
New American Library 1961) (there is "no other way than through the medium of courts"
to void a law on the ground that it is unconstitutional); 3 ELLiOTr, supra note 24, at 553-54
(John Marshall advises the Virginia Convention that only the courts can declare an act of
Congress to be void).
118. 1 Farrand, supra note 24, at 97.
119. 2 id. at 76.
120. 2 id. at 78.
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that they believe to be unconstitutional: the President, through a qual-
ified veto, may seek to prevent a bill from becoming law; the courts,
by the exercise of judicial review, may refuse to enforce such a law in
deciding cases before them.
12 1
The two branches might have enjoyed parity in terms of their
ability to oppose measures they thought unconstitutional had the
Council of Revision plan been adopted. For if the Judiciary had been
authorized to share the veto power with the President, James Madison
believed that the Convention would then have denied the courts a
second chance to pass on the constitutionality of laws.'
22
The Executive and the Judiciary would also have stood on
roughly equal footing had the President been given an absolute veto.
Each department would then have had an unqualified right to block
measures they thought unconstitutional: the President by preventing a
bill from becoming law, the judges by refusing to honor the law. By
opting instead to give the President only a qualified veto, while recog-
nizing the courts' power to disregard unconstitutional laws, the Fram-
ers deliberately created a scheme in which the federal judiciary was to
play a unique and in some ways superior role in the process of consti-
tutional review. This disparity reflected the Framers' unwillingness to
confer on the President the equivalent of a royal suspending power
which had been stripped from the kings of England a century before.
E. The Framers' Conception: A Summary
The argument that a President may refuse to enforce laws he be-
lieves to be unconstitutional is but a reincarnation of the claimed royal
prerogative of suspending the laws which was abolished in England by
the Bill of Rights of 1689. While the American Constitution does not
expressly deny such authority to the President, a fair reading of that
document, the history that preceded it, and the debates surrounding
its adoption makes clear that the Framers did not intend to confer
such a power on the Chief Executive."2 The President's Article II
121. Cf. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 25 (statement of Mark Tushnet
noting that President would have "two or more bites at the apple" if he could invoke the
Constitution in deciding whether to veto a bill, and again in deciding whether to comply
with the statute).
122. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Dec. 27, 1817), in 3 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 60, at 56 (The Council of Revision plan
would have given judges "a qualified negative on Legislative bills. Such a control, re-
stricted to Constitutional points .... would have precluded the question of a judiciary
annulment of Legislative acts." ).
123. That the Constitution denies Presidents the prerogative of suspending the laws
does not necessarily mean the Chief Executive lacks other prerogative powers. The pre-
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duty to insure that the laws are "faithfully executed," the assumption
implicit in Article I, section 9 that the suspending power belongs to
Congress, the grant to the President of a qualified rather than an abso-
lute veto, the Framers' concept of "the executive power," and the fail-
ure of even the staunchest Antifederalists to press for a ban against
the suspending power in the Bill of Rights-all point to one verdict:
the Constitution does not give the President a suspending power, not
even where the Chief Executive may think that a particular law is
unconstitutional.2 4
The Constitution arguably allows the Executive to ignore an al-
legedly invalid law under very limited conditions. While the Framers
anticipated that a veto based on constitutional grounds might be over-
ridden, they may also have expected that such constitutional disagree-
ments between Congress and the President would be resolved by the
courts. 125 To the extent this is true, a President would be justified in
disregarding an allegedly unconstitutional law where there would
otherwise be no "case or controversy" through which judicial review
could occur. 2 6 Such presidential action would be distinguishable
from the practices condemned by the Bill of Rights of 1689, for a royal
suspension of the law could not be reviewed by any other body. By
contrast, if a court disagreed with the President and found the statute
to be valid, the Executive would then have to enforce the statute
rogative of vetoing bills, for example, has survived in modified form. On the extent to
which the President possesses other prerogative powers, see Berg, supra note at 24, 416-
527; DANIEL P. FRANKLIN, EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES: THE EXERCISE OF PREROGA-
TIVE POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES 41-70 (1991); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 74, at 56-85; Jules Lobel, Emer-
gency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989).
124. For others who have reached this conclusion, though not always by identical rea-
soning, see 3 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 54 at 1502-04; CORWIN, supra note 104, at 68-72;
Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381 (1986); Rex E. Lee, The
Provinces of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1009, 1012-15 (1987); Miller,
supra note 104, at 396-98; Arthur S. Miller & Jefferey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on
the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST.
L.J. 51, 72 (1979); Memorandum from Raymond J. Calada, Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Library of Congress, to House Comm. on Gov't Operations (Feb. 6, 1985), reprinted
in GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 554-55.
125. But cf JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRO-
cEss: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 266-70,
368-71 (1980) (arguing that the Framers expected "political interplay between the two
branches-rather than judicial intervention-to maintain the proper balance of legislative
and executive power," and that a President's refusal to comply with a law on constitutional
grounds poses a political question"); TuLis, supra note 27, at 43-45 ("The founders urged
that 'line-drawing' among spheres of authority be the product of political conflict among
the branches, not the result of dispassionate legal analysis.").
126. See infra Part III.A.
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under Marbury v. Madison."7 On the other hand, if the court agreed
that the law was unconstitutional, the Judiciary rather than the Execu-
tive would take responsibility for the measure's nonenforcement. In
either case, the President's suspension of the law would be of only
temporary duration.
F. Presidential Invocation of the Constitution
To say that the President may not ignore any law he thinks un-
constitutional is not to render meaningless his obligation to "preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution." Marbury rightly noted "that
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.'
12
Though the President cannot invoke the Constitution as a basis for
refusing to honor and enforce an act of Congress, there are many le-
gitimate ways in which the Constitution may serve as a guide to execu-
tive action.
Presidents have taken the Constitution into account in a variety
of settings unrelated to the adoption and enforcement of laws.
Appointments: In 1793, President Washington withdrew his nomi-
nation of William Paterson for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
upon realizing that the appointment violated Article I, §6. The office
of Associate Justice had been created by Congress while Paterson was
a Senator, and his term had not yet expired. In his message of with-
drawal, Washington stated: "I deem the nomination to have been null
by the Constitution.'
' 29
Pardons: Shortly after taking office, Thomas Jefferson granted
full and unconditional pardons to those convicted under the Alien and
Sedition Acts because he believed that the Acts violated the free
speech provision of the First Amendment. 30
127. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding Supreme Court to be final arbiter as to
meaning of Constitution when there is a conflict between the branches as to its proper
interpretation). See supra note 8; Strauss, supra note 8, at 123-24 (Almost everyone, in-
cluding advocates of executive autonomy in construing the Constitution, "acknowledges
that the executive branch must comply with specific judgments of the Supreme Court (and
even the lower courts)."); see also infra note 666.
128. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
129. Message of Feb. 28, 1793, in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 129 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PA-
PERS]; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 102-03 n.2
(rev. ed. 1937).
130. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in 11 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 43-44 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905); JAMEs M. SMrrs,
FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
268-69 & n.67, 358 n.84 (1956).
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Congressional Resolutions: Presidents have frequently cited the
Constitution in refusing to comply with a resolution of one House of
Congress. George Washington, in March, 1796, decided to ignore a
House resolution requesting documents pertaining to negotiation of
the Jay Treaty, explaining that compliance would infringe upon the
Executive's Article II treaty-making power. 31 President Madison de-
clined, on constitutional grounds, to honor a Senate resolution asking
that he confer with a Senate committee concerning the nomination of
a minister to Sweden. 32
Moreover, even in connection with legislation, a President has a
range of legitimate options for dealing with bills or laws that he be-
lieves are unconstitutional, short of refusing to comply with a statute
on these grounds.
Shaping Legislation: The President can use his enormous prestige
and influence with Congress, including the threat of a veto, to help
ensure that measures he thinks unconstitutional never reach his
desk. 33 John Kennedy successfully lobbied Congress to delete a pro-
vision from a military procurement bill that would have "directed" the
Air Force Secretary to spend "not less than $491 million during Fiscal
Year 1963" on the B-70 bomber. Kennedy, who opposed develop-
ment of the aircraft, argued that such mandatory language infringed
his authority as Commander-in-Chief. As finally approved, the act
"authorized" rather than "directed" expenditure of the sum in
question.3
Vetoes: Numerous presidential vetoes have rested on constitu-
tional grounds. 135 The first veto, issued by George Washington in
1792, rejected a bill apportioning the House of Representatives on the
ground that it did not comply with Article I, section 2.136 James
131. Message of March 30,1796, in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 186-88.
132. Message of July 6, 1813, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 515-16.
133. GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS (1980); PIOUS,
supra note 73, at 176-202.
134. See EDWARD A. KOLODZr, TUE UNCOMMON DEFENSE AND CONGRESS, 1945-
1963, 405-19 (1966); Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 163-65 (1975); see
also infra note 374.
135. See Watson, supra note 39, at 408; CHESTER J. AnTEAU, THm ExEcUTIVE VEro 98
n.1 (1988) (noting that the first ten presidential vetoes were based on constitutional objec-
tions). No attempt has been made here to identify the total number of vetoes that have
been based wholly or in part on constitutional grounds. Part I.A of this Article, infra,
analyzes the constitutionally based vetoes that have been overridden by Congress.
136. Message of April 5,1792, in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 116. The
clauses of Article I, §2 that Washington believed were violated provided that
"[r]epresentatives ... shall be apportioned among the several States which may be in-
cluded within this Union, according to their respective Numbers," and that "ft]he number
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Madison vetoed three public bills-all for constitutional reasons; two
were measures to support churches, 37 while the third involved inter-
nal improvements. 38 Congress has at times responded by passing a
new bill that cures the alleged defect. Twelve days after vetoing an
Army appropriations bill on constitutional grounds, Woodrow Wilson
signed a revised bill from which the offending provision had been
removed. 39
Withholding Signature: Instead of vetoing a bill to which he has
constitutional objections, a President may hold the bill for ten days so
that it becomes law without his signature. He might then issue a state-
ment identifying the constitutional defect that caused him to withhold
his name from the measure. 40
Signing Statements: Presidents have frequently signed bills into
law and issued statements explaining that they viewed portions of the
measure as unconstitutional. The issuance of such signing statements,
though rare in the 19th century, has become a commonplace during
the latter half of this century.
141
Amendment or Repeal: Article II, section 3 of the Constitution
gives a President the power to "recommend... such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient .. .." This authority may be used
to urge the amendment or repeal of laws that the Executive believes
are unconstitutional. Such efforts may be aimed at statutes passed
during a prior administration, 42 or at a law enacted over the Presi-
dent's veto, or which the Executive signed despite his constitutional
of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand .. " U. S. CONST. art.
I, cl. 2.
137. Message of Feb. 21, 1811, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 474-75;
Message of Feb. 28, 1811, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 475.
138. Message of March 3, 1817, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 569-70.
139. See Message of Aug. 17, 1916, in 38 PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 40-42 (Arthur
S. Link ed., 1982); Statement of Aug. 29, 1916, in 38 PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra
at 101-02.
140. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2. Presidents have issued statements explaining why
they were allowing a bill to become law without their signature. See, e.g., Ulysses S. Grant,
Message of Feb. 15, 1871, in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 4076-77. I have
found no case where a President stated that he let a bill become law without his signature
because it was unconstitutional.
141. See infra part II.B.1 and Table 2.
142. A number of Presidents urged Congress to repeal the Tenure of Office Act, ch.
353, 24 Stat. 500 (1887), adopted during Andrew Johnson's administration, arguing that it
unconstitutionally limited the Executive's power to remove federal officers. See, e.g.,
Ulysses S. Grant, Message of Dec. 6, 1869, in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at
3992; Rutherford B. Hayes, Message of Dec. 6, 1880, in 10 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra
note 129, at 4557; Grover Cleveland, Message of March 1, 1886, in 11 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 129, at 4960-68.
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doubts. President Truman, believing that a legislative ban against pay-
ing salaries to two federal employees constituted a bill of attainder in
violation of Article I, section 9, signed the measures into law but sub-
sequently persuaded Congress to drop the ban. 43
Judicial Review: A President who believes that a law is unconsti-
tutional can try to give the Judiciary an opportunity to rule on the
question. If a suit is brought to challenge the measure, the administra-
tion might defend the law but at the same time inform the court that
the President believes it to be invalid.'" The Executive has at times
refused to defend the statute in court and even argued that it is uncon-
stitutional. 45 While some of these options raise difficulties of their
own, all stop short of a President's taking the extreme step of refusing
to enforce the law.
G. Two Constitutions
We have seen that the Framers rejected the notion that a Presi-
dent may refuse to honor those laws that he thinks are unconstitu-
tional. While this was the original understanding, the meaning of the
Constitution is subject to change over time. 46 As the Court observed
143. See Statement of May 12, 1949, in 1949 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNrrED STATES, 250 & n. (1964) [hereinafter PUB. PAPERS].
144. The Nixon administration took this approach with respect to the 1970 Voting
Rights Act Amendments, PUB. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970). Nixon signed the bill but
objected that some of its provisions were unconstitutional. Statement of June 22, 1970, in
1970 PUB. PAPERS 512-513 (1971). When the Act was later challenged, the Solicitor Gen-
eral defended the measure but "conceded that its validity was 'a very close question."' He
also told the Court that both the Justice Department and the President opposed the Act on
constitutional grounds. Fred P. Graham, New Law on Voting Rights at Age 18 Is De-
nounced Before Supreme Court by Lawyers for Foul Strategy, N.Y. Tinms, Oct. 20, 1970, at
25. In light of what Senator Abourezk rightly described as a "lackluster and unenthusias-
tic" defense, 123 CONG. REc. 2974 (1977), it is not surprising that the Court struck down
portions of the Act in, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
145. See Miller & Bowman, supra note 124 (documenting and objecting to practice);
Michael T. Brady, Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92
YALE L.J. 970, 970-84 (1983) (documenting practice); GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra
note 9, at 61-62, 69 (Sanford Levinson suggesting that President may refuse to defend pur-
portedly unconstitutional provisions that are contained in omnibus legislation and that can-
not as a practical matter be vetoed).
146. The role that original intent should play in the process of constitutional interpreta-
tion is the subject of an intense scholarly debate beyond the scope of this Article. For our
purposes it is sufficient to note that virtually all participants in the debate concede that
original intent is an important factor in construing the Constitution. While "originalists"
urge that such intent should ordinarily be dispositive, "non-originalists" argue that it is a
significant but not necessarily controlling consideration. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); Daniel A. Farber,
The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); Richard
S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objec-
Summer 1994] REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 899
in 1819, the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to come,
and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human af-
fairs."'147 Such adaptation may come about either by constitutional
amendment or through the case-by-case process of judicial
interpretation.
Neither of these formal routes has led to any departure from the
original understanding that the President lacks authority to ignore al-
legedly unconstitutional laws. No amendment to this effect has ever
been adopted.148 Nor has the Supreme Court construed the Constitu-
tion to give the President such a power.'4 9 In 1838, the Court in
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes 5 ° concluded that the Postmaster
General had improperly refused to comply with a law requiring that
certain monies be awarded to a postal contractor. While the Postmas-
ter's refusal was not based on constitutional grounds, the Justices cate-
gorically rejected the existence of an executive prerogative to
disregard acts of Congress. "To contend that the obligation imposed
on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to
forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and
entirely inadmissible."'' Recognizing such a power, said the Court,
would be vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has
no countenance for its support in any part of the constitution;
and is asserting a principle which, if carried out in its results to
all cases falling within it, would be clothing the President with a
power entirely to control the legislation of Congress, and para-
lyze the administration of justice.'52
tions and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226 (1988); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of
Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REv. 669 (1991); Law-
rence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1599 (1989).
147. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
148. There have been numerous proposals to amend the Constitution to give the Presi-
dent a qualified item veto; most have applied only to appropriations bills, but some would
have covered bills of any type; none of these has won approval from even one House of
Congress. See SpIrzER, supra note 40, at 126-29; Line-Item Veto: Hearing on S.J. Res. 26,
S.J. Res. 178 and S. 1921 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter Line-Item Veto Hearing]; S. Doc. No.
11, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 236-44 (1961).
149. On a few occasions, after a President refused to comply with an allegedly unconsti-
tutional law, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the law was
valid; in resolving this issue, the Court did not address the threshold question of whether
the President properly refused to comply with the law in the interim. See infra note 652
and accompanying text.
150. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
151. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 613.
152. Id.; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 292 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) ("The President performs his full constitutional duty, if, with the means and instru-
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The modem Supreme Court has reaffirmed this principle in not-
ing that executive branch agencies lack authority to pass on the consti-
tutionality of federal statutes they are charged with enforcing.153 In
Weinberger v. Salfi,1'54 the Court held that the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare could not hear a challenge to the validity of
the Social Security Act, as that "is a matter of constitutional law con-
cededly beyond his competence to decide."' 55 Justice Scalia has as-
serted that "the Executive can decline to prosecute under
unconstitutional statutes,"'56 but the Court has not endorsed his
ments provided by Congress and within the limitations prescribed by it, he uses his best
endeavors to secure the faithful execution of the laws enacted.").
153. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974); Oestereich v. Selective
Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.04, at 74 (1958); see also Continental Air Lines v. Dep't
of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 872
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
154. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
155. 422 U.S. at 767. The dissent agreed on this point. Id. at 794 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Salfi was similar to the position he had
taken earlier while an Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel. In a
1969 memo he wrote: "It is in our view extremely difficult to formulate a constitutional
theory to justify a refusal by the President to comply with a Congressional directive to
spend. It may be argued that the spending of money is inherently an executive function,
but the execution of any law is, by definition, an executive function, and it seems an anom-
alous proposition that because the Executive branch is bound to execute the laws, it is free
to decline to execute them." Hearings on the Executive Impoundment of Appropriated
Funds Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong. 1st Sess. 279, 283 (1971) [hereinafter Impoundment Hearings]. See also U.S.
Government Information Policies and Practices: The Pentagon Papers, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 381 (1971) [hereinafter Pentagon
Papers Hearings] (Rehnquist testifying that President may not unilaterally determine that a
law is unconstitutional except that a President "would have a right to take appropriate
steps to have the law tested.").
156. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The only au-
thority Scalia cited was United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), a case in which Presi-
dent Roosevelt complied with a statute he thought to be unconstitutional. Id. at 305.
While the Court agreed with Roosevelt's constitutional assessment, its opinion in no way
suggested that he might properly have refused to honor the measure. See infra text accom-
panying notes 338-342. Justice Scalia reiterated his view in Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S.
Ct. 2631, 2653 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing
Judge Easterbrook's article (see supra note 8) to suggest that if Congress passes laws that
invade the executive domain the President might have the power "even to disregard them
when they are unconstitutional"). While Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined
Scalia's Freytag concurrence, the quoted statement was a brief aside in an opinion dealing
with the question of whether it violated the Appointments Clause for the Chief Judge of
the Tax Court to name special trial judges to preside over certain tax proceedings. The
case did not involve an executive refusal to comply with the law.
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view.'5 7 No lower federal courts have held that a President may ig-
nore laws he thinks are unconstitutional. Most federal judges who
have addressed the issue have agreed that the Executive is obligated
to enforce such measures.
5 8
Our Constitution thus adheres to the Framers' notion that Presi-
dents can not disregard acts of Congress they believe to be unconstitu-
tional. There may be a difference, however, between the formal or
official Constitution and the actual practices of government. In this
sense we have two Constitutions:' 59 the first, consisting of the text as
construed by the Supreme Court, may at times be little more than a
157. The Court has recognized the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion, a doctrine
which rests on an array of policy considerations that do not include a claimed right to
simply ignore "unconstitutional" laws. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607
(1985) (listing factors on which prosecutorial discretion may hinge); Nader v. Saxbe, 497
F.2d 676, 679-80 & n.19 (D.C.Cir. 1974) (suggesting that prosecutorial discretion does not
include policy of bringing absolutely no prosecutions under a particular law).
158. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1121 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting as
"utterly at odds with the texture and plain language of the Constitution" a claim that "the
President's duty to uphold the Constitution and faithfully execute the laws empowers the
President to interpret the Constitution and disregard laws he deems unconstitutional") (em-
phasis in original), withdrawn in part, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Ameron, Inc.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1986) (dictum) ("This
claim of right for the President to declare statutes unconstitutional and to declare his re-
fusal to exercise them, as distinguished from his undisputed right to veto, criticize, or even
refuse to defend in court, statutes which he regards as unconstitutional, is dubious at
best."); Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1178-79 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that each
executive branch employee is, like the President, required to enforce measures even if they
are thought to be unconstitutional, and cannot "take it upon himself to decide which par-
ticular laws, regulations, and policies are legal or illegal, and to base his official actions
upon that private determination"). But see Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1492
n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, Coffey & Manion, JJ., dissenting) (voicing "doubt" that
executive agencies "lacked the authority to disregard statutes on constitutional grounds");
United States v. Instruments, S.A., Inc., Civ.A. No. 91-1574-LFO, 1993 WL 198842
(D.D.C. May 26, 1993) (mem. and order) (stating that the Justice Department's decision to
file a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the fee-recovery pro-
vision of the Competition in Contracting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c) (1988), rather than pay-
ing defendants their fees and costs, was "nothing more than the Department's good faith
attempt to do its job in subtle and difficult areas of law .... " (id. at *4); while the district
court thus implied that a President might refuse to comply with an allegedly unconstitu-
tional law, the court suggested that there may not in fact have been a failure to comply
with the law here, both because defendants had not pursued their administrative and judi-
cial remedies to secure payment under the Act, and because the Executive's conduct per-
haps reflected a valid interpretation of the statute (id. at *3)).
159. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT. A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 30 (reprint 1956) (1885) ("The Constitution in operation is manifestly a very dif-
ferent thing from the Constitution of the books."); Miller, supra note 104, at 399; Arthur S.
Miller, Pretense and Our Two Constitutions, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 375, 379-82 (1986);
Monaghan, supra note 74, at 1-9.
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"paper description," while the unofficial Constitution more accurately
depicts "living reality.'
160
The unofficial Constitution can serve either of several functions.
In some instances the formal Constitution is silent on a particular
point in that neither the text nor any judicial decisions speak clearly to
it. To fill these gaps, government officials must adopt whatever prac-
tices they deem most appropriate. These informal, interstitial usages
may exist for decades as part of our unofficial Constitution. If the
Supreme Court ultimately sanctions the practice, it will become part
of the formal Constitution. If the Court disapproves it, the practice
will presumably cease. In either case, the informal Constitution will
have served the role of providing an interim set of working principles
until such time as the Court announces a rule to fill the gap in the
official Constitution.
161
On other occasions, the unofficial Constitution serves not to fill
gaps in the formal Constitution but instead plays a revisionary role.
Government officials at the federal or state level may deliberately
adopt a practice that clearly conflicts with the constitutional text or
the Court's interpretation of it, perhaps in hope of persuading the
Court to revise its reading of the formal Constitution. 62
160. WALTER BAGEHOT, Trm ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 1 (2d ed. London, Kegan, Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1872).
161. One example of an interstitial use of the informal Constitution is the legislative
veto. This device, first employed in 1932 as a means of allowing Congress to retain some
degree of control over authority delegated to the executive branch, permitted one or both
Houses of Congress to veto certain actions of executive officials. The formal Constitution
did not expressly address the propriety of the legislative veto. As part of the unofficial
Constitution, such provisions were included in some 200 federal statutes. In 1983, the
Supreme Court ruled that the practice violated the bicameralism and presentment require-
ments of Article I. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). To the extent Congress continues
to pass laws containing legislative veto provisions (see FRANKLIN, supra note 123, at 85-86),
this now involves a revisionary rather than an interstitial use of the informal Constitution.
162. During the New Deal, for example, by sponsoring a series of laws that were incon-
sistent with the Court's previous rulings as to the scope of the federal commerce power, the
Roosevelt administration finally prevailed upon the Justices to make a "switch in time that
saved nine." See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 47-50 (1991). A
more recent example of the informal Constitution serving revisionary ends is the claim of
modem Presidents that they have the power to declare war.. Although Article I, § 8, cl. 11
expressly gives this power to Congress, Presidents since Lyndon Johnson have insisted that
the power to initiate hostilities now belongs to the Chief Executive. See S. REP. No. 797,
90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967); Allan Ides, Congress, Constitutional Responsibility and the War
Power, 17 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 599 (1984). Congress formally contested this presidential
practice by adopting the 1973 War Powers Resolution. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1988). The
Supreme Court has so far declined to resolve the conflict between the official and unoffi-
cial Constitutions concerning the locus of the power to declare war. See infra text accom-
panying notes 523-525.
Part II of this Article explores the unofficial Constitution, deter-
mining from the historical record the extent to which Presidents have
disregarded laws they believe to be unconstitutional. 63 To the extent
that the Supreme Court has endorsed the Framers' conception that
the President has no authority to suspend allegedly unconstitutional
laws, any presidential practice plays a revisionary rather than intersti-
tial role.
164
Whether employed for interstitial or revisionary purposes, the us-
ages that comprise our unofficial Constitution are important. Such
practices are significant in their own right as describing the actual
workings of government. They may also foreshadow the future con-
tent of the formal Constitution to the extent that a particular practice
may be sanctioned by the Court. 65 Yet it is important to note that
while custom and usage have sometimes played a role in giving mean-
ing to the Constitution, this has usually been true in defining the scope
of individual rights rather than in determining the structure of govern-
ment. Thus, while the Court has often looked to tradition to give
meaning to terms like "liberty"'16 6 and "due process,"' 6 it has been
163. The approach followed here, of looking first to the original understanding and
then to historical practice, is similar to that taken by-Professor Henry P. Monaghan in his
recent inquiry into the legitimacy of a claimed executive "law-making" authority. See
Monaghan, supra note 74, at 10 n.41.
164. While the practice of disregarding allegedly unconstitutional laws involves the in-
terstitial use of an informal constitutional means, a specific refusal may play an interstitial
or revisionary role, depending on the nature of the President's objection. For example, a
refusal to comply with the 1973 War Powers Resolution based on the President's claim that
the power to declare war belongs to the President would be revisionary in nature since the
formal Constitution expressly gives this power to Congress. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cI. 11.
On the other hand, a refusal to honor a law requiring Senate approval before a President
could terminate a treaty would serve interstitial ends, for neither the text of the Constitu-
tion nor any Supreme Court decision specifies how treaties must be abrogated. See Gold-
water v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Finally, a President's failure to comply with a law
may involve the use of an informal constitutional practice to protect the formal Constitu-
tion. This would be true where the President refused to enforce a statute which constituted
a bill of attainder, since such legislation is barred by Article I, Section 9.
165. See Miller, supra note 159, at 382 & n.24.
166. Compare Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing a funda-
mental liberty interest in decision to live together as an extended family "because the insti-
tution of the family is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition") with Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding no liberty interest in private homosexual conduct
not protected as a matter of "history and tradition"). See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("We have insisted not merely that the interest
denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental' . . . but also that it be an interest traditionally
protected by our society.").
167. Compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (noting due process guarantee
of right to jury trial in serious criminal cases based on jury's role in the Anglo-American
tradition) with Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (finding due process
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most reluctant to allow custom or usage to upset the original balance
of power between Congress and the President.1
68
H. Presidential Practice, 1789-1981
The task of identifying instances where American Presidents have
refused to comply with allegedly unconstitutional laws is, in theory at
least, fairly straightforward. One first locates those acts of Congress
to which a Chief Executive has made a constitutional objection. As to
each of these measures, one then ascertains whether or not the ob-
jecting President disregarded the law. Yet the simplicity of the under-
taking is deceptive. For unless the White House elected to publicize
its refusal to comply with a statute on constitutional grounds, the Pres-
ident's objection and any ensuing decision to ignore the measure may
be hidden. Thus, the most that one can do is attempt to trace the fate
of those laws to which the Executive has made his constitutional ob-
jections known.
Presidents have registered their constitutional disagreement with
congressional enactments in several different ways. The classic
method, as envisioned by the Framers, is through the veto power. To
invoke this, the Executive returns the bill "with his Objections" to the
House where it originated, which records "the Objections ... on their
Journal"; for the bill to become law, it must then be repassed by a
two-thirds majority of both Houses. 6 9 By examining presidential veto
messages for all vetoes that have been overridden by Congress, we
can isolate those measures which became law over the Executive's
constitutional protest.
A more recent means by which Presidents have voiced their con-
stitutional objection to laws is through signing statements.7 0 As the
not violated when defendant is served while temporarily present in the state, for physical
presence is "[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in
American tradition . ..").
168. See infra notes 543-546 and accompanying text.
169. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. This applies only to regular vetoes. A President is not
constitutionally required to give his reasons for employing a "pocket veto" by which a bill,
sent to the White House less than ten days before Congress adjourns, may be killed by the
President simply by failing to sign it before the adjournment. See SPITZER, supra note 40,
at 115-19 (noting that modem Presidents have generally made a practice of issuing memos
explaining the reason for a pocket veto).
170. See Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential
'Signing Statements', 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 209 (1988); Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer,
Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Ag-
grandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEms. 363 (1987); Brad Waites, Note, Let Me Tell
You What You Mean: An Analysis of Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REv. 755
(1987).
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name implies, these statements are usually issued at the time a Presi-
dent affixes his signature to a bill; however, they may appear days or
even months later.17 1 The record of presidential signing statements is
relatively complete.' 72 By reviewing them, the historian can identify a
second group of statutes with which Presidents have taken constitu-
tional issue.
While veto messages and signing statements offer the best leads
in a search for laws that the Executive has deemed to be unconstitu-
tional, they cannot provide us with an exhaustive list. If a President
objects to a measure that was passed during a prior administration,
neither of these devices is available. In such cases, the Executive's
objection is likely to come to light only if the President announces his
intention not to enforce the measure or urges Congress to repeal it, or
if a lawsuit is filed challenging the administration's refusal to honor
the statute.
This Article examines each of these categories-vetoes, signing
statements, and objections to previously enacted laws-to identify
those statutes which Presidents have opposed on constitutional
grounds. In each case we will then seek to determine the fate of the
measure in question. Of the range of options available to the Execu-
tive, we are interested in how often Presidents from George Washing-
ton through Jimmy Carter took the extreme step of refusing to honor
the law.'73
171. For example, President Roosevelt signed the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation
Act, ch. 218, 57 Stat. 431, on July 12, 1943. TWo months later he issued a statement ob-
jecting to a rider to the bill on the ground that it constituted a bill of attainder in violation
of Article I, § 9 of the Constitution. Statement of Sept. 14, 1943, in 12 PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 385-86 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
172. Signing statements are included in the two major series of presidential papers com-
missioned by Congress. The first series, MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, covers
the period from 1789 through Jan. 4, 1926. The second, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 143, covers President Hoover and every Presi-
dent from Truman to the present. Between them these series offer complete coverage of
all of the Presidents except Coolidge (missing 1926-1929) and Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Some of FDR's signing statements appear in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 171; this collection may not be complete as it appar-
ently does not even contain all of FDR's veto messages. See 9 id. at 127. For Coolidge and
Roosevelt, the Congressional Record provides an additional source of signing statements.
Since 1986, presidential signing statements have appeared in the United States Code Con-
gressional & Administrative News.
173. At this level of the inquiry we again confront a visibility problem, for it may be
difficult to determine whether or not a particular statute or provision was actually carried
out. As Arthur S. Miller noted,
Congress has delegated large chunks of governing power to the public administra-
tion. About four hundred public laws are enacted each year. There is no way, at
least no known way, that either Congress or the judiciary can oversee the imple-
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A. Constitutionally Based Vetoes Overridden by Congress
From 1789 to 1981, American Presidents vetoed a total of 462
public bills. Of this number, only 87-fewer than 20%-became law
over the Executive's objection. 74 Most of the overridden vetoes
rested solely on policy grounds. In 27 instances, however, the Presi-
dent's opposition was at least in part constitutionally based.
Table 1 summarizes these 27 cases, showing the nature of the stat-
ute, the basis for the veto, and whether or not the law was executed by
the President who had unsuccessfully vetoed it. All but six of these
vetoes occurred during the 19th century. The constitutional ground
invoked most often was federalism; i.e., in two-thirds of the cases,
Presidents claimed that Congress had exceeded the scope of its enu-
merated powers. Five vetoes were based on the separation of powers
claim that Congress had invaded the executive domain. The Bill of
Rights played a role in six vetoes, in one case forming the sole basis
for the President's objection.
Table 1
Statutes Enacted Over Presidents' Constitutionally Based Veto
1789-1981
Nature of Bill and Constitutional President's
President Statutory Citation Basis of Veto Responseb
FRANKLIN PIERCE (5) River & Harbor Approp. Federalism Executed
ch. 54, 11 Stat. 24 (1856)
River& HarborApro. Federalism Executed
ch. 55, 11 Stat. 25 
(1856)
River & Harbor Aprop. Federalism Executed
ch. 56, 11 Stat. 25 
(1856)
River & Harbor Approp. Federalism Executed
ch. 121, 11 Stat. 44 (1856)
River & Harbor Approp. Federalism Executed
ch. 126, U Stat. 51 (1856)
ANDREW JOHNSON (14) Civil Rights Act Federalism Executed
ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866)
Freedmen's Bureau Act Federalism; Executed
ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866) Bill of Rights
mentation of the details of the statutes in the United States Code .... In any
event, it requires no documentation (for it is common knowledge) that different
political administrations approach statutes in different ways. Some enforce them
to the hilt; others casually ignore them.
Miller, supra note 104, at 398-99. Yet by reviewing newspaper indices, congressional hear-
ings and reports, presidential papers, and the like, it is surprising how often an answer to
the enforcement question can be found. On only rare occasions was the search in vain.
174. SPrrzER, supra note 40, at 71-75. These figures cover only regular vetoes of public
bills and do not include either pocket vetoes (which Congress has no opportunity to over-
ride), or vetoes of private bills. Vetoes are compiled in U.S. CONGRESS, SENATE LIBRARY,
PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1789-1976 (1978) and in U.S. CONGRESS, SENATE LIBRARY, PRESI-
DENTIAL VETOES, 1977-84, S. PUB. No. 5, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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ANDREW JOHNSON
(continued)
Franchise for Blacks in






Admission of Nebraska Federalism No response
ch. 36, 14 Stat. 391 (1867) required
First Reconstruction Act Federalism; Executed
ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867) Bill of Rights
Tenure of Office Act Separation of Arguably
ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867) Powers Defied
Second Reconstruction Federalism Executed
Act ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867)
Third Reconstruction Act Federalism; Executed
ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14 (1867) Bill of Rights;
Separation of
Powers
Reconstruction Res. No. Federalism Executed
39, 15 Stat. 30 (1867)
Supreme Court Separation of No response
Jurisdiction ch. 34, 15 Stat. Powers required
44 (1868)
Freedmen's Bureau Separation of Executed
ch. 245, 15 Stat. 193 (1868) Powers
Admit Arkansas to Federalism No response
Congress ch. 69, 15 Stat. required
72 (1868)
Admit 6 States to Federalism No response
Congress ch. 70, 15 Stat. required73 (f868)
Electoral College




CHESTER A. ARTHUR River & Harbor Approp. Federalism Executed
ch. 375, 22 Stat. 191 (1882)
GROVER CLEVELAND River & Harbor Approp. Federalism Executed
ch. 314, 29 Stat. 302 (1896)
WILLIAM H. TAFT Webb-Kenyon Act ch. 90, Federalism No occasion
37 Stat. 699 (1913) to respond
WOODROW WILSON National Prohibition Act Federalism Executed
ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919)
HARRY S. TRUMAN (2) Internal Security Act ch. Bill of rights Executed
1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1950)
Immigration & Nationality Bill of Rights; Executed
Act ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 Separation of
(1952) Powers
RICHARD M. NIXON War Powers Resolution Separation of No response
Pub. L. No. 93-148 87 Powers required
Stat. 555 (1973)
GERALD R. FORD Freedom of Information Separation of No occasion
Act Amends., Pub. L. No. Powers to respond
93-502 88 Sta. 1561 (1974) I II
a "Federalism" means that a law exceeds the scope of the national government's powers and/or invades
the province of the states; "Separation of Powers" means that a statute usurps or interferes with the
functions of the Executive or the Judiciary; "Bill of Rights" means that the law violates the rights of
individuals.
b "No response required" means that the law could be carried out without any action on the part of the
Executive; "No occasion to respond" means that the President left office before any opportunity to
honor or enforce the law arose.
On the question most pertinent to this study, in only one of the 27
instances where a constitutional veto was overridden is there evidence
of the President failing to honor the law. That case involved Andrew
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Johnson's alleged defiance of the Tenure of Office Act, a move which
precipitated his impeachment. In none of the remaining 26 instances,
involving 9 different Presidents, did the Chief Executive elect to disre-
gard the statute.
1. Franklin Pierce
The first President to have a constitutionally-based veto overrid-
den by Congress was Franklin Pierce who, in 1856, unsuccessfully op-
posed five river and harbor appropriations bills. 175 Like many other
19th century Presidents, Pierce believed that the expenditure of funds
for so-called internal improvements was unconstitutional, falling
within neither Congress's power to spend for the general welfare176
nor its power to regulate commerce between the states. 77 However,
once the five bills became law, Pierce faithfully executed them by un-
dertaking the authorized improvements as promptly as weather condi-
tions permitted.7 8
2. Andrew Johnson
Andrew Johnson has the distinction of having had more public-
bill vetoes overridden than any other President in history.1 79 Of the
fifteen statutes enacted by Congress over his objection, fourteen were
opposed by Johnson on constitutional grounds. 8 ° Most of these laws
175. Act of July 8, 1856, ch. 54, 11 Stat. 24 (Miss. River at Southwest Pass and Pass L
'Outre); Act of July 8, 1856, ch. 55, 11 Stat. 25 (St. Mary's River, Mich.); Act of July 8,
1856, ch. 56, 11 Stat. 25 (St. Clair Flats, Mich.); Act of Aug. 16, 1856, ch. 121, 11 Stat. 44
(Patapsco River and Port of Baltimore); Act of Aug. 16, 1856, ch. 126, 11 Stat. 51 (Des
Moines Rapids in Miss. River). Pierce's vetoes of these five bills appear in 7 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 2919-21. For Pierce's general position on internal im-
provements, see 7 id. at 2790-804.
176. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. On the 19th century view of internal improvement
appropriations, see MAsON, supra note 39, at 94-106.
178. See S. ExEc. Doc. No. 5, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 340, 345, 365, 367 (1857); S. EXEc.
Doc. No. 11, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 2 at 219, 287-88, 290, 291, 305-06, 356-63, 393-95
(1858).
179. See SPrrznR, supra note 40, at 74.
180. The 14 measures were: (1) Act of April 9, 1866 (1866 Civil Rights Act), ch. 31, 14
Stat. 27; (2) Act of July 16, 1866 (Freedmen's Bureau Act), ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; (3) Act of
Jan. 8, 1867 (elective franchise in D.C.), ch. 6, 14 Stat. 375; (4) Act of Feb. 9, 1867 (admis-
sion of Nebraska), ch. 36, 14 Stat. 391; (5) Act of March 2,1867 (Tenure of Office Act), ch.
154, 14 Stat. 430; (6) Act of March 2, 1867 (First Reconstruction Act), ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428;
8-9; (7) Act of March 23, 1867 (Second Reconstruction Act), ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; (8) Act of
July 19, 1867 (Third Reconstruction Act), ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14; (9) Act of July 19, 1867 (Re-
construction), Res. No. 39, 15 Stat. 30; (10) Act of March 27, 1868 (Judiciary Act), ch. 34,
15 Stat. 44; (11) Act of June 22, 1868 (admission of Arkansas to Congress), ch. 69, 15 Stat.
72; (12) Act of July 25, 1868 (Freedmen's Bureau), ch. 245, 15 Stat. 193; (13) Act of July 20,
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dealt with Reconstruction, a process which Johnson believed fell
within the executive province rather than that of Congress. According
to Johnson, the eleven rebellious states had never left the Union and
were entitled to immediate representation in the House and Senate.
The Republican Congress thought otherwise. Through a series of stat-
utes adopted over Johnson's veto, the former Confederacy was placed
under military rule."8' Many of Johnson's vetoes rested on the prem-
ise that Congress could not constitutionally legislate for the southern
states at a time when their representatives were excluded from the
House and the Senate.1s2
Though Johnson's constitutional opposition to these measures
was deeply felt, 83 he more than once acknowledged that if a veto is
overridden by Congress, the President is bound to enforce the statute
despite his constitutional misgivings.' s With the possible exception of
the Tenure of Office Act, Johnson adhered to this principle. Six of the
14 measures that became law over his constitutionally based veto took
1868 (Electoral College), Res. No. 58, 15 Stat. 257; (14) Act of June 25, 1868 (admission of
six states to Congress), ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73. See 8-9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129,
at 3603-852.
181. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLU-
TION, 1863-1877 (1988); ERIC L. McKrrRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION
(reprint ed. 1988) (1960); KENNETH M. STAMP?, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-
1877 (paper ed. 1965).
182. See, e.g., Message of July 16, 1866, in 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at
3620-24; Message of March 2, 1867, in 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 3696-
3709.
183. McKrrRICK, supra note 181, at 85-93, 108-09.
184. In 1866, several months after the Civil Rights Act had been adopted over his veto,
Johnson explained that since the measure was "now a law of the land," it "will be faithfully
executed so long as it shall remain unrepealed and may not be declared unconstitutional by
courts of competent jurisdiction. ... ." Message of July 16, 1866, in 8 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 129, at 3620, 3622. In 1867, Attorney General Henry Stanbery ap-
peared in the Supreme Court on the President's behalf and explained that while Johnson
had vetoed the Reconstruction Acts as unconstitutional, "when the President did that he
did everything he intended to do in opposition to these laws. From the moment they were
passed over his veto there was but one duty in his estimation resting upon him, and that
was faithfully to carry out and execute these laws." Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 475, 492 (1867). In his State of the Union Message to Congress in 1867, Johnson
discussed the question of how far a President could go "in opposing an unconstitutional act
of Congress ... ." Message of Dec. 3, 1867, in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at
3756, 3766-67. Because a President's defiance of the law could lead to "civil war," he said,
such action is inappropriate when measures "which are peaceable remain open to him or to
his constituents." Id. Johnson noted that "[t]he so-called reconstruction acts, though as
plainly unconstitutional as any that can be imagined, were not believed to be within the
class last mentioned," for the people retain the power to redress the situation at the polls.
Id. However, Johnson suggested that executive refusal to comply with an unconstitutional
law might be proper "if there be neither judicial remedy for the wrongs it inflicts nor power
in the people to protect themselves ... ." Id.
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effect without any action on the Executive's part. 8 5 Johnson grudg-
ingly complied with seven other statutes dealing with the Freedmen's
Bureau and with Reconstruction, despite his basic disagreement with
them. 8 6 While Johnson did everything he could to frustrate Con-
gress's Reconstruction program, he did so by exercising his discretion-
ary powers in ways that, in a "strained and nominal sense," adhered to
the letter of the law.'8 7 Had it been otherwise, not only would the
House probably have impeached him much earlier, but the Articles of
Impeachment would surely have rested on more than Johnson's de-
batable refusal to comply with the Tenure of Office Act. 88
It is far from clear that Andrew Johnson failed to comply with the
Tenure of Office Act. That statute, enacted over his veto on March 2,
1867, provided that the Secretary of War and other Cabinet members
"shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the
President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month
Had Johnson wished to adopt a contrary stance, he might have done so with the sup-
port of an Attorney General's opinion. Shortly after Johnson became President, Attorney
General James Speed advised the Secretary of the Treasury that
[t]he Constitution is the supreme law-a law superior and paramount to every
other. If any law be repugnant to the Constitution, it is void; in other words, it is
no law. It is the peculiar province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is in particular cases. But before such cases arise, and in the absence of
authoritative exposition of the law by that department, it is equally the duty of
the officer holding the executive power of the Government to determine, for the
purposes of his own conduct and action, as well the operation of conflicting laws
as the constitutionality of any one.
11 Op. Att'y Gen. 209, 213-15 (1865).
185.. This was true of the acts extending the franchise to blacks in the District of Colum-
bia, admitting Nebraska to the Union, excluding certain southern states from the electoral
college, narrowing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases, and
of two laws restoring some of the southern states to representation in Congress. See supra,
Table 1.
186. In his Annual Message to Congress in December 1867, Johnson urged repeal of
many of the Reconstruction acts on the ground that they were unconstitutional. Message
of Dec. 3, 1867, in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 3756, 3760-69.
187. McKrrRICK, supra note 181, at 493. See also, MICHAEL LEs BENEDICt, THE IM-
PEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 49, 60 (1973) (noting that while Johnson
had sought to undermine Congress's Reconstruction efforts, until the Tenure-of-Office-Act
episode, "Johnson had broken no law; he had limited himself strictly to the exercise of his
constitutional powers").
188. The House of Representatives, which voted to impeach Johnson on February 24,
1868, had been searching for grounds to impeach him since late 1866. Three earlier im-
peachment drives failed in the House for want of "charges that contained legal substance
." McKrrRICK, supra note 181, at 491. The articles of impeachment voted by the
House contained only one allegedly illegal act-Johnson's dismissal of Secretary of War
Edwin Stanton without the Senate's consent. This action was alleged to violate the Tenure
of Office Act and several other Reconstruction measures. 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra
note 129, at 3907-16.
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thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate."' 89 Johnson had vetoed the measure on the ground that it
interfered with the President's power of removal, a position subse-
quently vindicated by the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States.190
Johnson's alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act stemmed
from his efforts to remove Edwin Stanton as Secretary of War. Stan-
ton, a holdover from Lincoln's Cabinet, sympathized and cooperated
with the Radicals in Congress, and acted to thwart Johnson in a host
of ways. As Secretary of War, Stanton occupied a strategic position in
carrying out military reconstruction. For Johnson, gaining control of
the War Department was thus critical to being able to implement his
own very different views of Reconstruction.' 9 ' In August 1867, after
Stanton had refused the President's request that he resign, Johnson
suspended him as Secretary of War and appointed General Ulysses
Grant as interim Secretary. Because Congress was not in session at
the time, the President's action was in accord with the Tenure of Of-
fice Act, which allowed such an interim suspension subject to the Sen-
ate's later concurrence. When the Senate disapproved the suspension
on January 13, 1868, Grant relinquished the office to Stanton.
This attempt to displace Stanton having failed, Johnson on Febru-
ary 21, 1868, issued an order removing Stanton as Secretary of War
and naming General Lorenzo Thomas as his interim replacement.
Three days later, the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly
to impeach Johnson.192 Of the eleven Articles of Impeachment later
approved by the House, all but one related to the President's firing of
Stanton in alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act. 9 3
Yet as House Democrats unsuccessfully argued,'9 4 because Stan-
ton had been appointed Secretary of War by President Lincoln, he
was not covered by the Tenure of Office Act. When the final version
189. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, § 1, 14 Stat. 430 (1867) (emphasis added).
190. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See infra text accompanying notes 498-506.
191. See DAVID MILLER DEWrrr, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHN-
SON 232-87 (reprint ed. 1967) (1903); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTrru-
TIONAL PROBLEMS 259-60 (1973); BENEDICT, supra note 187, at 95-97; MCKITRICK, supra
note 181, at 495, 497.
192. The House vote to impeach Johnson was 126 to 47. DEWrrr, supra note 191, at
373.
193. Articles I-DC and XI related to the President's efforts to remove Stanton; only
Article X, which dealt with Johnson's public criticism of Congress, made no reference to
the removal of Stanton. 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 3907-16. See SA-
MUEL E. MORISON, THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 720-21 (1965);
BERGER, supra note 191, at 271-72.
194. DEWIr, supra note 191, at 366-70.
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of the statute was debated in the Senate, it was noted without contra-
diction that while President Johnson's hands might be tied with re-
spect to the Cabinet members he appointed, "the Secretary of War...
according to the terms of this provision, may be removed by him
tomorrow." 195
Andrew Johnson's firing of Stanton was thus not a case where a
President, believing a law to be unconstitutional, chose not to comply
with it. While Johnson was convinced that the Tenure of Office Act
was unconstitutional, he did not think he was violating the Act by re-
moving the Secretary of War. As he told the Senate a day after dis-
missing Stanton, "Whether the act were constitutional or not, it was
always my opinion that it did not secure him from removal.'
'1 96
In the impeachment trial before the Senate, the President's coun-
sel ably refuted the charge that Johnson, by removing the Secretary of
War, had violated the Tenure of Office Act.197 But, perhaps mindful
of the inefficacy of similar arguments in the House impeachment pro-
195. Id. at 197-98 (quoting Senator James R. Doolittle). Senator John Sherman agreed
that the Act "would not prevent the present President from removing the Secretary of War
." Id. at 198-99.
196. Message of Feb. 22, 1868, in 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 3820,
3823. According to Johnson, "It would be a violation of the plain meaning of this enact-
ment to place Mr. Stanton upon the same footing as those heads of Departments who have
been appointed by myself. As to him, this law gives him no tenure of office." Id. at 3822.
Johnson also admitted he was "aware that there were doubts as to the construction of the
law," id. at 3823, and noted that the public and many in Congress believed Stanton was
protected by the Act. McKrrRICK, supra note 181, at 497. This perception arose from the
fact that Stanton would have been protected had the Act's wording not been altered at the
last minute by a joint conference committee whose report received little scrutiny in the
House. DEWrrr, supra note 191, at 193-99, 577-78; McKrrRICK, supra note 181, at 495-97.
The House Managers contended that because Johnson initially suspended Stanton in
accord with the Tenure of Office Act, he was estopped from later claiming that the Act did
not cover Stanton. It has also been suggested that Johnson's initial compliance with the
Act proves he did not fire Stanton in order to challenge the Act's constitutionality, for
"how could he have intended to do so by removing an officer to whom he believed the act
did not apply?" BENEDiCr, supra note 187, at 151, 157-58. Yet a President bent on remov-
ing Stanton might first seek to do so in accord with the statute that many regarded as
applicable; only when that effort failed was the President then forced to adopt a more
confrontational stance, asserting both that Stanton was not protected by the Act, and that
even if he were, the measure was unconstitutional.
197. See DEWrr, supra note 191, at 424-26; McKrrRiCK, supra note 181, at 507; BER-
GER, supra note 191, at 274-80. The House prosecutors argued that Johnson was serving
out Lincoln's term rather than his own and that Stanton had therefore been dismissed
"during the term of the President by whom [he was] appointed." Even if Johnson's term
were deemed a continuation of Lincoln's, Stanton was appointed in Lincoln's first term
which expired in 1865. See DEWrrr, supra note 191, at 411-12,448-51; BERGER, supra note
191, at 278-80. But see BENEDICT, supra note 187, at 148-51 (concluding that it was unclear
whether Stanton was protected by the Act).
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ceeding,198 Johnson's lawyers also asserted that the President may
sometimes disregard unconstitutional laws, at least if he seeks to have
the issue resolved by the courts.199
The most careful elaboration of the "test-case defense" was ad-
vanced by Benjamin Curtis. In his opening argument for the defense,
the former Supreme Court Justice conceded that, as a general rule, the
President "is not to erect himself into a judicial court and decide that
the law is unconstitutional, and that therefore he will not execute it
... "200 The only time a President may refuse to comply with a law,
said Curtis, is when
a question arises whether a particular law has cut off a power
confided to him by the people through the Constitution, and he
alone can raise that question, and he alone can cause a judicial
decision to come between the two branches of the Government
to say which of them is right, and... when he takes the needful
steps to raise that question and have it peacefully decided.20
Though the President's lawyers were probably unaware of it, the
principle they advanced was recognized by one of the leading consti-
tutional analysts of the day, John Norton Pomeroy. In a treatise pub-
lished in 1868, but written prior to Johnson's impeachment, Pomeroy
stated that the President normally may not disregard a law, even if he
believes it to be unconstitutional. Yet there was an exception to this
"general rule":
A statute may be passed of such a form and character as to be
addressed directly to the President; it assumes to regulate his
official action; no private person and no subordinate officer is
affected by its provisions. If the Chief Magistrate enforces this
198. See BENEDICr, supra note 187, at 105-06.
199. See BENEDicr, supra, note 187, at 153-56; DEWrrr, supra note 191, at 427-32.
Thomas Nelson thus declared that "if a law is unconstitutional in the view of the President
it is no law at all, and he is not bound to follow it." CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
supp. at 301 (1868). A similar argument was made by Attorney General Henry Stanbery.
Id. at 373-74. However, Nelson pointedly added that Johnson had not sought to settle the
question by his "own strong hand," but had tried to "submit it to the judicial tribunals of
the country ....." Id. at 302. Another of the President's attorneys, William Groesbeck,
urged that in "doubtful cases" such as that involving the Tenure of Office Act, a President
may ignore a law if he seeks to "test the accuracy of the new interpretation in the forum
which is the highest and final interpreter of such questions." Id. at 314. According to
Groesbeck, only if a "law be upon its very face in flat contradiction to plain express provi-
sions of the Constitution" may a President ignore it "without going to the Supreme
Court .... "1 Id.
200. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 126 (1868). Curtis's argument is sum-
marized in DEWrrr, supra note 191, at 427-32.
201. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 126-27 (1868). The test-case defense
was consistent with the position Johnson himself had taken earlier in a December, 1867
message to Congress. See supra note 184.
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law, no question as to its validity can be raised, no opportunity
can be given to deny the power of the legislature .... In such a
case the President, unless he chooses to acquiesce, may plainly
exercise an independent judgment, and act upon his own sepa-
rate convictions.2°2
Pomeroy expressly noted that the Tenure of Office Act posed just
such a case,203 for unless the President ignored the statute, no one
would be in a position to bring a lawsuit challenging its validity.2°4
The House Managers who acted as prosecutors in the Senate trial
did not deny that the only way to test the Tenure of Office Act in
court was for the Executive to violate the statute.20 5 However, they
vehemently contested the premise that a President may ignore an al-
legedly unconstitutional law even where necessary to obtain a judicial
ruling as to its validity. Benjamin Butler echoed the Framers in his
opening argument for the House:
[A]ll the power or right in the President to judge upon any sup-
posed conflict of an act of Congress with the paramount law of
the Constitution is exhausted when he has examined a bill sent
him and returned it with his objections. If then passed over his
veto it becomes as valid as if in fact signed by him .... After
that he and all other officers must execute the law, whether in
fact constitutional or not.
20 6
Representative George Boutwell specifically rejected the claim that
Johnson "had a right to violate this law for the purpose of obtaining a
202. JOHN N. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 444-45 (N.Y., Hurd & Houghton 1868).
203. Citing the 1867 Tenure of Office Act as an example, Pomeroy explained that "[ilt
is only by a refusal to execute such a statute that the President can possibly create an issue
between himself and Congress .... In such a case the President, unless he chooses to
acquiesce, may plainly exercise an independent judgment, and act upon his own separate
convictions." POMEROY, supra note 202, at 244-45.
204. There was no declaratory judgment remedy available at the time. CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 58-59, 670 (4th ed. 1983). Even if there were, it
is unclear whom the President would sue in seeking a declaration that the Act was uncon-
stitutional; the Speech or Debate Clause would preclude suing members of Congress. U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. See CORWIN, supra note 104, at 70-72 (noting that unlike other
Reconstruction measures that Johnson opposed on constitutional grounds, the Tenure of
Office Act could be challenged in court only by presidential defiance).
205. Thomas Williams, one of the House Managers, stated in his closing argument that
"it was not necessary to violate the law .... All that it was necessary for [President John-
son] to do, was to issue his order of removal, and give the officer a notice of that order, and
its object." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 332 (1868). However, this was
precisely what Johnson did. Stanton ignored the order and did not relinquish the office of
Secretary of War until the impeachment trial had concluded. DEWrrr, supra note 191, at
591-92.
206. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 36 (1868).
judicial determination."2 "7 John Bingham concluded the case for the
House by dramatically suggesting that Andrew Johnson and King
James II presented "the most remarkable parallel that I have ever
read in history," for the "charges against James are substantially the
charges presented against this accused President ... that he has sus-
pended the laws and dispensed with the execution of the laws ....
The impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson thus squarely raised
the issue of whether a President may refuse to honor an allegedly un-
constitutional law in order to secure a judicial ruling as to its validity.
The Senate vote to convict was 35-19, one shy of the two-thirds major-
ity required to remove a President from office. 209 To what extent did
Johnson's acquittal rest on Senate recognition of his claim that the
Chief Executive may disregard an act of Congress where this is the
only way to test its constitutionality in court?
The President's test-case defense was accepted in principle by
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, who presided over the impeachment
trial. While Chase did not reveal his position publicly,210 Senators
could easily deduce it from his consistent rulings to admit evidence
concerning the President's belief that the Tenure of Office Act was
unconstitutional and his efforts to test it in court.211 In private, how-
ever, the Chief Justice was quite explicit as to his views, even during
the trial.212 On April 19, 1868, ten days after Johnson's attorneys first
presented the test-case defense, Chase wrote to a friend:
207. Id. at 279. As Boutwell explained, "The constitutional duty of the President is to
obey and execute the laws. He has no authority under the Constitution, or by any law, to
enter into any schemes or plans for the purpose of testing the validity of the laws of the
country, either judicially or otherwise .... Nor is it any answer to say ... that 'there never
could be a judicial decision that a law is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it is only by disre-
garding a law that any question can be raised judicially under it.' If this be true, it is no
misfortune." Id.
208. Id. at 405.
209. The Senate voted on Articles XI, II, and III, in that order; each Article turned on
whether Johnson had violated the Tenure of Office Act; the vote on each article was the
same: 35 to convict, 19 to acquit. Id. at 412, 414-415.
210. Douglas Kmiec, head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel under
President Reagan, erroneously asserted that Chase "cast[ ] the deciding vote against John-
son's impeachment.... ." DouGLAs W. KMIEC, THE ArORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER:
INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTCE DEPARTMENT 55 (1992); only Senators voted on whether or
not to convict the President.
211. See BENEDICr, supra note 187, at 120-22.
212. On April 20, 1868, Chase told a Congressman who attended the trial that day that
the President had a duty to ignore "what he believed to be unconstitutional legislation on
the part of Congress, [and] to take the earliest legal measures to test any such question
judicially ...." Jerome Mushkat ed., The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson: A Contempo-
rary View, 48 N.Y. HISTORY 275, 280 (1967).
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[I]t seems perfectly clear that the President had a perfect right
and indeed was under the highest obligation to remove Mr.
Stanton, if he made the removal, not in wanton disregard of a
constitutional law, but with a sincere belief that the Tenure of
Office Act was unconstitutional and for the purpose of bringing
the question of its constitutionality before the Supreme Court.
Plainly it was then a proper and peaceful, if not the only proper
and peaceful mode of protecting & defending the
Constitution.213
Despite the Chief Justice's views, the fact that nearly two-thirds
of the Senate voted to convict Johnson might seem a clear repudiation
of the claim that Presidents may ignore laws in order to test their va-
lidity. As students of Johnson's impeachment have noted, however,
the case was as much a political trial as a legal proceeding214 Our
ability to interpret the impeachment proceedings would have been
213. Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Gerrit Smith (April 19, 1868), in SALMON P.
CHASE PAPERS, Library of Congress. See also ROBERT B. WARDEN, AN ACCOUNT OF THE
PRIVATE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 684-85 (Cincinnati,
Wilstach, Baldwin 1874) (reprinting letter in slightly different form). Chase also stated his
views in more general terms. "In case a law, believed by the President to be unconstitu-
tional, is passed, notwithstanding his veto .... it seems to me that it is his duty to execute it
precisely as if he held it to be constitutional, except in the case where it directly attacks and
impairs the executive power confided to him by the Constitution. In that case it appears to
me to be the clear duty of the President to disregard the law, so far at least as it may be
necessary to bring the question of its constitutionality before the Judicial Tribunals." Let-
ter from Salmon P. Chase to Gerrit Smith (April 19, 1868), quoted in CHARLES FAiRMAN,
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, pt. 1, 524 (1971).
214. See JAMES G. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUC-
TION 614-17 (2d rev. ed. 1969); BENEDICT, supra note 187, at 110, 126, 140; HANS L.
TREFOUSSE, ANDREW JOHNSON: A BIOGRAPHY 328-31 (1989) [hereinafter TREFOUSSE, A
BIOGRAPHY]. Many of the Republicans who made up more than three-quarters of the
Senate were prepared to convict the President regardless of the evidence. Charles Sumner,
for example, was one of two Senators who found Johnson guilty on every count in the
Articles. The President, he said, was "Guilty on all and infinitely more." CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 473 (1868). According to Sumner, "It is very wrong to try this
impeachment merely on these articles" for impeachment is "a political proceeding, before
a political body, with political purposes .... " Id. at 463-64. Many Democrats were equally
determined to acquit the President. A middle group of Senators may have made a genuine
effort to set their political prejudices aside, including seven conservative Republicans who
crossed party lines to vote for Johnson's acquittal. Yet even these recusants did not neces-
sarily accept the President's test-case defense, and may have been influenced by political
considerations. If Johnson were removed from office, he would have been succeeded by
Ohio Senator Ben Wade, a fiery radical whom the conservatives had reason to fear. See
HANS L. TREFOUSSE, IMPEACHMENT OF A PRESIDENT:. ANDREW JOHNSON, THE BLACKS,
AND RECONSTRUCTION 172-79 (1975); BENEDICT, supra note 187, at 126-43; JAMES E. SEF-
TON, ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE USES OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 182 (1980). To the
extent their decisions did rest on legal grounds, several of the Republican holdouts voted
to acquit solely on the ground that Johnson's firing of Stanton did not violate the Tenure of
Office Act, without addressing the issue of whether Johnson would have been justified in
violating the Act in order to test its validity in court. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
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greatly enhanced had all of the Senate's 54 members written opinions
explaining their votes. As it was, only 29 Senators did so. Of these, 20
addressed the President's claimed right to ignore laws where neces-
sary to test their validity-8 Senators recognizing such a right, and 12
rejecting it.215 These opinions represent the views of barely a third of
the Senate, making it difficult to distill from the outcome of Johnson's
impeachment trial a precedent on the issue of whether Presidents are
ever justified in refusing to comply with allegedly unconstitutional
laws.
Professor Michael Benedict has suggested a potentially more
fruitful approach which focuses on the Senate's evidentiary rulings
rather than on the outcome of the case.216 While the Senate voted 29-
20 to exclude evidence tending to show that Johnson and his Cabinet
thought the Tenure of Office Act was unconstitutional, 217 it agreed by
votes of 29-21, 27-23 and 26-25 to admit evidence of Johnson's desire
to obtain a judicial determination of the Act's constitutionality.218
Thirty-two different Senators voted for at least one of these motions
to admit, and 21 supported all three. The Senate was thus more will-
ing to recognize a narrow right of noncompliance, limited to situations
where such action is necessary to create a test case, than it was to
acknowledge a general presidential right to ignore laws that the Exec-
utive believes are unconstitutional.
Though a bare majority of the Senate was willing to hear evi-
dence of the President's efforts to obtain a judicial ruling on the Ten-
ure of Office Act, this does not necessarily mean they accepted the
legitimacy of such a defense. John Sherman and Charles Sumner, for
example, voted to admit this evidence but then concluded that the
President should not be allowed to ignore a law even where this is the
2d Sess. supp. at 417-20 (1868) (opinion of Lyman Trumbull); id. at 452-57 (opinion of
William P. Fessenden).
215. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 417-526 (1868). Senators Grimes,
Johnson, Davis, Vickers, Buckalew, Doolittle, Henderson and Frelinghuysen appear to
have recognized a presidential right to violate a law in order to test its constitutionality,
while Senators Edmunds, Sherman, Ferry, Williams, Wilson, Sumner, Morrill (Vt.), Yates,
ipton, Howard, Patterson (N.H.), and Cattell rejected such a right. Id.
216. BENEDICr, supra note 187, at 153-57.
217. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 225-27 (1868).
218. Id. at 169-171 (testimony of Gen. Sherman as to President's stated purpose in of-
fering Sherman the position of interim Secretary of War); id. at 200-201 (testimony of at-
torney Walter S. Cox as to President's request that he institute legal proceeding to
challenge Tenure of Office Act); id. at 201-02 (testimony of Walter S. Cox as to efforts to
bring a test case at President's direction).
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only way to test its validity in court.219 Others may have felt likewise,
which explains why, of 32 Senators who agreed to hear evidence sup-
porting the test-case defense, 13 ultimately voted to convict the
President.220
It is also likely that some who accepted the test-case defense in
principle were not persuaded that Johnson had violated the Tenure of
Office Act in order to obtain a judicial ruling as to its validity.221 The
President on several occasions said he wished to obtain a court deter-
mination of the question,222 and he did take some steps to bring this
about.223 The most significant of these occurred after Johnson had
ordered Stanton's removal and named General Thomas to replace
him. Stanton refused to give up the office and instead filed criminal
proceedings against Thomas in the District of Columbia Supreme
Court. After Thomas was arrested and charged with violating the
Tenure of Office Act,2 24 the President hired Walter S. Cox, a private
attorney, to represent Thomas. Johnson instructed Cox that "he de-
sired the necessary legal proceedings to be instituted without delay to
219. See id. at 170, 200-02, 447, 471-72. Sumner voted to admit all of the evidence that
was offered. Id. at 465.
220. The 13 Senators who voted for at least one of the three motions to admit evidence
concerning the test-case defense, but who then voted to find the President "guilty," were
Republican Senators Anthony, Cole, Corbett, Frelinghuysen, Howe, Morgan, Morton,
Sherman, Sprague, Sumner, Wiley, Morrill (Me.), and Patterson (N.H.). See id. at 169-71,
200-02,411. Of this group, six wrote opinions explaining their impeachment vote: Freling-
huysen, Howe, Sherman, Sumner, Morill (Me.), and Patterson (N.H.).
221. See BENEDICt, supra note 187, at 157-58 (concluding that there was "no founda-
tion in fact" to the defense that Johnson had fired Stanton with the intent to test the Act in
court).
222. CONo. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 140 (1868) (testimony of Gen. Lo-
renzo Thomas); id. at 170, 173 (testimony of Gen. William T. Sherman); id. at 200 (testi-
mony of Walter S. Cox).
223. When the President suspended Stanton in August, 1867, naming General Grant as
interim Secretary, Johnson did so believing that if the Senate disapproved the suspension,
Grant would not give up the office, thereby triggering a lawsuit by Stanton. Johnson re-
portedly offered to pay the $10,000 fine Grant risked for violating the Tenure of Office
Act, in order to test the Act in court. Grant upset these plans by surrendering the office to
Stanton after the Senate disapproved the suspension action. See TanFoussE, A BIOGRA-
PHY, supra note 214, at 306-08 (1989); DEWi-rr, supra note 191, at 282-85, 322-38. In his
February 22,1868 message to the Senate defending the removal of Stanton, Johnson stated:
"My order of suspension in August last was intended to place the case in such a position as
would make a resort to a judicial decision both necessary and proper. My understanding
and wishes.., were frustrated, and the late order for Mr. Stanton's removal was a further
step toward the accomplishment of that purpose." Message of Feb. 22, 1868, in 8
MESSArES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 3820, 3823.
224. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 168-69 (1868). Section 5 of the
Tenure of Office Act made it a crime, punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and imprison-
ment for up to 5 years, to accept an appointment contrary to the terms of the Act. Ch. 154,
§ 5, 14 Stat. 430, 431 (1867).
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test General Thomas's right to the office and to put him in
possession.
' 225
There were three avenues by which Cox might have obtained a
ruling on the validity of the Tenure of Office Act. First, he could have
filed a habeas corpus action seeking Thomas's release from custody on
the ground that the law he was charged under was unconstitutional.
Second, Cox could have raised the issue of the Act's validity as a de-
fense to the criminal action. Third, he could have arranged to have a
quo warranto proceeding brought to challenge Stanton's right to re-
main in office. None of these avenues was pursued with diligence.
The first two were quickly eliminated when Cox asked the court to
discharge his client; to Cox's purported surprise, the judge did so, put-
ting an end to the criminal suit and to any chance of filing a habeas
petition.226 Quo warranto proceedings could be brought only by the
government with the consent of Attorney General Stanbery.227 Cox
presented quo warranto papers to the local district attorney who re-
fused to sign them "without instructions or a request from the Presi-
dent or the Attorney General.""22  Though Cox passed this
information on to Stanbery, nothing further occurred.2 29
The evidence of Cox's ineptitude and the Attorney General's in-
action undermined the President's claim that he had sought to have
the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act resolved by the Judi-
ciary." 0 Instead, it may have appeared that Johnson was trying to
clothe his purely political objectives in the more respectable garb of
the Constitution. The House Managers made much of the point, not-
ing that he could easily have instituted a test case if he wanted to.3
1
Several Senators who had agreed to admit evidence supporting the
test-case defense but who later voted to convict cited his weak and
225. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 200 (1868).
226. Id. at 201-04 (testimony of Walter S. Cox); id. at 204-06 (testimony of Richard T.
Merrick, a private attorney representing Gen. Thomas); DEWrrr, supra note 191, at 377.
According to Johnson's trial counsel, if the D.C. Supreme Court had ruled against Thomas
in the habeas proceeding, the plan was to take an immediate appeal to the Supreme Court.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 167 (1868).
227. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 198-200 (1868).
228. Id. at 203 (testimony of Walter S. Cox).
229. Id. at 203-04 (testimony of Walter S. Cox). The government may have decided not
to pursue the quo warranto route because Johnson had by then been impeached, making it
unlikely that a federal court would intervene in the matter.
230. See BENEDIcr, supra note 187, at 157-58.
231. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 37 (1868) (opening argument of Rep.
Benjamin Butler); id. at 271 (closing argument of Rep. George Boutwell); id. at 332-33
(closing argument of Thomas Williams).
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vacillating efforts to place the question before the courts .1 2 In the
absence of any serious attempt to create a test case, Johnson was in
effect claiming that Presidents may simply ignore allegedly unconstitu-
tional laws-a prerogative which he and his defense counsel had re-
peatedly disavowed, and to which Congress was firmly opposed.
In sum, Andrew Johnson's dismissal of Stanton was not a case of
a President choosing to violate a law to which he had constitutional
objections, for Johnson was on solid ground in believing that the Ten-
ure of Office Act did not protect Stanton. Yet because Congress
treated the incident as one of presidential noncompliance, the im-
peachment proceeding does shed light on the perceived legitimacy of
such conduct. As we have seen, while there is evidence that the Sen-
ate rejected the broad assertion that a President may ignore any stat-
ute that he thinks is unconstitutional, a majority of the Senate may
have accepted a limited right of noncompliance in cases where such
defiance is necessary to produce a test case.
The Johnson impeachment also makes clear that a President who
invokes this principle bears a heavy burden. He cannot, as Johnson
sought to do, merely assert his belief that a law is unconstitutional.
Instead, the Chief Executive must make every effort to assure that the
question is presented to the federal courts for final resolution. With-
out a requirement that a President take these steps, the Executive
could routinely invoke the Constitution as a means of suspending laws
which he opposes on policy grounds.
In the veto context, at least, Andrew Johnson's impeachment ap-
pears to have had a chastening effect. Not until more than 100 years
later did another President dare to ignore a law that was passed over
his constitutionally based veto.2a3
3. Chester A. Arthur
On August 2, 1882, Congress overrode President Arthur's veto of
an $18.7 million river and harbor improvements bill, 334 then the larg-
est such appropriation ever. Arthur opposed the measure as being an
"extravagant expenditure of public money," and on the ground that
232. Senator Frelinghuysen stated that "[t]hree months have transpired since the re-
moval, and the first step to make this test has not been taken." Id. at 522. Charles Sumner
expressed similar views though, by his own admission, he would have voted to convict the
President in any event. Id. at 471, 473.
233. Ronald Reagan refused to comply with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086, which was passed over his constitutionally-based
veto. See infra notes 551-553 and accompanying text.
234. Act of Aug. 2, 1882, ch. 375, 22 Stat. 191.
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"it contains appropriations for purposes not for the common defense
or general welfare, and which do not promote commerce among the
states."111 5 In repassing the bill, the Congress ignored Arthur's recom-
mendation that the appropriation be reduced by half.
The President's veto message did not specify which of the hun-
dreds of projects were allegedly unconstitutional. However, Senator
George Hoar later noted that Arthur objected to "a very few items
only, amounting altogether to a very few thousand dollars." 6 Hoar's
account is substantiated by a report which the President submitted to
Congress in January 1884, reporting river and harbor improvements
"from the beginning of the Government to the present time." It iden-
tified only three projects that did not involve navigable waters: Lake
Winnepissiogee in New Hampshire, the North Carolina portion of the
Yadkin River, and the French Broad River in North Carolina.237 The
first of these was not funded by the 1882 Act. Thus, the two North
Carolina projects were the only improvements in the vetoed bill to
which the President was constitutionally opposed. The amounts ap-
propriated for these two projects were quite small: $25,000 for the
Yadkin and $53,000 for the French Broad. 3
Despite his constitutional objections Arthur proceeded to imple-
ment the Act even as to the disputed projects. While not all of the
appropriated funds were spent by the end of the 1883 fiscal year, the
Secretary of War expended $9,061 on the Yadkin River project and
$1,364 on improving the French Broad River. 39 During the same
year the administration spent all of the funds remaining from previous
appropriations for Lake Winnespissiogee, even though President Ar-
thur had voiced constitutional objections to this project as well.240
4. Grover Cleveland
Like Chester Arthur, Grover Cleveland unsuccessfully vetoed a
major river and harbor improvements bill.241 The Act of June 3, 1896
directly appropriated $12.6 million for 417 projects, and authorized
the War Department to contract for an additional $62 million in im-
235. H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 222, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1882).
236. 2 GEORGE F. HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 118 (1903).
237. H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 64, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. iii (1884).
238. Act of August 2, 1882, ch. 375, 22 Stat. 199. The Act did not require that the funds
be spent within a set period of time.
239. H.R. Exnc. Doc. No. 64, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 41-42 (1884).
240. Id. at 4-5.
241. Act of June 3, 1896, ch. 314, 29 Stat. 202.
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provements to be funded by future appropriations.242 It is not entirely
clear that Cleveland's objections rested on constitutional grounds, but
this may have been the case.
In his veto message, Cleveland listed nine reasons for rejecting
the bill. The first was that some of the improvements "are not related
to the public welfare, and many of them are palpably for the benefit of
limited localities or in aid of individual interests."243 The President
perhaps meant by this that the measure violated Article I, section 8,
which limits Congress's spending power to "provid[ing] for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare ... The balance of Cleve-
land's objections reflected his view that if the federal government
were to become a "giver of gifts" it would "stimulate a vicious pater-
nalism."'24 This concern, too, may have had constitutional roots. Ac-
cording to one of his biographers, the President "proposed to confine
the government to its proper functions as prescribed in the Constitu-
tion-which Cleveland believed did not include paternalistic aid to
any group or individual." '246
Treating President Cleveland's rivers and harbors veto as having
rested on constitutional grounds, there is no evidence that he refused
to spend the appropriated funds. Cleveland left office in March 1897,
nine months after the bill became law. During this period, the War
Department began to carry out the authorized improvements.247 And
though the administration sought in a few cases to limit disbursements
under the Act, it did so based on the wording of specific appropria-
tions, not under a claimed right to ignore projects that were thought to
be unconstitutional.2" Cleveland's Attorney General in fact in-
structed the Secretary of War that, except in a few particular in-
stances, the Act did not "leave anything to your discretion with
242. H.R. Doc. No. 2,54th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. II, at 21-22 (1896); Message of May 29,
1896, in 12-13 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 6109-11.
243. Message of May 29, 1896, in 12-13 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at
6109-11.
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
245. Message of May 29, 1896, in 12-13 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at
6109-11.
246. HORACE S. MERRILL, BOURBON LEADER: GROVER CLEVELAND AND THE DEMO-
CRATIC PARTY 137 (1957) (emphasis added). See also REXFORD G. TUGWELL, GROVER
CLEVELAND 126 (1968) (Cleveland believed "that the federal government itself ought to
be severely restricted in exercising regulatory and directive powers.").
247. See H.R. Doc. No. 2,54th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. I, at 40-41 (1896); id., vol. II, at 21
et seq. (1896); H.R. Doc. No. 2, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., vol I., at 37-39 (1897).
248. See, e.g., 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 391 (Aug. 1, 1896); 21 Op. Att'y Gen. at 414 (Sept. 29,
1896); 21 Op. Att'y Gen. at 471 (Jan. 11, 1897).
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respect to the expenditure of the sum appropriated. '249 Instead,
"[t]he intention of Congress was, except in instances where a contrary
intent is manifested. . . that you should proceed with the projects
specified to the extent of the appropriations without inquiry as to their
wisdom."' ' 0 There is nothing to suggest that the Secretary of War
failed to heed this advice.
5. William Howard Taft
The Webb-Kenyon Act, passed by Congress over President Taft's
veto, outlawed the interstate shipment of intoxicating liquor if it was
intended for use contrary to the laws of the state of destination.?
5 '
This Act for the first time enabled states to enforce local prohibition
laws by barring the importation of liquor. The President had vetoed
the measure on the ground that "it [was] in substance and effect a
delegation by Congress to the States of the power of regulating inter-
state commerce in liquors which is vested exclusively in Congress." 2
However, Taft never faced the choice of whether or not to implement
the Act, for he turned the White House over to Woodrow Wilson
three days after the measure became law.
6. Woodrow Wilson
During World War I, the prohibition lobby capitalized on the
need to conserve foodstuffs and on the prevailing spirit of self-sacri-
fice to push through Congress a series of laws which turned the
United States into a "dry" nation on July 1, 1919, more than six
months before the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect.253 Not
satisfied with these victories, the Anti-Saloon League in October 1919,
nearly a year after the armistice, induced Congress to again use its war
powers to expand the scope of the War-Time Prohibition Act even
249. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. at 421 (Oct. 9, 1896).
250. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. at 420,421-22 (Oct. 9, 1896) (citation omitted) (concluding that
while the Secretary was obliged to spend the funds appropriated by this act, the Secretary
had discretion with respect to entering into contracts to be funded from future
appropriations).
251. Act of March 1, 1913, PuB. L. No. 398, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699.
252. 49 CONG. Rc. 4291,4292 (Feb. 28, 1913). The Court later upheld the Act in Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R.R., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
253. CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR
POWERS SINCE 1918, at 60-73 (1989). The 18th Amendment, outlawing the manufacture,
sale, transportation and importation of intoxicating liquours, was ratified January 16, 1919,
and took effect one year later.
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though it would be displaced in a few months by the Eighteenth
Amendment.5 4
Woodrow Wilson vetoed the bill to expand the War-Tune Prohi-
bition Act, declaring that "[it has to do with the enforcement of an
act which was passed by reason of the emergencies of the war and
whose objects have been satisfied in the demobilization of the Army
and Navy, and whose repeal I have already sought at the hands of
Congress." 5  While Wilson's message was ambiguous, he appears to
have been asserting that Congress was constitutionally barred from
making further use of its war powers and that it must instead wait for
the Eighteenth Amendment to take effect. Wilson's October 27 veto
message cautioned that "[iun all matters having to do with the per-
sonal habits and customs of large numbers of our people, we must be
certain that the established processes of legal change are followed." 256
Congress overrode the President's veto on October 281 7 That
same day the White House announced that the expanded War-Time
Prohibition Act would be fully enforced-a pledge to which the ad-
ministration adhered." 8 On January 5, eleven days before it was su-
perseded by the Eighteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court ruled 5
to 4 that the expanded War-Time Prohibition Act was
constitutional. 9
7. Harry S. Truman
President Truman issued two constitutionally-based vetoes that
were overridden by Congress. The first involved the Internal Security
Act of 1950.260 In his September 22, 1950 veto message, Truman ob-
jected that Title I of the Internal Security Act, which required so-
called Communist front groups to register with the government,
"would make a mockery of the 'Bill of Rights' and greatly chill ex-
pression. '  He also opposed Title II of the Act, which authorized
the President to declare an "internal security emergency," during
254. Volstead Act (Act of Oct. 28,1919), ch. 85, title 1, 41 Stat. 305; see MAY, supra note
253, at 86-91.
255. Message of Oct. 27, 1919, in 6 PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WItSON 424-25 (Ray
Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd eds., 1927).
256. Id.
257. MAY, supra note 253, at 91-93.
258. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1919, at 1; N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1919, at 10.
259. Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920); see MAY, supra note 253, at 191, 203-06.
260. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, PUB. L. No. 830, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987; Title I was entitled
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950; Title II was the Emergency Detention Act
of 1950.
261. 96 CONG. REC. 15631 (1950).
which the government could detain any persons whom the Attorney
General has "reasonable ground to believe.., probably will engage in
... acts of espionage or of sabotage." Truman warned that "under our
legal system to detain a man not charged with a crime would raise
serious constitutional questions unless the writ of habeas corpus were
suspended," which the act did not do.262 The measure became law
over the President's veto on September 23, 1950.263
The Truman administration immediately proceeded to enforce Ti-
tle I despite the President's constitutional objections. 2 4 In October,
1950, the Attorney General issued regulations implementing the regis-
tration provisions.2 65 A month later he petitioned the Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Board for an order compelling the Communist Party
to register under the Act.266 The President never had occasion to in-
voke the emergency detention provisions of Title II. However, the
Truman Justice Department did carry out the statute to the extent of
rehabilitating six World War II installations for use as detention camps
should an internal security emergency be declared.267
The second statute that Truman unsuccessfully vetoed on consti-
tutional grounds was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.268
His veto message of June 25, 1952 was based mainly on policy con-
cerns, but it also noted that "serious constitutional questions" were
raised by the Act's provisions dealing with children's loss of citizen-
ship, denaturalization procedures, and judicial review of administra-
tive denials of citizenship.269 In addition, Truman objected under the
"doctrine of the separation of powers" to the section requiring the
Executive to provide any information requested by a new Joint Con-
gressional Committee on Immigration and Nationality. 270
The Joint Committee had no chance to make any requests of the
Truman administration for it began to function only after he left of-
262. Id. at 15630 (1950).
263. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1950, at 1.
264. Id., Sept. 25, 1950, p. 1.
265. THOMAS I. EMERSON, ET AL., POLITICAL AND CIVIL RrIcrrs IN THE UNrIED
STATES 160 (student ed. 1967).
266. 1951 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 6; 1952 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 11-12; EMERSON ET AL.,
supra note 265, at 160-61. In April 1953, three months after Truman left office, the Attor-
ney General sought to enforce the Act against Communist-front organizations. Id. at 182.
267. EMERSON ET AL., supra note 265, at 186.
268. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163.
269. 98 CONG. REc. 8084 (June 25, 1952).
270. Id. Section 401 provided: "The Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall
without delay submit to the [Joint Congressional Committee on Immigration and National-
ity] all regulations, instructions, and all other information as requested by the Committee
.... " Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, § 401(f), 66 Stat. 163, 274.
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fice. 271 The other provisions of the Act took effect on December 24,
1952, less than a month before Truman's term ended.272 During this
period the administration began to enforce the Act.273 Implementing
regulations published on December 19 contained no caveats or refer-
ences to the President's prior constitutional objections. 274 In early
January, he told Congress that enforcing the Act had increased the
Justice Department's expenses, necessitating a supplemental appropri-
ation for 19535 Truman repeatedly urged Congress to amend or re-
peal the Act,2 76 but there is no evidence that he refused to enforce or
carry out any of its provisions.
8. Richard M. Nixon
The War Powers Resolution of 1973, requiring the President to
consult and notify Congress if U.S. military forces are introduced into
situations involving actual or imminent hostilities, became law on No-
vember 7, 1973, over President Nixon's veto.277 In his veto message of
October 24, 1973, the President asserted that the Resolution unconsti-
tutionally sought "to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities
which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for
almost 200 years."278 The message also objected that the section per-
mitting Congress by concurrent resolution to compel the withdrawal
of armed forces "denies the President his constitutional role in ap-
proving legislation."279
Shortly after the War Powers Resolution was enacted, the Nixon
administration indicated it would probably comply with the measure,
271. The House appointed members to the Joint Committee in June 1952, but Congress
adjourned before the Senate could do so. 98 CONG. REC. 8621, 9750 (1952). In the next
Congress, the House appointed members to the Joint Committee on January 26, 1953; the
Senate did so on February 4, 1953. 99 CONG. REC. 574, 824 (1953). Truman left office on
January 20, 1953.
272. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, § 407, 66 Stat. 163, 281.
273. See 4000 Former Nazis Now May Enter U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,1952, at 12; N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1952, at 6; N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1952, at 1; 1953 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 46.
274. 17 FED. REG. 11469-11564 (1952).
275. Message of Jan. 9, 1953, in 1953 PUB. PAPERS 1128, 1163 (1966).
276. Anthony Leviero, President Vetoes Immigration Bill as Discriminatory, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1952, at 1; Anthony Leviero, New Body to Study Immigration Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1952, at 9; Texts of Truman's Speeches in Harlem and at the Waldorf Asto-
ria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1952, at 77, 79; Alien Law Bars 269 of Liberte's Crew, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1952, at 7; Message of Jan. 9, 1953, in 1953 PUB. PAPERS 1128, 1163 (1966).
277. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988)).
278. Message of Oct. 24, 1973, in 1973 PuB. PAPERS 893, 893-95 (1975).
279. Id. at 893. A concurrent resolution requires approval of the House and the Senate
but not that of the President.
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despite the President's constitutional objections. "The law is on the
books," said a White House source, and "we may just have to live with
it."2 °0 In the remaining nine months of his presidency that the War
Powers Resolution was in effect, Nixon did not use the military in situ-
ations that fell within the Resolution's consulting or reporting require-
ments.28' By the time it was passed, American troops had been
removed from Indochina and the U.S. bombing of Cambodia had
ceased.282 While the United States later employed the armed forces
to evacuate American personnel and foreign civilians from Cambodia
and Vietnam, these operations occurred after Nixon had resigned
from office.8 3
9. Gerald R. Ford
Among the changes made by the 1974 Freedom of Information
Act amendments was a provision allowing federal courts to review de
novo a government agency's claim that requested information is ex-
empt from disclosure, the agency having the burden of proving that it
had a right to withhold the records in question. 4 In a veto message
issued on October 17, 1974, President Ford objected to this amend-
ment as it applied to classified material. "Such a provision would vio-
late constitutional principles," he said, for "a determination by the
Secretary of Defense that disclosure of a document would endanger
our national security would, even though reasonable, have to be over-
turned by a district judge who thought.the plaintiff's position just as
reasonable." 5 The President's veto was overridden on November 21,
1974.286
280. WASH. STAR, Nov. 9, 1973, at C-back page, quoted in JOHN H. SULLIVAN, STAFF
OF HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON THE WAR POW-
ERs RESOLUTION 169 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter SULLIVAN REPORT].
281. Members of Congress twice questioned the Nixon administration's compliance
with the War Powers Resolution. At issue were the July, 1974 use of Navy helicopters to
evacuate American and foreign nationals from Cyprus, and the airdropping of supplies to
Cambodian villages under siege by Communist forces. Congress ultimately accepted the
administration's explanation that the reporting requirement was not triggered because the
aircraft in question were unarmed and because they did not operate in hostile areas. SUL-
LIVAN REPORT, supra note 280, at 173-76.
282. See John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part 1. The (Troubled) Constitu-
tionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 908, 910 (1990).
283. Clement J. Zablocki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record and Future Promise,
17 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 579, 580-83 (1984); SULLIVAN REPORT, supra note 280, at 179-220.
284. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1562 (codified as 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (1988)).
285. Message of Oct. 17, 1974, in 1974 PUB. PAPERs 374, 375 (1975).
286. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.
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The amendment to which Ford objected on constitutional
grounds was addressed to the federal courts, not to the executive
branch. There was therefore no way the President could directly re-
fuse to honor the provision. Moreover, not until 1986 would an appel-
late court uphold on the merits, a decision to reject an agency's
classification claim.287 Thus, Ford had no occasion to refuse compli-
ance with a court order compelling disclosure of classified material
during his years in the White House.
Summary
This historical review reveals that, with perhaps one exception,
American Presidents from 1789 through 1980 acted on the premise
that once a bill becomes law over their veto, the Executive must honor
the measure despite his constitutional misgivings. In some instances,
third parties were in a position to challenge the act in court, thereby
securing a judicial resolution of the disagreement between Congress
and the Executive 288 But in many other cases, Presidents imple-
mented such laws even though the effect of doing so was that no one
would have standing to seek a judicial ruling as to the statutes' valid-
ity.289 That Congress might thus have the last word on the issue of
constitutionality was not deemed by the President a sufficient reason
for refusing to enforce the law.
B. Constitutional Objections to Bills the President Signed Into Law
With growing frequency, Presidents have registered their consti-
tutional objections to bills, not through exercise of the veto power, but
by approving the measure while issuing a statement pointing out its
alleged constitutional defects. Where the White House is opposed to
a bill as a whole, it may still employ the veto, citing the measure's
287. JUSTIN D. FRANKLIN & ROBERT F. BOUCHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY Acs, § 1.04, at p. 1-36(2d ed. 1992).
288. See, e.g., Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917)
(upholding Webb-Kenyon Act vetoed by President Taft); Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264
(1920) (sustaining Title I of the National Prohibition Act vetoed by President Wilson).
289. This was true, for example, of the internal improvement bills vetoed by Presidents
Pierce, Arthur, and Cleveland. Had the Executive refused to implement these measures,
the states for whom the funds were designated might have challenged the Executive's ac-
tion. No one, however, had standing to challenge the expenditure of these monies. Even if
federal taxpayer standing had been recognized at the time, standing would not have existed
since the measures were not alleged to have violated the Establishment Clause. See Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sep-
aration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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constitutional defects as among the grounds for rejection.2 90 But
where, as is often the case, the legislation contains otherwise desirable
features, the President may allow the bill to become law while voicing
his constitutional objections in a signing or post-signing statement.2 9'
1. The Evolution of Presidential Signing Statements
The Constitution makes no mention of signing statements. Arti-
cle I declares simply that if the President approves of a bill "he shall
sign it;" 2" there is no indication that he is also to issue a statement
explaining his action. Only where the Chief Executive elects to veto a
measure does the Constitution provide that he is to set forth his rea-
sons for doing so.2 93 It is thus not surprising that in the early decades
of the Republic Presidents seldom issued statements in connection
with signing a bill.2 94 During the first half-century under the Constitu-
tion only two such statements were issued, both by Andrew Jack-
son.295 When President Tyler in 1842 issued a signing statement
expressing doubt about the constitutionality of a bill he had signed,
Congress branded his action "a defacement of the public records and
archives" and an "evil example for the future .... 29 6 In 1854, Frank-
lin Pierce apologized for issuing a signing statement, noting that he
had "deviate[d] from the ordinary course of announcing the approval
of bills by an oral statement only .... ,,297 Even as late as 1875, Presi-
290. For example, of the 40 vetoes issued by President Bush during his term in office, 11
(or 27.5%) cited constitutional concerns. 25-28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (1989-92).
291. While most signing statements are issued when the President signs a bill into law,
the term is used here also to embrace statements issued by a President at a later date, as
well as the occasional statement explaining why the President allowed a bill to become law
without his signature.
292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cf. 2.
293. Article I, § 7, clause 2 provides that when a bill is presented to the President "[i]f
he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in
which it shall have originated .... ." (emphasis added.)
294. President Monroe twice issued statements long after a bill had become law ex-
plaining his understanding of how the measure was to be executed; in neither case did he
object that the law was invalid. See Message of Dec. 17,1819, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS,
supra note 129, at 632; Message of April 13, 1822, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note
129, at 698.
295. Message of May 29, 1830, in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 1045;
Message of May 30, 1830, in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 1046. Only the
second of these statements raised a constitutional objection.
296. H.R. REP. No. 909, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 12 (1842).
297. Message of July 22, 1854, in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra'note 129, at 2776.
The message involved an internal improvements bill and did not raise any constitutional
objections. In 1848, James Polk had likewise apologized for issuing a signing statement,
noting that when a President signs a bill, "usage requires that he shall notify the House in
which it originated . . ." but "[t]he mode of giving this notification has been by an oral
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dent Grant acknowledged that his use of a signing statement was an
"unusual method of conveying the notice of approval .... ,2 98
Signing statements still remained the exception at the turn of the
century.29 9 By 1950, however, they had become commonplace. 300
President Truman issued nearly 16 signing statements a year.301 As
Table 2 indicates, the figure has increased significantly since then.
Presidents Ford and Carter averaged about 60 signing statements a
year.30 2 While the annual rate dropped to about 30 during the Reagan
years, it rose to more than 50 under President Bush, who issued 80
signing statements in 1992 alone.
0 3
Presidents may issue signing statements for a number of pur-
poses. They sometimes play a ceremonial or political role, celebrating
the enactment of a law and perhaps giving credit to those responsible
for its passage °.3  They may also be employed to identify policy short-
comings in a statute and to urge the adoption of corrective legisla-
tion.30 5 Presidents have also used signing statements to promulgate
their own interpretation of an ambiguous or controversial law, both
for the guidance of executive branch officials and with hope that
message by his private secretary." Message of Aug. 14, 1848, in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS,
supra note 129, at 2456.
298. Message of Jan. 14, 1875, in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 4268.
299. From 1789 until the Civil War, six signing statements appeared. There was a small
surge during the Civil War and Reconstruction eras when Lincoln, Johnson and Grant
issued a total of 12 such statements. From 1877 through 1900, five more statements ap-
peared. See 1-14 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129. In the early 1900s, Theodore
Roosevelt issued one signing statement. Message of March 7, 1906, in 17 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 129, at 7667. President Taft issued only a few. See 17-18 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS, supra note 129.
300. See infra Table 2.
301. See Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953 PUB. PAPERS (1961-66).
302. See 10-16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (1974-81). Carter holds the record for a
single year, issuing 92 signing statements between January 3,1980 and January 2,1981. See
16 WEEKLY ComP. PRE. Doc. (1980-81).
303. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (1992), Table 4A.
304. See, e.g., Harry S. Truman, Statement of May 22, 1947, in 1947 PUB. PAPERS, 254-
55 (1963) (signing statement of Bill Endorsing Truman Doctrine). The perceived political
value of signing statements is suggested by the fact that there is often a surge in the year a
President is seeking reelection. Thus, Richard Nixon issued 41 signing statements in 1972,
well above his yearly average of 26; in 1976, Gerald Ford issued 78 statements, more than
twice the number he issued in any prior year; Jimmy Carter, who averaged 57 signing
statements a year, issued 92 in 1980; Ronald Reagan, who averaged 31 statements a year,
issued 46 in 1984; and George Bush issued 80 signing statements in 1992,20 more than his
previous annual high. See infra Table 2; 8 WEEKLY COMP..PRES. Doc. (1972); 12 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. (1976); 16 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. (1980-81); Ronald W. Reagan,
1984 PUB. PAPERS, (1986-87); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (1992), Table 4A.
305. See, e.g., Ronald W. Reagan, Statement of Oct. 24, 1984, in 1984 PUB. PAPERS,
1643 (1987) (signing statement regarding bill amending Volunteers in the Parks Act).
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Table 2
Presidential Signing Statements (1945-1993)
Signing Statements
of All lypes Constitutionally Based Signing Statements
Annual Annual As Percent of All
President Total Average Total Average Signing Statements
Truman 121 15.7 4 0.5 3.3%
(1945-53)
Eisenhower 146 18.3 9 1.1 6.2%
(1953-61)
Kennedy 37 12.8 1 0.3 2.7%
(1961-63)
Johnson 171 33.5 9 1.8 5.3%
(1963-69)
Nixon 146 26.1 9 1.6 6.2%
(1969-74)
Ford 146 60.8 15 6.3 10.3%
(1974-77)
Carter 229 57.3 30 7.5 13.1%
(1977-81)
Reagan 247 30.9 87 10.9 35.2%
(1981-89)
Bush 217 54.2 116 29.0 53.5%
(1989-93)
Source: The data for Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter is drawn
from the volumes of PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNrrED STATES covering their
presidencies. The data for Reagan and Bush is drawn from the same series and from U.S. Code.
Cong. & Admin. News, volumes for 1981 through 1992.
judges will treat the White House's views as a part of the act's legisla-
tive history when the measure is later construed by the courts.3 °6 Fi-
nally, signing statements may express the President's constitutional
306. See, e.g., Harry S. Truman, Statement of July 3, 1946, in 1946 Pun. PAPERS, 336-37
(1962) (signing statement interpreting Hobbs Bill as not infringing rights of organized la-
bor). President Reagan made extensive use of signing statements for this purpose. In
1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese made arrangements for presidential signing state-
ments to appear in the "legislative history" section of United States Code Congressional &
Administrative News. Strasser, Executive Intent, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10, 1986, at 2. This use of
signing statements has triggered a vigorous debate as to the legitimacy of the Executive's
attempt to create legislative history. Compare Douglas W. Kmiec, Judges Should Pay At-
tention to Statements by President, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 13; Cross, supra note 170;
and Kathyryn M. Dessayer, Note, The First Work The President's Place in 'Legislative
History', 89 MICH. L. REv. 399 (1990) (defending the practice) with Garber & Wimmer,
supra note 170 ; Waites, supra note 170; and William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential
Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991) (criticizing the practice).
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disagreement with a statute. These goals are not mutually exclusive
and a signing statement may often serve more than one of them.
3 7
Only in the last 50 years have signing statements emerged as a
principal means for the White House to assert constitutional objec-
tions to acts of Congress. Prior to 1945, the number of signing state-
ments that raised constitutional issues was negligible. From 1789 to
1945, only 15 such statements were issued, an average of about one a
decade.3 0 8 In the period from early 1945 to mid-1974, embracing the
presidencies of Harry Truman through Richard Nixon, constitution-
ally based signing statements appeared at a rate of one every year.
30 9
As Table 2 reveals, during the Ford and Carter eras, the number in-
creased to between 6 and 8 a year.3 10 The upward trend continued
under Ronald Reagan who averaged 11 constitutionally based state-
ments a year for an 8-year total of 87,311 nearly equal to that of all of
his predecessors combined.31 During the next four years, George
Bush almost tripled Reagan's annual output, averaging 29 constitu-
tionally based signing statements a year.3 13 Such statements, rather
than appearing once a decade, now arrive at a rate of roughly one
every two weeks.
The extent to which signing statements have become a vehicle for
raising constitutional objections is further reflected in the fact that
during the administrations of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Ken-
nedy, Johnson, and Nixon, the percentage of all signing statements
that rested on constitutional grounds hovered in the range of 3% to
6%.314 As Table 2 indicates, the proportion has jumped dramatically
since then. During the Bush administration, over half of the Presi-
307. See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement of July 17,1964, in 1964 PuB. PAPERS, 861-
62 (1965) (signing statement praising the Water Resources Research Act and the Senator
who guided it through Congress, but requesting deletion of a provision that violated the
spirit of the Constitution).
308. These 15 statements were issued by Presidents Jackson, Tyler, Buchanan, Lincoln,
Johnson (2), Grant, Arthur, Cleveland, Taft, Wilson (2), Hoover, and Roosevelt (2).
309. During this 29-year period, 32 constitutionally based signing statements were is-
sued, as follows: Truman (4), Eisenhower (9), Kennedy (1), Johnson (9), and Nixon (9).
See supra Table 2.
310. Gerald Ford issued 15 constitutionally based signing statements; Jimmy Carter is-
sued 30. See 10-16 WEEKLY CoMp. PRES. Doc. (1974-81). See also supra Table 2.
311. See Ronald W. Reagan, 1980-1988 PUB. PAPERS (1982-90); see also supra Table 2.
312. Presidents from George Washington through Jimmy Carter issued a total of 92
constitutionally based signing statements, only 5 more than Reagan's individual total.
313. See U.S. Code. Cong. & Admin. News (1989-92); 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
(1992). See also supra Table 2.
314. See supra Table 2.
dent's signing statements raised constitutional objections.315 Thus,
whether measured in absolute terms or as a percent of all statements
issued, constitutionally based signing statements have become much
more prevalent in recent years.
2. The Constitutional Grounds for Objection
Table 3 presents a breakdown of the constitutionally based sign-
ing statements issued between 1789 and 1981, showing the ground on
which the President objected.316 If a President opposed a measure on
more than one constitutional ground, the statute appears more than
once. Thus, while signing or post-signing statements were issued with
respect to 93 laws during this period, Table 3 has a total of 103
entries.317
Table 3
Presidential Signing and Post-Signing Statements: Constitutional
Grounds for Objection and Nature of President's Response
(1789-1981)
Note: If a signing statement contained more than one constitutional objection (whether
to a single provision or to different provisions of the same law), the statement will
appear more than once in this table; such statements are identified by an asterisk (*).
As a result, while only 93 statutes where objected to on constitutional grounds, this table
contains 103 entries.
PRESIDENT, STATUTE, AND BASIS OF OBJECTION PRESIDENT'S
RESPONSE'
FEDERALISM (7)
Exceeds Scope of National Power (3)
Jackson May 31, 1830, ch. 232, 4 Stat. 427 Complied
Grant Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 267, 19 Stat. 132 Disregarded
Cleveland Aug. 2, 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209 Complied
Intrudes Upon Other Rights of States (4)
Tyler June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 No Occasion
A. Johnson July 24, 1866, Res. No. 73, 14 Stat. 364 No Occasion
315. A total of 590 public laws emerged from the 102d Congress, which met during 1991
and 1992; President Bush issued signing statements raising constitutional objections to 59
of these laws, representing 10% of the statutes enacted. See U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News (1991-92).
316. This Article's analysis of signing statements in terms of the grounds on which they
were based and the President's response to the law in question covers the period from 1789
to 1981. To have similarly analyzed the more than 200 constitutionally based statements
issued by Presidents Reagan and Bush would have required at least five more years of
research. For a list of constitutionally based signing statements issued in the period 1972-
88, without an indication of the President's response to the law, see Popkin, supra note 306,
at 718-22.
317. Of the 93 statutes with respect to which signing statements were issued, 6 were
opposed on 2 distinct constitutional grounds, and 2 were opposed on 3 distinct grounds.
These 8 laws account for 18 entries in Table 3.
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A. Johnson March 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 6, 14 Stat. 485* No Occasion
Nixon June 22, 1970, PL 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 Complied
SEPARATION OF POWERS (83)
Appointment (and Removal) Power (8)
Arthur Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 b Disregarded
Truman June 29, 1948, ch. 754, 62 Stat. 1112* Complied
Truman May 12, 1949, ch. 101, 63 Stat. 67* Complied
Nixon Nov. 16, 1973, PL 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 No Occasion/
Complied'
Ford Oct. 23, 1974, PL 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 Disregarded
Ford Dec. 20, 1975, PL 94-158, 89 Stat. 844* Complied
Ford Jan. 3, 1976, PL 94-201, 89 Stat. 1129 Complied
Carter Dec. 12, 1980, PL 96-515, 94 Stat. 2998-3000* Disregarded
Members of Congress Holding Other Office (2)
Ford Oct. 20, 1975, PL 94-118, 89 Stat. 603 Disregarded
Ford Dec. 20, 1975, PL 94-158, 89 Stat. 844* Complied
Executive Functions Placed Outside Executive Branch (1)
Nixon Aug. 15, 1970, PL 91-379, 84 Stat. 796 Complied
Commander-in-Chief (5)
Buchanan June 25, 1860, ch. 211, 12 Stat. 104 Disregarded
A. Johnson March 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 2, 14 Stat. 485* Complied
L. Johnson Sept. 12, 1966, PL 89-568, 80 Stat. 739 Complied
L. Johnson April 4, 1967, PL 90-8, 81 Stat. 8 Complied
L. Johnson Oct. 21, 1967, PL 90-110, 81 Stat. 279 Compliedd
Power to Pardon (1)
Carter Aug. 2, 1977, PL 95-86, 91 Stat. 444* Disregarded
Conduct of Foreign Relations (10)
Grant Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 288, 19 Stat. 170 Complied
Wilson June 5, 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988, 1007e  Disregarded
Truman Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, 64 Stat. 595, 758 Complied
Eisenhower Aug. 2, 1955), ch. 491, 69 Stat. 435 Complied
Eisenhower July 31, 1956), ch. 803, 70 Stat. 733 Complied
Eisenhower Aug. 8, 1956, ch. 1036, 70 Stat. 1119 Complied
Eisenhower July 29, 1958, PL 85-568, 72 Stat. 426 Disregarded
Ford April 13, 1976, PL 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 Complied
Carter Aug. 17, 1977, PL 95-108, 91 Stat. 871 Complied
Carter Aug. 15, 1979, PL 96-60, § 108, 93 Stat. 397* Disregarded
Legislative (and Committee) Veto: Disapproval Power (31)
Eisenhower Aug. 6, 1956, ch. 972, 70 Stat. 1044 No Occasion
Eisenhower Aug. 6, 1959, PL 86-137, 73 Stat. 280 No Occasion
Eisenhower July 14, 1960, PL 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 No Occasion
Kennedy Oct. 23, 1962, PL 87-872, 76 Stat. 1163' Complied
L. Johnson July 17, 1964, PL 88-379, 78 Stat. 329 No Occasion
L. Johnson Oct. 8, 1964, PL 88-638, 78 Stat. 1035* No Occasion
Nixon Aug. 5, 1974, PL 93-365, 88 Stat. 399 No Occasion
Ford Aug. 21, 1974, PL 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 No Occasion
Ford May 26, 1975, PL 94-25, 89 Stat. 90 Complied
Ford Aug. 9, 1975, PL 94-88, 89 Stat. 433 No Occasion
Ford May 11, 1976, PL 94-283, 90 Stat. 4759 Complied
Ford June 30, 1976, PL 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 No Occasion
Ford Sept. 14, 1976, PL 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 No Occasion
Ford Oct. 15, 1976, PL 94-502, 90 Stat. 2383 No Occasion
Carter July 27, 1977, PL 95-75, 91 Stat. 308 No Occasion
Carter Aug. 4, 1977, PL 95-92, 91 Stat. 622-23 No Occasion
Carter Dec. 28, 1977, PL 95-223, 91 Stat. 1628 No Occasion
Carter Mar. 10, 1978, PL 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 No Occasion
Carter Sept. 18, 1978, PL 95-372, 92 Stat. 641, 668 No Occasion
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Carter Oct. 5, 1978, PL 95-421, 92 Stat. 923 No Occasion
Carter Oct. 6, 1978, PL 95-424, 92 Stat. 956 Complied
Carter Aug. 15, 1979, PL 96-60, 93 Stat. 405-06* No Occasion
Carter March 5, 1980, PL 96-199, 94 Stat. 73-74 No Occasion
Carter May 23, 1980, PL 96-247, 94 Stat. 352-53 No Occasion
Carter May 28, 1980, PL 96-252, 94 Stat. 393-96 No Occasion
Carter Aug. 29, 1980, PL 96-332, 94 Stat. 1057 No Occasion
Carter Oct. 17, 1980, PL 96-464, 94 Stat. 2067 No Occasion
Carter Dec. 12, 1980, PL 96-515, 94 Stat. 3004* No Occasion
Carter Dec. 16, 1980, PL 96-533, 94 Stat. 3136, 3142 No Occasion
Carter Dec. 17, 1980, PL 96-539, 94 Stat. 3195 No Occasion
Carter Dec. 24, 1980, PL 96-592, 94 Stat. 3449-50 No Occasion
Legislative (and Committee) Veto: Approval Power (14)
Truman July 5, 1949, ch. 296, 63 Stat. 405 Complied
Eisenhower July 13, 1955, ch. 358, 69 Stat. 301, 321 Complied
L. Johnson Dec. 31, 1963, PL 88-257, 77 Stat. 844 No Occasion
L. Johnson Oct. 8, 1964, PL 88-638, 78 Stat. 1035* Compliedh
L. Johnson Oct. 14, 1964, PL 88-643, 78 Stat. 1043' Complied
L. Johnson Oct. 26, 1965, PL 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073 No Occasion
Nixon May 27, 1972, PL 92-306, 86 Stat. 163 No Occasion
Nixon June 17, 1972, PL 92-313, 86 Stat. 216 Complied
Nixon July 11, 1973, PL 93-66, 87 Stat. 152 Complied
Ford Feb. 9, 1976, PL 94-212, 90 Stat. 153 Complied
Ford June 30, 1976, PL 94-330, 90 Stat. 771 Complied
Carter Sept. 30, 1978, PL 95-405, 92 Stat. 877 No Occasion
Carter Nov. 10, 1978, PL 95-625, 92 Stat. 3549 Complied
Carter Sept. 8, 1980, PL 96-342, 94 Stat. 1082 No Occasion
Recommending Measures to Congress (2)
Taft Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 350, 37 Stat. 360, 415i  Disregarded
L. Johnson Sept. 8, 1966, PL 89-556, 80 Stat. 689 Complied
Executive Privilege (2)
Eisenhower July 24, 1959, PL 86-108, 73 Stat. 246 Complied
Nixon Nov. 18, 1969, PL 91-120, 83 Stat. 203 Complied
Prosecutorial Function (1)
Nixon Dec. 17, 1973, PL 93-190, 87 Stat. 73 6-37k No Occasion
Execution of Laws and Supervisory Power (6)
Wilson June 23, 1913, ch. 3, 38 Stat. 4 Complied ?
Roosevelt June 17, 1944, ch. 262, 58 Stat. 280 No Occasion
Carter Dec. 9, 1977, PL 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460 Complied
Carter Oct. 1, 1980, PL 96-369, 94 Stat. 1356 Complied
Carter Dec. 12, 1980, PL 96-515, 94 Stat. 2999* No Occasion
Carter Dec. 12, 1980, PL 96-516, 94 Stat. 3007 No Occasion
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS (13)
Punishment for Treason (1)
Lincoln July 17, 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 No Occasion
Bill of Attainder (4)
Roosevelt July 12, 1943, ch. 218, 57 Stat. 431' Complied
Truman June 29, 1948, ch. 754, 62 Stat. 1112* Complied
Truman May 12, 1949, ch. 101, 63 Stat. 67* Complied
Carter Aug. 2, 1977, PL 95-86, 91 Stat. 444* Disregarded
First Amendment (5)
Ford Oct. 15, 1974, PL 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 Complied
Carter Nov. 2, 1978, PL 95-567, 92 Stat. 2405 Disregarded
Carter Nov. 10, 1978, PL 95-629, 92 Stat. 3636-39 Disregarded
Carter Jan. 8, 1980, PL 96-187, 93 Stat. 1367 No Occasion
Carter Dec. 24, 1980, PL 96-593, 94 Stat. 3452 No Occasion
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Due Process (2)
Hoover March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 No Occasion
Carter Aug. 2, 1977, PL 95-86, 91 Stat. 444* Disregarded
Equal Protection (1)
Carter Oct. 8, 1977, PL 95-126, 91 Stat. 1106) Complied
Notes to Table 3
a The following designations are used in this column of the table: "Complied" indicates the
President complied with the law, either by honoring or agreeing to honor the provision whose
constitutionality was questioned, or by finding a lawful manner of proceeding that made it
unnecessary to use the provision in question; "Disregarded" indicates the President disre-
garded the law by failing to honor or enforce the allegedly unconstitutional provision: "No
Occasion" indicates the President had no occasion to honor or ignore the provision because,
for example, the Executive was not required to take any action with respect to it, or the
provision was quickly amended or repealed, or the President left office before an opportunity
to respond to the law arose.
b Post-signing statement issued March 1, 1883, in 11 MESSAGES AND PAPERS supra note 129, at
4745 (objecting to law which Arthur had signed on January 16, 1883).
c President Nixon objected to two different sections of this act, § 404 and § 405, claiming that
each interfered with his power of appointment. There was no occasion to honor or ignore
§ 404 because the position in question was abolished. See ExEc. ORDER No. 11775, 39 Fed.
Reg. 11415 (1974). Nixon complied with § 405.
d President Johnson objected to 3 provisions of this act - §§ 809, 810 and 1001 - on the basis
that each interfered with his authority as Commander-in-Chief; because each provision was
challenged on the same ground, the statute appears only once in this table.
e Message of Aug. 24, 1920, in 17 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 8871-72; 66
PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 139, at 136-37 (post-signing statement issued by
State Department at Wilson's direction on August 24, 1920, objecting to § 34 of Jones Act
which Wilson had signed June 5, 1920).
f Message of January 8, 1963, in 1963 Pua. PAPERS 6 (1964) (post-signing statement objecting to
law Kennedy had signed without objection on October 23, 1962).
g The legislative veto provision to which Ford here objected had been added by the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 209, 88 Stat. 1287, and
was simply carried forward by this law. When Ford signed the 1974 act he objected to other
aspects of the law but not to the legislative veto provision. See 1974 PuB. PAPERS 303-04
(1975). By now objecting to this provision, Ford was in effect issuing a post-signing statement
concerning the 1974 act. However, for simplicity's sake, his May 11, 1976 signing statement
will be treated as an objection to the 1976 act.
h The law required approval of an Advisory Committee made up of both executive branch
officials and designated Members of Congress.
The act required that before certain regulations issued by the CIA could take effect, they had
to be approved by "the chairmen and ranking minority members" of the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees, but not by the committees as a whole.
Post-signing message issued February 26, 49 CoNG. REc. 3985-86 (1913), submitting proposed
budget to Congress in a form barred by an act of Congress which Taft had signed without
objection on August 23, 1912. Prior to passage of that act, however, Taft had informed Con-
gress that he believed he possessed the constitutional authority to submit a proposed budget
in whatever form he wished. 48 CONG. REC. 8500-01 (June 27, 1912).
k Non-signing statement explaining why President let bill become law without his signature.
I Post-signing statement issued September 14, 1943, objecting to one provision in an appropria-
tions measure that Roosevelt had signed on July 12, 1943. 89 CoNG. REC. 7521, 7558 (1943).
The most frequent ground for challenge involved some aspect of
separation of powers. This was the basis for 80% of the constitutional
objections raised.318 Not surprisingly, virtually all of these entailed
318. Table 3 places objections to legislative veto provisions in the separation of powers
category. Though such devices have been held to violate Article I of the Constitution, INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the veto provisions objected to in signing statements all
involved attempts to allow Congress or its committees to take action without presentment
to the President, thus denying the Executive one of its essential functions.
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alleged inroads on the authority of the executive branch. More than
half of the separation of powers objections were directed at "legisla-
tive veto" provisions giving one or both Houses of Congress, or speci-
fied congressional committees, the power to approve or disapprove
action taken by the executive branch.319 Presidential claims that a law
violated the rights of individuals made up 13% of the objections
raised. Federalism concerns, that Congress had exceeded the scope of
its enumerated powers or otherwise invaded the domain of the states
accounted for only 7% of signing statement challenges.
3. Presidential Compliance
As we saw earlier in reviewing constitutionally-based vetoes, it is
one thing for a President to assert that a law is unconstitutional, and
quite another for him to actually disregard it. The same distinction
has held true with respect to signing statements. Of the 93 statutes
whose validity was challenged in presidential signing statements be-
tween 1789 and 1981, only 12 were disregarded by the President. In
the remaining 81 cases, representing 87% of the total, the Chief Exec-
utive either had no occasion to execute the law or chose to honor the
statute despite his constitutional reservations.
Most of the instances where the White House was not put to the
choice of executing or defying the disputed statute resulted from cir-
cumstances beyond the President's control. In the legislative veto
cases, for example, the Executive seldom faced the issue of whether or
not to comply with a congressional vote of disapproval, for Congress
rarely exercised its veto authority.320 In other instances, the statute
was such that no action on the part of the Executive was called for.
This was true, for example, of President Tyler's 1842 signing statement
suggesting that Congress could not constitutionally require the states
to establish single-member districts for electing representatives to
319. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 974, 978 & n. 15 (White, J., dissenting) (recogniz-
ing that the term "legislative veto" in its broad sense embraces provisions requiring the
approval of one or both Houses of Congress, and those giving the power to approve or
disapprove to congressional committees); accord Louis FisHER, CONSTrrtrONAL CON-
FmIars BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PREsmENTr 135 (3d ed. rev. 1991).
320. Most of the instances in Table 3 where Presidents are shown to have complied with
a legislative veto provision involved cases where the Executive agreed in advance to abide
by Congress's wishes, but where Congress never actually voted a resolution of disapproval.
In a few instances Presidents acquiesced in committee vetoes or agreed not to act until
committee approval was granted.
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Congress.21 And in a few cases the President left office before there
was time to execute the provision in question.
3 22
Not every instance where the Executive lacked occasion to en-
force a disputed law was foreordained. A President who would prefer
not to enforce a law he thinks unconstitutional, but who is equally
reluctant to take the extreme step of ignoring the law, may be able to
escape the dilemma by finding a middle course. One way to accom-
plish this is by persuading Congress to amend or repeal the offensive
provision. Indeed, many signing statements asserted that the White
House would seek corrective action from Congress, but the fact that
the provision was enacted in the first place suggests that such efforts
are likely to prove ineffectual.32 Yet, in a few instances the White
House did secure an amendment which cured the perceived constitu-
tional defect.
32 4
In other cases, Presidents found ways of by-passing the allegedly
unconstitutional provision without having to engage in conduct that
amounted to noncompliance. In 1975, Gerald Ford signed a bill giving
executive functions to the Federal Council on the Arts and the Hu-
manities even though four of its members were not appointed in ac-
cord with the Constitution.3z In his signing statement, Ford noted
that another statute allowed him to alter the Council's membership
321. Message of June 25, 1842, in 5 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 2012-13.
For Congress's protest and remonstrance against this message, see H.R. REP. No. 909,27th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1842).
322. Richard Nixon, for example, issued a constitutionally based signing statement four
days before he resigned the Presidency. Message of Aug. 5,1974, in 1974 PUB. PAPERS, 620
(1975).
323. See, e.g., Grover Cleveland, Statement of Aug. 2, 1886, in 10 MESSAGES AND PA-
PERS, supra note 129, at 4992-94; Harry S. Truman, Statement of July 5, 1949, in 1949 PuB.
PAPERS, 346-47 (1964); Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement of Oct. 26, 1965, in 1965 PUB. PA-
PERS, 1082-84 (1966). In none of these instances did Congress amend the statute as re-
quested by the President.
324. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-157,73 Stat. 338 (deleting legislative
veto provision from a law Eisenhower had signed but objected to 8 days earlier); State-
ment of Aug. 6, 1959, in 1959 PUB. PAPERS, 566 (1960); Act of July 13,1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
351, 86 Stat. 471 (repealing provision in statute Nixon had signed but objected to 6 weeks
earlier); Statement of May 28, 1972, in 1972 PUB. PAPERS, 627-28 (1974); Act of Dec. 23,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-579, 94 Stat. 3359 (amending statute Carter had signed but objected to
three and a half months earlier); Statement of Sept. 8, 1980, in 1980 Pun. PAPERS, 1667-68
(1982).
325. Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Act, Pub. L. No. 94-158, 89 Stat. 844 (giving new
functions to the Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities which had been created
by the Act of Sept. 29,1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, § 9,79 Stat. 845,851-52). The Act allowed
four Council members to be appointed in a manner not provided for by Article II, § 2. In
addition, one member could be a Congressperson, contrary to Article I, § 6.
and he immediately exercised this authority to resolve the constitu-
tional problem 6
In the legislative veto context, Presidents were occasionally able
to circumvent the objectionable provision by not engaging in the con-
duct for which congressional approval was required. Lyndon Johnson,
for example, signed the Flood Control Act of 1965 but objected to the
validity of a section which required House and Senate committee ap-
proval of any water resource development projects the Army wished
to undertake. 27 Johnson sidestepped this legislative veto mechanism
by ordering the Secretary of the Army not to exercise the authority
given him by the Act until Congress deleted the provision.328 While
the question may be a close one, the President's action probably did
not amount to a refusal to comply with the law. The Act authorized,
but did not direct, the Army to pursue these projects. Moreover, it
was so worded as not to appropriate any funds until after a proposal
was approved by the committees, thereby precluding a charge that the
President had impounded funds which Congress had directed him to
spend.329
Johnson similarly managed to steer clear of a legislative veto
clause written into the 1964 Water Resources Research Act.330 The
provision, to which Johnson had objected in a signing statement,
331
barred the Secretary of the Interior from funding a project under Title
II of the Act if it was disapproved by either of two congressional com-
mittees. While the Act authorized up to $1 million a year to be spent
on these projects, no funds had been appropriated, and Johnson or-
dered the Secretary not to request any. Congress might have
326. Statement of Dec. 20, 1975, in 1975 PUB. PAPERS, 1990-91 (1977) (noting constitu-
tional objections and invoking authority given him by Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
209, § 9(b), 79 Stat. 851, to order that when the Council carries out functions given it by the
1975 Act, the four members in question "shall not serve as members of the Council..
327. See Statement of Oct. 26, 1965, in 1965 PUB. PAPERS, 1082-84 (1966).
328. See Separation of Powers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., pt. I, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 148, 153 (1967) [hereinafter
Separation of Powers Hearings].
329. The Act expressly stated: "No appropriation shall be made" until a project was
approved by the House and Senate committees. Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 201(a), 79 Stat.
1073. But see FISHER, supra note 134, at 166, 308 n.52 (stating that Johnson impounded
these funds). Fisher confuses the statute at issue here with the 1954 Watershed Protection
and Flood Control Act, which Johnson also objected to on legislative veto grounds.
330. Water Resources Research Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-379, § 200, 78 Stat. 329,
331.
331. Statement of July 17, 1964, in 1964 PUB. PAPERS, 861-62 (1965) (stating that the
veto provision violated separation of powers).
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amended the President's budget to include such funding,332 but it
failed to do so. As a result, Title II was not implemented until after
Congress amended the Act in 1966 to delete the committee approval
requirement.333
However, in more than half the cases where constitutionally-
based signing statements were issued, Presidents ultimately con-
fronted the issue of whether to honor the law or defy it.334 In the vast
majority of these instances (i.e., 76% of the time) the President chose
compliance.
335
In many cases where the President honored a statute about which
he had constitutional doubts, he at the same time sought to resolve the
problem in other ways. The Chief Executive often urged Congress to
amend the law in question,336 sometimes submitting an administration
bill to this effect.
337
On at least five occasions, Presidents complied with a law while at
the same time taking steps to have the question of its constitutionality
resolved by the courts. The first of these involved Franklin Roosevelt
who, in July, 1943, approved an urgent deficiency appropriation bill
that contained a rider prohibiting the government from continuing to
332. See Pious, supra note 73, at 258, 276-77; ALAN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY:
BUDGETING, SPENDING AND TAXING 169-77 (1980).
333. Act of April 19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-404, 80 Stat. 129; Water Resources Research:
Hearings on H.R. 3606 and S. 22 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 8, 15, 32 (1966);
Office of Water Resources Research, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 1965 Ann. Rep. xv-xvi, 27-
28 (1965); Office of Water Resources Research, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 1966 Ann. Rep.
3, 132, 135 (1966).
334. See supra Table 3.
335. Of the 103 entries in Table 3, 43 were situations where the President had no occa-
sion to honor or defy the law, 44 involved compliance, and 15 were cases of defiance; one
entry, involving two statutory provisions, involved both "no occasion" and "compliance."
The President thus chose between compliance and defiance in 59.5 (44.5 + 15) or 58% of
the 103 cases. The instances of compliance (44.5) comprised 75% of this group.
336. See, e.g., Andrew Johnson, Message of Dec. 3, 1867, in 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS,
supra note 129, at 3760; Andrew Johnson, Message of Dec. 9, 1868, in 8 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 129, at 3871-72 (urging Congress to repeal provisions of Act of March
2, 1867, ch. 170, 14 Stat. 485, to which he had objected in March 2, 1867 signing statement
(8 id. at 3670)); Richard M. Nixon, Statement of July 11, 1973, in 1973 PUB. PAPERS, 642-43
(1975).
337. See, e.g., Defense Production Act Amendments, 1972: Hearings on S. 669 and S.
1901 Before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 8-9 (1972) (Nixon administration submitted
proposal to amend Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796, the constitutionality of which Nixon
had objected to in his Statement of Aug. 17, 1970, in 1970 PuB. PAPERS, 674-76 (1971)).
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employ three named individuals after November 15.338 In mid-Sep-
tember, Roosevelt issued a post-signing statement "placing on record"
his view that the rider was a bill of attainder, and explaining that he
had approved the measure in order "to avoid delaying our conduct of
the war."33 9 Roosevelt complied with the act but made sure that the
men would have standing to challenge it in court.340 When they later
sued, the Justice Department refused to defend the validity of the act,
a task which fell to Congress participating as an amicus curiae. After
the Court of Claims found for the plaintiffs without reaching the con-
stitutional issue,34 ' the Justice Department took the case to the
Supreme Court where the Attorney General successfully argued that
the rider was unconstitutional.342
President Nixon also turned to the courts to vindicate his consti-
tutional opposition to the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 in-
sofar as they lowered the voting age to 18 in federal, state, and local
elections. In his June 22 signing statement Nixon announced that he
had "directed the Attorney General to cooperate fully in expediting a
swift court test of the constitutionality of the 18-year-old provi-
sion. '343 In order to produce a test case, the administration immedi-
ately undertook to enforce the law despite its opposition to it.344 By
the end of August four cases involving the constitutionality of the
amendments had been filed directly in the Supreme Court.345 In con-
trast to the Roosevelt administration, the Nixon Justice Department
338. Act of July 12, 1943, ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (barring employment of the
men in any capacity unless, prior to November 15, 1943, they were appointed to office by
the President and confirmed by the Senate).
339. Statement of Sept. 14, 1943, in PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, 1943, supra note 171, at 385-86; U.S. CONST., art. I., § 9 ("No Bill of Attainder
or ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
340. When one of the men, Robert M. Lovett, lost his job prior to the November 15
termination date, he was named to another post, giving him a salary claim sufficient to
confer standing to challenge the validity of the rider in the Court of Claims. See John H.
Ely, United States v. Lovett- Litigating The Separation of Powers, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rnv. 1, 4-6 n.20 (1975).
341. Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
342. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
343. Statement of June 22, 1970, in 1970 PUB. PAPERS, 512-13 (1971).
344. See Christopher Lydon, Mitchell Gives States to Aug. 3 to Act on Vote at 18, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 1970, at 16, col. 5; Mitchell Promises Vigorous Defense of Vote Age Suit,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1970, at 11, col. 4; Mitchell Sets Subpoena Rules to Allay Growing
Press Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1970, at 24, col. 1; Fred P. Graham, U.S. Sues to Uphold
18 year old Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1970, at 25, col. 3; U.S. Widens Test of Vote at 18
Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1970, at 27, col. 5.
345. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 n.1 (1970); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
802 (1970).
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formally defended the Act, but its performance was "lackluster and
unenthusiastic. '346 At oral argument, Solicitor General Erwin Gris-
wold told the Justices that both the President and the Attorney Gen-
eral thought the voting rights amendments were unconstitutional, and
conceded that in his own mind their validity was "a very close ques-
tion. ' 347 Nixon's efforts met with partial success. On December 21,
1970, the Court sustained all of the Voting Rights Act Amendments
except the one lowering the voting age in state and local elections,
which was held to be unconstitutional.348
Two of the other three instances where Presidents complied with
the law but sought to have the issue of its validity decided by the
courts involved the Ford administration. In October 1974, Ford
signed but expressed First Amendment reservations about amend-
ments to the Federal Election Campaign Act,349 which placed limits
on individual contributions and candidate expenditures; however,
Ford was confident "such issues [could] be resolved in the courts.
'350
When a suit challenging the constitutionality of the amendments was
filed, the Justice Department vigorously defended them despite the
administration's doubts as to their validity.3 1 The Supreme Court
partially sustained Ford's position, holding some of the expenditure
limits to be unconstitutional.352
The same 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
contained a one-House legislative veto provision which Ford did not
oppose at the time.353 During 1975 and 1976, the Ford administration
acquiesced in the provision by routinely submitting proposed Federal
Election Commission regulations to Congress where some of them
were blocked by the House or the Senate. 4 But when the provision
346. 123 CONG. REC. 2974 (1977) (remarks of Sen. James Abourezk).
347. Fred P. Graham, U.S. Sues to Uphold 18 year old Vote, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 18,1970,
at 25, col. 3; Fred P. Graham, New Law on Voting Rights At Age 18 is Denounced Before
Supreme Court By Lawyers For Four States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1970, at 25, cols. 1-3; 123
CONG. REc. 2974 (1977) (transcript of oral argument).
348. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
349. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263.
350. Message of Oct. 15, 1974, in 1974 PUB. PAPERS 303-04 (1975).
351. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
352. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
353. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 209, 88 Stat. 1287-88.
354. See Federal Election Comm'n, 1976 Ann. Rep. iii, 45; Federal Election Comm'n,
1977 Ann. Rep. 6 n.*, 7; 121 CONG. REC. 32321 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-409, 94th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 33664, 33674 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-552, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975).
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was carried over by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1976,111 Ford now objected that the veto was unconstitutional. He
instructed the Attorney General "to challenge the constitutionality of
this provision at the earliest possible opportunity." '356 Rather than de-
fend the disputed provision, the administration this time took the of-
fensive by having the United States intervene as a plaintiff in a suit
which former Attorney General Ramsey Clark brought against vari-
ous defendants, including the Federal Election Commission.35 7 How-
ever, the President failed in this effort to secure a judicial resolution of
the issue, for the case was dismissed as not being ripe.
35 8
Jimmy Carter likewise turned to the Judiciary, in order to deter-
mine the validity of a 1977 rider limiting the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's authority to enforce Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. 59 The Carter administration complied with the pro-
vision by settling or dismissing proceedings HEW had filed against
local school districts to compel bussing.360 When the provision was
challenged in court, the Justice Department vigorously and success-
fully defended it,361 apparently satisfied that the case against its con-
stitutionality would be argued capably by the plaintiffs.
There may have been instances where compliance with a law re-
flected a presidential awareness that the constitutional objection
raised in a signing statement was so insubstantial as to border on the
frivolous. It is difficult to imagine a President undertaking an official
act in jest, yet it is hard to come up with any other explanation for
Lyndon Johnson's objection to a section of the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1968, which barred the Defense De-
partment from closing the Naval Academy's dairy farm at Annapo-
lis.3 62 According to the President, "Congress, which has given the
Navy Department authority over the world's most powerful fleet, has
withdrawn the Department's authority over 380 cows." This, he said,
355. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475.
356. Statement of May 11, 1976, in 1976 PUB. PAPERS 1530 (1979).
357. Vote Law Change Sought by Clark, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1976, at A9, co. 5; Justice
Department Opposes Veto Plan On Election Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1976, at 7, col. 4;
Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc).
358. Clark, 559 F.2d at 647, aff'd sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977).
359. Statement of Dec. 9, 1977, in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 2087-88 (1978) (objecting to Act
of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460).
360. See Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221, 1229 n.42, 1237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
361. Brown v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1978), affd, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
362. Pub. L. No. 90-110, § 810, 81 Stat. 279, 309. Pressure to close the dairy came from
private local milk producers who wished to supply the Academy with dairy products. L.A.
TimEs, April 16, 1989, at 19, col. 1.
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"raise[s] questions concerning the constitutional separation of pow-
ers."363 Questions, but not "grave" ones. The plan to sell the Naval
Academy's dairy was dropped.
Presidential compliance with measures to which the President
had objected was not always intentional. On two occasions, a White
House attempt to defy an allegedly unconstitutional law was thwarted
by subordinates in the executive branch. Both cases involved legisla-
tive veto provisions which executive officials may have been reluctant
to ignore for fear that Congress might retaliate by reducing the
agency's future funding level.3 4 On January 8, 1963, John Kennedy
issued a memorandum objecting, on the Attorney General's advice, to
the validity of a committee veto provision in an appropriation act that
he had signed the previous October.365 Kennedy instructed David E.
Bell, head of the Agency for International Development to whose ac-
tions the veto applied, that he was to treat the provision as a mere
"request for information" on the part of the congressional commit-
tees.366 The agency nevertheless complied with the provision during
Fiscal Year 1963 when it was in effect. AID did so, said Bell, because
"the Comptroller General gave an opinion that it was in the act, un-
constitutional or not, and we had to abide by it as long as it was in the
act .... ,367 It is unclear whether Kennedy ever learned that this exec-
utive agency had ignored his instruction and the advice of the Attor-
ney General in favor of a contrary legal opinion issued by someone
who was an agent of Congress.368
President Carter was similarly frustrated when he attempted to
ignore a two-House legislative veto provision contained in the Na-
tional Parks and Recreation Act of 1978. A section of the Act re-
quired the Department of Agriculture to obtain, by concurrent
resolution, House and Senate approval before making certain land ex-
changes in Montana's Gallatin-Beaverhead National Forest, if the ex-
363. Statement of Oct. 21,1967, in 1967 PUB. PAPERS 935 (1968). See JACK SWEETMAN,
THE U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 163-64 (1979); L.A. TIMES, April
16, 1989, at 19, col. 1.
364. On the fact that executive agencies sometimes show greater loyalty to Congress
than to the President, see FRANKLIN, supra note 123, at 63-64; Louis FISHER, THE PoLrICs
OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 89-92 (2d ed. 1987); FISHER, supra
note 134, at 73.
365. Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-872,76 Stat. 1163, 1164; Memorandum, Jan. 8,
1963, in 1963 PUB. PAPERS 6 (1964).
366. Memorandum, Jan. 8, 1963, in 1963 PUB. PAPERS 6 (1964)
367. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1964: Hearings on
H.R. 9499 Before the Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 312-13 (1963).
368. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,727-32 (1986) (finding Comptroller General to
be an agent of Congress).
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change involved over 6400 acres. 69 Carter's November 10, 1978
signing statement noted that both he and the Justice Department
thought the section was unconstitutional. Carter directed the Secre-
tary of Agriculture that while he should listen to Congress's views, he
should "consummate any land exchanges covered by [the section]
which are, in his opinion, otherwise authorized by statute, irrespective
of the acreage involved."370 Senator John Melcher of Montana, who
had sponsored the section, took the extraordinary step of appealing
the President's action to the Justice Department, persuading it that "in
spite of the President's direction, the Department and the Forest Ser-
vice should cooperate with him and the Congress in processing these
land exchanges."'371 The Justice Department then advised the Agri-
culture Department that it could as a matter of policy elect to comply
with the veto provision. On November 22, ten days after Carter had
issued his directive to the contrary, the Department of Agriculture
ordered the Forest Service "to proceed as if [the section] were applica-
ble, that is, that proposed exchanges exceeding 6,400 acres would have
to be approved by concurrent resolution of Congress. '372 The Forest
Service saw the writing on the wall and suspended further considera-
tion of the proposed exchanges.373
4. Presidential Noncompliance
Table 4 shows the 12 instances in which Presidents failed to com-
ply with laws to which they had objected in a signing or post-signing
statement.3 74 What is immediately striking is that a majority of these
369. National Parks and Recreation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-625, § 1301, 92 Stat. 3467, 3549;
Additions to the National Wilderness Preservation System: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
24-26 (1979) [hereinafter Wilderness Hearings].
370. Statement of Nov. 10, 1978, in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1999-2000 (1979).
371. Wilderness Hearings, supra note 369, at 244-45.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 35 (testimony of Bill Cunningham, Wilderness Society); id. at 42-47 (testi-
mony of Tom Costen, U.S. Forest Service).
374. There are a number of well-known incidents that may be thought to involve presi-
dential refusals to honor a law on constitutional grounds, but which do not belong in this
category.
Andrew Jackson: In 1830 Jackson signed an internal improvements bill, Act of May 31,
1830, ch. 232, 4 Stat. 427, but issued a signing statement declaring that the $8,000 appropri-
ated for the road from Detroit to Chicago could not be used to extend the road beyond the
Michigan Territory (into the state of Indiana). Statement of May 30, 1830, in 3 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 1046. This reflected Jackson's view that Congress had
power to provide for improvements in the territories but not within the states. See 3 id. at
1046-56, 1071-77. In this case, Jackson's concerns were purely hypothetical, for the Chi-
cago Road was still far from the Indiana border. Contrary to later assertions, see, e.g., H.R.
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REP. No. 909,27th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1842), all of the funds were spent during his admin-
istration, as were some later appropriations for the Chicago Road. See H.R. ExEc. Doc.
No. 2,21st Cong., 2d Sess. 97, 102-03 (1830); H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 2,22nd Cong., 1st Sess.
84, 104-05 (1831); H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 22nd Cong., 2d Sess. 99-100 (1832).
Abraham Lincoln: Lincoln allegedly "ignored Congressional directions to terminate
the Rush-Bagot Agreement disarming the Great Lakes ...." Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 418-19 n.136 (1972). Yet no such directions existed. Af-
ter Secretary of State Seward had notified Great Britain that the 1817 treaty would be
terminated, Congress passed a joint resolution which "adopted and ratified" the notice "as
if the same had been authorized by [C]ongress." Act of Feb. 9, 1865, Res. No. 13, 13 Stat.
568. Because Congress only authorized rather than directed termination of the treaty,
Seward's later withdrawal of the termination notice was not a refusal to comply with the
resolution. See Jesse S. Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of Treaties, 15 AM. J.
INT'L LAW 33, 35-36 (1921).
Ulysses Grant: In 1876, President Grant signed a river and harbor appropriation bill,
Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 267, 19 Stat. 132, but issued a statement asserting that many of the
items were "for works of purely private or local interest, in no sense national," and declar-
ing that "during my term of office no public money shall be expended upon them." State-
ment of Aug. 14, 1876, in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 4331. Grant made
good on his promise. Of the 146 projects funded by the Act, he spent nothing on more
than half of them; many others received only partial funding. See 1876 ANN. REP. OF THE
SECRETARY OF WAR, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 12, 35-37
(1876); 1877 ANN. REP. OF TE SECRETARY OF WAR, H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, 45th Cong.,
2d Sess., vol. 2, at 31 (1877). While for some earlier Presidents, an objection to funding
"local" projects might have reflected constitutional scruples, this was not so with Grant,
who earlier and without objection had signed two river and harbor bills that funded many
of the same projects he now refused to undertake. See Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 416, 17
Stat. 370; Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 233, 17 Stat. 560. The problem in 1876 was that the
country was in a depression and tax revenues were down. Grant's signing statement thus
gave, as the only reason for his action, that "[t]here is very great necessity for economy of
expenditures at this time ...." 9 MESSAGE AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 4331. See also
WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE, ULYSSES S. GRANT, POLITICIAN 75,80,159 (1935) (Grant had no
sense or knowledge of the Constitution and as President was "[u]ntrammeled by constitu-
tional scruples . . ").
Harry Truman: In 1949, Congress appropriated funds to increase the Air Force to 58
groups; Truman, believing that 48 groups would suffice, impounded the extra funds. While
it has been said that Truman based his objection partly on his "authority as Commander-in-
Chief," FISHER, supra note 134, at 162-63, his opposition rested solely on policy grounds.
Statement of Oct. 29, 1949, in 1949 PUB. PAPERS 538-39 (1964). Truman cited his authority
as Commander-in-Chief only as the basis for ordering the Secretary of Defense not to
spend the funds. See Impoundment Hearings, supra note 155, at 524-25.
Dwight Eisenhower Eisenhower signed a 1959 law amending the Mutual Security Act,
but objected on separation of powers grounds to a provision requiring the Executive, at the
request of the General Accounting Office or any congressional committee, to furnish Con-
gress with material concerning the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). Act
of July 24, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-108, 73 Stat. 246; Statement of July 24, 1959, in 1959 PUB.
PAPERS, 549 (1960). In response, Congress amended the Act to provide that FY 1960
funds for the ICA and for the State Department's Office of Inspector General would be
cut off if requested materials were not disclosed; but this provision accommodated the
President's concerns by stating that no cut-off would occur if, in rejecting a request, the
President personally certified that the material should not be disclosed. Act of Sept. 28,
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-383, § 111(d), 73 Stat. 720. A similar certification and cut-off provi-
sion was included in the FY 1961 appropriation act. Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-
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incidents occurred between 1974 and 1981, the last 7 years covered by
this study. Before 1970, there were only 5 such occurrences-2 in the
last half of the 19th century, and 3 more between 1900 and 1973. To
put it differently, from 1789 through 1973, executive noncompliance
occurred on an average of once every 36 years, while during the pe-
riod from 1974 through 1980 it was an annual event. To the extent
there is now a developed practice of Presidents refusing to enforce
laws based on constitutional objections raised in signing statements, it
is one of extraordinarily recent vintage.
In examining each of these 12 episodes, we will consider among
other things the extent to which the President's attempt to defy the
law was subject to check by Congress or the courts. While every re-
fusal to carry out the law raises serious concerns, the danger is some-
what reduced where the Executive's action is such that it can have no
effect without the affirmative cooperation of Congress. Similarly, to
704, § 101(d), 74 Stat. 776, 778. Eisenhower denied several requests for information, in
each instance giving the required certification. See Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Subcomm. (Nov. 10, 1959), in 1959 PUB. PAPERS 776-
77, (1960); Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Comptroller Gen. (Dec. 15, 1959), in
1959 PuB. PAPERS, 874-75 (1961); President's certification (Dec. 2, 1960), in 1960 PUB.
PAPERS 881-83 (1961). The Comptroller General nonetheless ruled that these refusals re-
quired cutting off funds; the Attorney General replied with an opinion explaining that the
Comptroller General's reading of the law was erroneous, and stating that, if it were cor-
rect, the law would be unconstitutional. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 507 (1960). Eisenhower then
ordered funding to continue during his remaining term in office. CHARLES J. ZINN, Ex-
TENT OF THE CONTROL oiF THE ExEcuTrE BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 n.5 (Comm. Print 1962). Some say Eisenhower refused to comply
with the law. See, e.g., CLARK R. MOLLENIOFF, WASHINGTON COVER-UP 169-76 (1962);
BERGER, supra note 104, at 306. Yet his actions were fully supported by a fair reading of
the statute. Eisenhower did defy the Comptroller General, but it seems inappropriate to
characterize this incident as one where the President chose to defy an act of Congress.
John Kennedy: Kennedy refused to spend funds appropriated in 1962 to develop the
RS-70 weapons system, but his action was not based on constitutional grounds, nor did it
amount to a refusal to carry out the law. Kennedy had opposed a provision in the bill
which "directed" the administration to spend at least $491 million on the program, stating
that this would interfere with his authority as Commander-in-Chief. Letter from John F.
Kennedy to Carl Vinson (March 20, 1962), reprinted in Impoundment Hearings, supra note
155, at 526. Due to his objection, the language of the bill was changed from "directed" to
"authorized" before it became law. Gerald W. Davis, Congressional Power to Require De-
fense Expenditures, 33 FORDHAM L. REv. 39, 40-44 (1964). Kennedy's only remaining ob-
jection to the Act rested on policy grounds. See KOLODZIEJ, supra note 134, at 408-19.
Because Congress had expressly changed the wording of the Act to make it permissive
rather than mandatory, Kennedy's failure to spend all of the funds was not a refusal to
comply with the law.
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Table 4
Presidential Noncompliance with Laws to Which the President
Had Constitutionally Objected in a Signing or Post-Signing
Statement (1789-1981)
President Statute Nature of Objection
BUCHANAN Act of June 25, 1860 ch. Requiring Washington Aqueduct to be
211, 12 Stat. 104 completed only under the supervision of
Captain Meigs violates President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief.
ARTHUR Act of Jan. 16, 1883 ch. 27, Chief Examiner of Civil Service
22 Stat. 403 Commission is an officer of the U.S. and
cannot be chosen by Commission but
must be appointed in accord with Article
II.
TAFT Act of Aug. 23, 1912 ch. President has constitutional right to
350, 37 Stat. 360 submit additional budget information to
Congress in any form he chooses.
WILSON Act of June 5, 1920 ch. 250, Congress may not direct that President
41 Stat. 988 terminate treaties.
EISENHOWER Act of July 29, 1958 PL 85- President may enter into executive
568, 72 Stat. 426 agreements without he approval of the
Senate.
FORD Act of Oct. 23, 1974 PL 93- Senate may not participate in the
463, 88 Stat. 1389 appointment of executive branch officials
who are not appointed by the President.
Act of Oct. 20, 1975 PL 94- Members of Congress may not participate
118, 89 Stat. 603 as voting members on a federal
commission.
CARTER Act of Aug. 2, 1977 PL 95- Congress may not prohibit the executive
86, 91 Stat. 444 branch from spending funds to implement
a presidential pardon.
Act of Nov. 2, 1978 PL 95- Federal ban on editorializing by public
567, 92 Stat. 2405 broadcasting stations violates the First
Amendment.
Act of Nov. 10, 1978 PL Establishment Clause prohibits
95-629, 92 Stat. 3636 government from spending money to
restore and maintain the San Antonio
Missions.
Act of Aug. 15, 1979 PL Congress may not direct the President to
96-60, § 108, 93 Stat. 397 close certain U.S. Consulates abroad.
Act of Dec. 12, 1980 PL Congress may not name members of an
96-515, 94 Stat. 2998 advisory council that performs executive
functions.
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the degree that there are persons with standing to secure prompt judi-
cial review, a President's ability unilaterally to suspend a law is sub-
stantially diminished.37 5
a. James Buchanan: The Captain Meigs Affair
In June 1860, Congress appropriated $500,000 to complete the
Washington Aqueduct, an Army Corps of Engineers project that was
to carry water from the Great Falls of the Potomac to the cities of
Washington and Georgetown. The measure specified that the funds
were "to be expended according to the plans and estimates of Captain
Meigs and under his superintendence. '37 6 President Buchanan signed
the bill on June 25, but issued a statement objecting to the proviso that
the monies had to be spent under the supervision of Montgomery C.
Meigs, the Army captain who had designed the Aqueduct and who
had overseen its construction from the outset. Because the proviso
interfered with his authority as Commander-in-Chief, said Buchanan,
he would treat it merely as an expression of Congress's "preference"
and not as "intending to deprive the President of the power to order
[Meigs] to any other army duty for the performance of which he might
consider him better adapted." '377
On September 1, 1860, after a long simmering quarrel between
Meigs and Secretary of War John B. Floyd forced the President to
choose between the two men, Meigs was relieved of his duties and
sent to the Dry Tortugas in the Gulf of Mexico.378 In February, 1861,
after Floyd had resigned from the Cabinet, Meigs returned to Wash-
ington to resume charge of the Aqueduct project. During his six
375. In considering whether anyone had standing to challenge the President's defiance,
this part of the Article does not discuss possible suits by the House, the Senate, or their
members. The potential for congressional standing is discussed in Part III.B., infra. Stand-
ing doctrine has evolved considerably over time. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 'Injuries,' and Article 111, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 163, 168-97
(1992). In the discussion here, standing is evaluated under the Court's current test which
requires that a litigant have suffered an actual or imminent injury caused by the action
complained of, and likely to be redressed by a favorable judgment; a court may also insist
that a litigant assert only her own legal rights and that her grievance not be shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498-500 (1975); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
376. Statement of June 25, 1860, in 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 3128.
Act of June 25, 1860, ch. 211, 12 Stat. 104. See S. Misc. Doc. No. 83, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-4 (1864).
377. Statement of June 25, 1860, in 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 3129.
378. RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNION ARmy: A Bi-
OGRAPHY OF M.C. MEIGS 78-112 (1959); S. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. at 84
(1861).
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months' absence, however, the Army had paid out more than $150,000
of the funds Congress had insisted be spent only under Meigs' per-
sonal superintendence. 79
Without doubt, Buchanan ignored a provision of law that he be-
lieved to be unconstitutional. In taking this step, he was supported by
an opinion of his Attorney General, Jeremiah S. Black, who advised
the President that the Meigs proviso was unconstitutional to the ex-
tent that it sought to deprive the Commander-in-Chief of the "right to
decide according to [his] own judgment what officer shall perform any
particular duty ... ."I" The Attorney General added that if the Presi-
dent wished, he could spend the Aqueduct funds and ignore the Meigs
proviso "as if the paper on which it is written were blank." '38 While
this was the course Buchanan ultimately pursued, it was contrary to
the intent of Congress, which was to give the President the choice of
spending the money under Meigs' supervision or not spending it at
all. 82
The Meigs proviso had not placed Buchanan in a situation where
he was forced either to defy an act of Congress or surrender what he
viewed as his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. Con-
gress had left him with the option of not undertaking work on the
Aqueduct during the time Captain Meigs was not its supervisor
38 3
While this alternative may sound unrealistic, the Aqueduct project
was not one for which the administration had sought funding in 1860.
Congress appropriated the money only at the Captain's request, for
Meigs feared that without further work in the Washington area, Secre-
tary Floyd might carry out threats to send him to a distant post. Meigs
not only initiated the appropriation but was also the one who sug-
gested a proviso that the funds had to be spent under his supervi-
379. WEIrLEY, supra note 378, at 126-30; S. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 84-85,
89-91 (1861).
380. 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 463, 468-69 (1860). This opidion had been issued in July, 1860,
after Meigs complained to the President that a War Department order had denied him his
right to superintend the project; the claim was specious, as the opinion went on to point
out. Id. at 470-73.
381. Id. at 470.
382. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 3209 (1860) (statement of Sen. Davis); i at
3210 (statement of Sen. Green); id. at 3211 (statement of Sen. Gwin); id. at 3213 (statement
of Sen. Toombs).
383. Prior to leaving Washington for the Tortugas, Meigs sent the Aqueduct funds to
the treasury and wrote notes td the Secretary of the Treasury and others, urging that they
not pay any project expenses incurred during his absence. His recommendation was ig-
nored. S. Exuc. Doc. No. 1, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 84-85 (1861).
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sion.384 The project thus does not appear to have been of great
importance to the Buchanan administration. Since Congress had not
insisted that the money be spent, the failure to do so would not have
constituted a refusal to enforce the law through impoundment. 315
Was Buchanan's action defensible on the basis that it was the
only way to secure a judicial determination as to the Act's validity?
While the President never sought to justify his conduct on this (or any
other) basis, suppose that he had. If Buchanan had honored the pro-
viso by spending the funds under Meigs' direction, it is difficult to see
how anyone would have had standing to challenge the proviso in
court. However, it was by no means clear that the prospects for judi-
cial review were enhanced by noncompliance. Meigs was clearly upset
at being shipped to the Tortugas, but he suffered no apparent loss in
pay or rank as a result. Moreover, the Act gave him no right not to be
reassigned. Congress implicitly recognized the President's authority
to transfer Meigs, and merely provided that if he were sent to another
post, the money was not to be spent. Meigs therefore lacked standing
to challenge Buchanan's action. Spending the money in defiance of
the proviso did not cause a discrete injury to anyone else who could
have complained in court. The President would thus have had a hard
time invoking the test-case defense here, particularly as there is no
evidence that he sought to facilitate a legal challenge to the Act.
At the same time, the President's action did not have the effect of
absolutely precluding judicial review. It might have, but for the fact
that when Captain Meigs returned to Washington in February 1861, he
refused to pay $5,600 in claims for work performed on the Aqueduct
in his absence, on the theory that the contracts were void because they
were made in defiance of the law.38 6 It would seem that these individ-
uals might have sued in the Court of Claims, arguing that the statutory
proviso was unconstitutional and that their contracts with the govern-
ment were therefore valid and enforceable. If any such suits were
filed, they were mooted by the Act of June 14, 1862, which was passed
at Meigs' request and authorized payment of all of the outstanding
claims.387
384. WEIGLEY, supra note 378, at 101-04; 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 463, 467-68 (1860); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 3210 (1860) (statement of Sen. Seward).
385. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259 n.13 (2d ed.
1988).
386. S. ExEc. Doc. 1, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 85, 92-93 (1861).
387. Act of June 14, 1862, Res. 34, 12 Stat. 619; CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.
1723 (statement of Rep. Calvert); H.R. Exsc. Do. No. 1, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 615 (1862).
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b. Chester Arthur: Appointing the Chief Examiner
When Congress created the U.S. Civil Service Commission in
January 1883, it provided for the position of a Chief Examiner, to be
hired by the Commission itself.388 ' President Arthur had signed the
bill without objection on January 16, but on March 1 he sent a
message to the Senate objecting to the manner in which the Chief
Examiner was to be chosen.38 9 Because of the nature of the position,
said Arthur, "there is great doubt whether such examiner is not prop-
erly an officer of the United States," in which case the provision al-
lowing him to be named by the Commission "is not in conformity with
section 2, Article II of the Constitution. '390 Arthur noted that he was
supported in this view by an opinion from his Attorney General.39'
Yet the Attorney General appears to have cautioned Arthur against
trying to resolve the matter himself:
The question.. . is one which can not be settled by executive
action. Whether the functions or duties and powers of the chief
examiner constitute him an officer of the United States ... is
one that can only be authoritatively determined by the courts.
But should the doubt appear well founded, it may be worthy of
your consideration whether it is expedient to call the attention
of Congress thereto.
392
The President chose not to heed this admonition. While he did bring
the matter to Congress's attention, his March 1 message to the Senate
went considerably further. It concluded by "nominat[ing] Silas W.
Burt, of New York, to be chief examiner of the Civil Service
Commission.""39
In this case, the President's decision-to ignore a law he believed
unconstitutional was in itself harmless, for it could have no effect un-
less the Senate acquiesced by ratifying Arthur's nominee. If the Sen-
ate had refused to do so, Congress might have prevented the
President from defying the law and cleared the way for the Commis-
388. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, §3, 22 Stat. 403, 404.
389. Message of March 1, 1883, in 10 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 4745.
390. Id.; Article II, §2 provides that officers of the United States must be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate unless Congress vests the appoint-
ment "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S.
CONST. art II, § 2, cl.2.
391. 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 504 (Jan. 22, 1883).
392. Id. at 508-09. While this could be read as merely saying that any action the Presi-
dent takes may be subject to judicial review, the last quoted sentence appears to counsel
against doing anything other than urging Congress to amend the statute.
393. Message of March 1, 1883, in 10 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 4745.
REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE
sion to make the appointment itself.3 9 4 Instead, the Senate confirmed
Arthur's nominee on March 3, 1883, at the same time passing a resolu-
tion which declared that
the Senate neither assent to nor dissent from the constitutional
views concerning the appointment of an examiner, communi-
cated by the President in his message of March 1, and consider
its present action as affording no precedent for the future.39 5
The Senate may have avoided setting a precedent on the question of
whether the Chief Examiner of the Civil Service Commission is an
officer of the United States.3 96 Yet it seems to have been unaware
that it risked creating precedent on the much more significant ques-
tion of whether Presidents may ignore the law whenever they think it
is unconstitutional.
The Attorney General had suggested to President Arthur that the
matter should be resolved judicially, rather than through executive ac-
tion.397 This could have been done by complying with the statute, let-
ting the Civil Service Commission appoint a Chief Examiner, and then
instituting quo warranto proceedings to decide whether the appoint-
ment was one which the Constitution allowed Congress to place in the
hands of the Commission. This was therefore not an instance where it
was necessary for the President to defy an allegedly unconstitutional
law in order for the matter to be resolved judicially.
By taking the course he did, Arthur made it virtually impossible
to test the law in court. Once the Senate confirmed the President's
appointee, the only person with standing to raise the constitutional
issue would have been someone appointed Chief Examiner by the
Commission. If the government refused to pay the Commission's ap-
pointee for services rendered, he or she might have sued in the Court
394. At the time Arthur sent his nomination to the Senate, the Commission had not
begun to function. See 23 . OF ExEc. PROC. OF U.S. SENATE 711 (1901); Charles Lyman
Appointed Chief Examiner, N.Y. TIMEs, May 11, 1883, at 1, col. 4; Chester A. Arthur,
Executive Order, May 7, 1883, in 10 MESSAES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 4748-53.
395. 23 J. OF Exnc. PROC. OF U.S. SENATE 723 (1901) (confirming Edward 0. Graves
as Chief Examiner). Silas Burt, the President's March 1 nominee, immediately declined
the post. On March 2, Arthur named Graves in his place. Id. at 712; The Ejected Harbor
Board: Its Claim to Hold Office-The Attorney General's Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
1883, at 1, col.2, and 3, col. 1.
396. The Senate continued to acquiesce in the view that the Chief Examiner was an
officer who had to be appointed in accord with Article II. See 24 J. OF EXEC. PROC. OF
U.S. SENATE 146 (1901) (confirming President Arthur's appointment of Chief Examiner);
25 J. OF ExEc. PROC. OF U.S. SENATE 683 (1901) (confirming President Cleveland's ap-
pointment of Chief Examiner); see also 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1886) (advising President
Cleveland that the Chief Examiner is an officer of the United States).
397. See 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 504, 508-09 (1882).
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of Claims, forcing a judicial determination of which appointee-the
President's or the Commission's-was entitled to the post. This im-
probable scenario never came about, no doubt because Civil Service
Commissioners appointed by the President were unwilling to chal-
lenge the Chief Executive in this way. Thus, while the Senate might
have prevented it, the President had the last word as to the constitu-
tionality of this law.
c. William Howard Taft: The Presidential Budget
In his last week of office, President Taft refused to honor a law
that prohibited him from submitting a national budget to Congress.
In 1911, Taft had appointed a Commission on Economy 'and Effi-
ciency whose final report, "The Need for a National Budget," was is-
sued in June 1912.398 The Commission in essence recommended that
instead of having each executive department submit its own budget
figures directly to Congress, they should report to the President who,
after reviewing the numbers, would prepare and submit a coherent
national budget.399 Taft forwarded the report to Congress, urging that
it amend the law to adopt the proposed procedure. But even without
such a statute, he said, the President is constitutionally entitled to re-
quire information to be submitted to him in such form as he sees fit,
and to then submit to Congress "a definite well-considered budget,
with a message calling attention to subjects of immediate impor-
tance."40 Taft meanwhile instructed each department to prepare two
sets of budget estimates, "one in accordance with the present practise
and one substantially in accordance with ... the report of the Com-
mission."401 Congress responded by adding a rider to a pending ap-
propriation bill directing that budget estimates be submitted "only in
the form and at the time now required by law, and in no other form
and at no other time. 40 2
While Taft signed the measure in August, 1912, he defied the pro-
hibition six months later by sending Congress a national budget along
with budget figures in the form required by law. Taft defended his
action on the basis that the President has a constitutional duty to send
Congress "a regular statement and account of the receipts and ex-
398. H.R. Doc. No. 854, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912); see Frederick A. Cleveland, The
Federal Budget: What the President is Trying to do by Way of Budget Making for the Na-
tional Government, 3 PROC. ACAD. POL. Sci. 165, 165-66 (1912-13).
399. See FIsHER, supra note 319, at 189-90.
400. 48 CONG. Rnc. 8500-01 (1912).
401. Cleveland, supra note 398 at 118-20.
402. Act of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 350, §9, 37 Stat. 360, 415.
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penditures," and to make such recommendations to Congress as "he
shall judge necessary and expedient."4 "3
The President's refusal to comply with the law was such that his
action could have no effect without the affirmative approval of Con-
gress. Though there was additional expense in having executive de-
partments prepare budget data for both Congress and the White
House, the statute did not bar the President from requesting or receiv-
ing such information; instead, it regulated only the manner in which
the material was to be sent to Congress.4°a The legislators' real con-
cern was that Taft might propose a lower level of funding for projects
in their districts than was sought by departmental budget estimates. °5
Yet no actual harm of this type could occur unless Congress voted to
accept the President's recommendations. The legislators were free to
ignore Taft's model budget, as they in fact did.406
As far as judicial review was concerned, had the President com-
plied with the ban by not submitting his own budget, no one would
appear to have had standing to challenge the ban's validity in court.40 7
By disregarding the prohibition, there was at least in theory the possi-
bility of judicial review. If an agency or department learned in ad-
vance that the President was planning to recommend less funding than
was sought in the departmental budget estimates, it might have gone
to court to invoke the statutory ban as a basis for enjoining the White
House from submitting its own budget figures. The President could
then raise the constitutional issue as a defense, thereby affording the
courts an opportunity to resolve the matter.
While this was perhaps a situation in which presidential defiance
was necessary to secure judicial review, there is no evidence that Taft
403. Message of Feb. 26, 1913, S. Doc. No. 1113, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1913). See
FisrmR, supra note 319, at 189 ("The President does not have to await statutory authority
to submit a budget.").
404. The rider only regulated the form in which budget estimates were to be "prepared
and submitted to Congress." Act of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 350, §9,37 Stat. 360, 415. The rider
was defended in Congress, however, on the basis that preparing figures for the President
would divert executive officials from "their ordinary and pressing duties," suggesting that
Congress hoped to dissuade the President from even collecting the information. Cleve-
land, supra note 398 at 119 (quoting remarks by the Chairman of the House Appropria-
tions Committee).
405. FisHER, supra note 134, at 30.
406. FISHER, supra note 319, at 189; FisHER, supra note 134, at 31.
407. If Taft wished to increase funding for an agency above that sought in the depart-
mental estimates, but refrained from doing so due to the statutory bar, the agency might
have had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the ban. However, this is an im-
plausible scenario, for Taft's goal was to decrease rather than increase the federal budget.
See Message of Feb. 26, 1913, H.R. Doc. No. 1113, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1913).
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took any steps to facilitate this, such as by "leaking" details of his
budget in advance. Though the President's final budget was not sub-
mitted to Congress until a few days before Taft left office, it would
seem that a test case could have been arranged earlier, in time to al-
low a court to rule on a request for injunctive relief.
d. Woodrow Wilson: The Termination of Treaties
Woodrow Wilson signed the Merchant Marine Act, or Jones Act,
on June 5, 1920. The Act sought to strengthen the American shipping
industry and enhance its ability to compete with foreign shipping in-
terests. Section 28 of the Act authorized domestic interstate carriers
to charge lower freight rates for goods imported in American ships
than for goods imported in foreign vessels. 08 The United States had
32 treaties which barred such unequal treatment. However, §34 of the
Act declared it to be the "judgment of Congress" that these treaties
should be terminated to the extent they prohibited the United States
from discriminating against foreign vessels or goods imported by
them. Section 34 went on to state that "the President is hereby au-
thorized and directed within ninety days" to notify the affected gov-
ernments that our treaties with them would to this extent "terminate
on the expiration of such periods as may be required for the giving of
such notice by the provision of such treaties .... "409
On September 2, 1920, a day before the 90-day deadline was to
run, Wilson advised his Secretary of State that he would not comply
with §34 of the Jones Act. The matter, he said, was a "sacred" one,
involving "[tlhe binding force of treaties and the reciprocal obligation
which treaties imply." And, "inasmuch as it is clearly not the Consti-
tutional right of Congress to direct the President to do anything
whatever, particularly in regard to foreign affairs," Wilson concluded
that he "ought to stand stiff upon the prerogatives of the Presidential
office."41 0 Three weeks later, the State Department announced that
408. Merchant Marine Act, Pub. L. No. 261, ch. 250, §28, 41 Stat. 988, 999-1000 (1920).
See JEFFREY J. SAFFORD, WILSONIAN MARITIME DIPLOMACY, 1913-1921, at 221-32 (1978).
409. Merchant Marine Act §34.
410. Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Bainbridge Colby (Sept. 2, 1920), in 66 PAPERS
OF WOODROW WILSON 89 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1992). To the extent Wilson was claiming
that the President may terminate a treaty without consulting Congress, the issue remains
open. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (dismissing, as nonjusticiable, chal-
lenge by members of Congress to President's unilateral termination of treaty with Taiwan).
If Wilson's complaint was that Congress could not pass laws that violate U.S. treaty obliga-
tions, he was on weak ground. An act of Congress inconsistent with a prior treaty must
still be given effect. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); HENKIN,
supra note 374, at 163-64. Moreover, Wilson's complaint would then be with §28 of the
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"The President... does not deem the direction, contained in Section
34 of the so-called Merchant Marine Act, an exercise of any constitu-
tional power possessed by Congress."' 411 His defiance produced "con-
gressional rumblings of impeachment," '412 but Congress was not in
session at the time and by the time it reconvened in December, Wil-
son had only three months left in office.
The President's constitutional objection to section 34 of the Jones
Act appears to have been an afterthought. He signed the bill in June
without complaint, after having discussed it with the Cabinet.413 Five
years earlier he had approved the LaFollette Seamen's Act and com-
plied with one of its provisions that "instructed and directed" him to
send notices of treaty termination to 17 countries. 414 This apparent
inconsistency illustrates the fact that constitutional objections are not
invoked in a vacuum; they are invariably raised in order to accomplish
some independent objective. 41 5 In the case of the Jones Act, its pas-
sage had triggered protests and threats of retaliation from countries
around the world. By September 1920, Wilson had developed second
thoughts about taking action which, according to the State Depart-
ment, "would amount to nothing less than the breach or violation of
said treaties. '416 Ironically, by refusing to send the notices required
by section 34, the President potentially exacerbated this very problem.
His refusal meant that, by engaging in the discrimination permitted by
Act, not §34, for the giving of notice was intended to comply with, not violate, existing
treaties. While Wilson did not implement §28, this was not a defiance of the law because
§28 expressly allowed the Executive to suspend its enforcement.
411. Letter and Enclosure from Bainbridge Colby to Woodrow Wilson (Sept. 23, 1920),
in 66 PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 410, at 136-37. The State Department
also noted that the President believed compliance with §34 would amount to breaching the
treaties in question. Id.
412. SAFFORD, supra note 408, at 237.
413. Id. at 229.
414. Seaman's Act of 1915, ch. 153, §16,38 Stat. 1164, 1184; see Reeves, supra note 374,
at 33, 37; CORWIN, supra note 104, at 220-21; but see id. at 479-480 n.66 (In a Dec. 8, 1919,
letter to Senator Albert Fall, Wilson opposed a pending resolution which would have di-
rected him to sever diplomatic relations with Mexico, stating that "the initiative in di-
recting the relations of our Government with foreign governments is assigned by the
Constitution to the Executive and to the Executive only.").
415. See DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONsTTruTION: A STUDY OF RE-
SPONSiBiLrrY 150 (1966) (noting that constitutional issues do not exist "in a political vac-
uum" and that the "accommodation of special interests is a common ingredient").
416. Letter and Enclosure from Bainbridge Colby to Woodrow Wilson (Sept. 23, 1920),
in 66 PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 410, at 136. See also SAFFORD, supra note
408, at 232-39.
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section 28, the United States would breach many treaties that might
have been lawfully terminated by the giving of notice.417
However, besides refusing to comply with section 34, the adminis-
tration also declined to implement section 28, the provision allowing
domestic interstate carriers to discriminate against goods imported in
foreign vessels. Section 28, by its terms, could be suspended by the
Interstate Commerce Commission if the U.S. Shipping Board certified
that there were not enough American ships to service the country's
import needs. The Board invoked this authority four days after the
Jones Act was passed, suspending section 28 for 90 days, ostensibly
due to the inadequacy of American shipping facilities.418 In July, the
moratorium was continued through the end of the year; in December
1920, it was extended indefinitely.419 While the Board cited the al-
leged inadequacy of U.S. shipping, it appears that section 28 was sus-
pended due to the angry response it had provoked from foreign
governments.420 The section remained inoperative for the balance of
Wilson's term and well into 1922, for President Harding likewise re-
fused to comply with section 34,421 though on the purely policy ground
that it would "involve us in a chaos of trade relationships."
42
The possibility for judicial review of President Wilson's action
was virtually nonexistent. Because the enforcement of section 28 was
not tied to compliance with section 34, persons who might have bene-
fited from the implementation of section 28 could not claim to have
suffered a legal injury because of Wilson's failure to honor section 34.
A judgment ordering the administration to send treaty termination
notices would not necessarily redress their injury, because the Ship-
417. Reeves, supra note 374, at 37-38.
418. H.R. Doc. No. 227, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1921). Because the Board suspended
§28 several months before Wilson asserted any constitutional objection to the Jones Act,
and because §28 and §34 were included in the Act at the instigation of the Shipping
Board's chairman, it seems clear that the Board did not suspend §28 on constitutional
grounds. See SAFFORD, supra note 408, at 229, 232.
419. H.R. Doc. No. 227, supra note 418, at 27-28; H.R. Doc. No. 407, 67th Cong., 3d
Sess. 13 (1921); SAFFORD, supra note 408, at 233, 244.
420. See SAFFORD, supra note 408, at 233. Congress may not have expected §28 to take
effect until treaty termination notices had been sent under §34, but had this been the
Board's rationale for suspending §28, one would expect the suspension to have been lim-
ited to goods from nations with such treaty arrangements.
421. N.Y. TIMEs, May 20, 1921, at 12, col. 7; Cabinet Takes Up Shipping Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1921, at 4, col. 1; To Mend Marine Act That Hit Treaties, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
26, 1921, at 10, cols. 3-4; President to Urge Tariff Bill Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1921, at
5, col. 2; H.R. Doc. No. 407, supra note 419, at 13. In the 1920 presidential campaign
Harding had criticized Wilson for not complying with §34. CORNWiN, supra note 104, at 220.
422. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1921, at 8, col. 3.
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ping Board remained free to continue the suspension of section 28
until it decided that U.S. shipping facilities were adequate. The only
harm caused by noncompliance with section 34 itself would be the
treaty violations that would occur once section 28 was implemented.
While this could give rise to suits by foreign governments and by those
of its nationals who were protected by the treaties, the issue as to the
constitutionality of section 34 would not arise in such proceedings.
Nor could these foreign parties sue to enjoin the President from en-
gaging in conduct that would result in a breach, for American courts
will not "sit in judgment on the political branches to prevent them
from.., breaching a treaty." 4'
On the other hand, the prospects for judicial review would have
been no better had Wilson complied with section 34. No one could
have claimed injury from the mere transmittal of notices, as distinct
from the enforcement of section 28.424 The Jones Act episode thus
illustrates the fact that there will be occasions when there may be no
one who, under any plausible scenario, will be in position to trigger
judicial review of a law the President claims is unconstitutional.
e. Dwight Eisenhower: The Agreement with Chile
Throughout most of the 1950s, there was a campaign to amend
the Constitution to restrict the President's ability to make unilateral
executive agreements with foreign governments, in lieu of treaties re-
quiring ratification by the Senate. The fight came to an end in No-
vember 1958, when Senator John Bricker was defeated in his bid for
reelection to Congress.4' In June 1958, during the waning days of the
Bricker Amendment crusade, Congress passed a bill creating the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).42 6 The mea-
sure authorized the President to cooperate with other nations in the
fields of aeronautics and space exploration, but section 205 mandated
that any such international agreements be "made by the President
423. HENKIN, supra note 374, at 171.
424. Sending notices might, as a practical matter, have cleared the way for enforcement
of §28, causing injury to a plaintiff whose goods were discriminated against. But as the
enforcement of §28 was not tied to the sending of §34 notices, a favorable ruling that the
President was improperly forced to send termination notices might still not redress plain-
tiff's injury, for the notices might not be withdrawn, and even if they were, §28 might still
be enforced.
425. See generally DuANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A
TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
426. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 205, 72 Stat.
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with the advice and consent of the Senate."'427 President Eisenhower
had strenuously opposed the Bricker Amendment. He signed the bill
but objected to section 205, explaining, "I regard this section merely
as recognizing that international treaties may be made in this field,
and as not precluding, in appropriate cases, less formal arrangements
for cooperation. To construe the section otherwise would raise sub-
stantial constitutional questions."
42 8
Eisenhower ignored this statutory restriction on at least one occa-
sion. Through an exchange of notes between the American Ambassa-
dor and the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, the two countries
entered into an agreement for a joint program of tracking and receiv-
ing radio signals from earth satellites and space vehicles. The agree-
ment designated NASA as the U.S. cooperating agency. According to
the State Department, the agreement took effect immediately.429
There is no evidence that it was ever approved by the Senate as re-
quired by section 205.430 By defying this law, the President cut off any
possibility for judicial review, as it is doubtful anyone could claim a
sufficient injury from the agreement to challenge its validity in court.
If, on the other hand, Eisenhower had complied under protest by
seeking Senate approval, there was at least a possibility of securing
judicial review. For had the Senate rejected the agreement, NASA or
the State Department might have brought suit against Chile for a de-
claratory judgment as to whether the agreement was binding despite
its rejection by the Senate.43'
f. Gerald Ford: The Power of Appointment
President Ford objected to and refused to comply with two differ-
ent statutes that provided for the appointment of executive branch
officials in a manner which he believed violated the Constitution. The
first of these involved the Executive Director of the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission. The 1974 law creating the Commission al-
lowed it to appoint an executive director "with the advice and consent
427. National Aeronautics and Space Act § 205.
428. Statement of June 29, 1959, in 1958 PuB. PAPERS 573 (1959).
429. Agreement on Tracking Stations, Feb. 19, 1958, U.S.-Chile, 10 U.S.T. 783-86.
430. The Congressional Record for 1959-1961 contains no reference to the agreement
or to any Senate approval of it.
431. Such an action would have resembled INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), where
the Court found a case or controversy to exist even though the executive branch agreed
with its adversary that a statutory restriction Congress had placed on its ability to act was
unconstitutional; the fact that the Executive was bound by the limitation sufficed to make a
case or controversy.
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of the Senate. 43 2 In signing the bill, Ford objected that the Act vio-
lated the separation of powers by "providing for an executive branch
appointment in a manner not contemplated by the Constitution." He
urged that the problem "be corrected by deletion of the request for
Senate confirmation of the Executive Director.
4 33
In 1975 the President had corrective legislation introduced in
Congress,434 but the statute was not amended to provide for appoint-
ment by the Commission alone until 1978, well after Ford had left
office. 35 In the interim, this portion of the law was not executed; no
one was appointed to the Executive Director's position. The role was
instead filled by a series of "acting" directors, none of whose names
was submitted to the Senate.436
This was another case where failure to comply with the law effec-
tively precluded judicial review, for no one had standing to challenge
the Commission's refusal to appoint an Executive Director. As a
study prepared for the House Appropriations Committee noted, if
Ford had instead directed the Commission to submit a nominee to the
Senate and the person had been confirmed, "actions of the appointee
[might] be challenged as those of one not legally in office. '437 Alter-
natively, the Attorney General might have brought a quo warranto
proceeding to determine whether or not the Executive Director had
been appointed in a constitutional manner.
The second statute to which President Ford objected because of
its allegedly unconstitutional appointment provisions was a 1975 law
creating the Japan-United States Friendship Commission.438 In a sign-
ing statement, Ford observed that four of the commissioners were to
be Members of Congress, whom the Constitution bars from serving in
432. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463,
§101(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1389, 1390.
433. Statement of Oct. 24, 1974, in 1974 Pun. PAPERS 462 (1975). Because Ford pro-
posed having the appointment made by the Commission itself-a method not found in
Article II, §2-he must have viewed the Executive Director as being neither an officer nor
an inferior officer of the United States. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976)
(finding Art. II not applicable to mere "employees" or "lesser functionaries").
434. STAFF OF THE HousE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVES-
TIGATIVE STUDY ON THE COMMODITY FuTuREs TRADING COmMIssION 30-31 (Comm.
Print 1978) [hereinafter CFTC STUDY].
435. Act of Sept. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, §2, 92 Stat. 865.
436. H.R. REP. No. 95-1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978); Reauthorization of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural
Research and General Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and For-
estry, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 22, 29-30 (1978); CFTC STUDY, supra note 434, at 30.
437. CFTC STUDY, supra note 434, at 30.
438. Japan-United States Friendship Act, Pub. L. No. 94-118, 89 Stat. 603 (1975).
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any other office of the United States; therefore, he said, the congres-
sional members of the Commission "will serve in an advisory capacity,
as nonvoting members."4 39 Since its inception, the Friendship Com-
mission has followed Ford's directive, its by-laws providing that "[t]he
four members of Congress appointed to the Commission shall not be
entitled to vote.""'  For all practical purposes, this action removed
the congressional members from the Commission, contrary to the re-
quirements of the statute.
The President's action in refusing to honor this provision of law
was not insulated from judicial review. The Senators and Representa-
tives named to the Commission could have sued to overturn the by-
law denying them the right to vote, arguing that it was inconsistent
with the statute; the Commission would then have raised the constitu-
tional issue as a defense, permitting the federal courts to resolve the
issue. Yet it was not necessary for the President to defy this law in
order to set up the possibility of judicial review. Instead, he might
have allowed the Members of Congress to assume their positions as
full voting members of the Commission and had the Attorney General
institute a quo warranto proceeding to test their right to do so,
thereby assuring that judicial review occurred. *. 1
g. Jimmy Carter: Five Instances of Defiance
Jimmy Carter holds the distinction of having refused to comply
with five different statutes which he signed but to which he raised con-
stitutional objections. The first of these involved an attempt by Con-
gress to protest the "complete and unconditional pardon" which
Carter had extended to Vietnam-era draft resisters immediately upon
taking office in early 1977.12 That summer Congress attached a rider
to the Fiscal Year 1978 appropriation bill, barring the Justice Depart-
ment from using any of the funds to carry out the President's par-
439. Statement of Oct. 21, 1975, in 1975 PUB. PAPERS 1719 (1977). Article I, §6 states
that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
440. Regulations of the Japan-United States Friendship Commission (adopted Oct. 5,
1976); Telephone interview with Eric J. Gangloff, Exec. Dir., Japan-U.S. Friendship
Comm'n (Apr. 15, 1993).
441. Such a suit would not be barred by the Speech or Debate Clause, for Art. I, §6
shields members of Congress only with respect to "legislative acts." See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
442. Proclamation No. 4483, 91 Stat. 1719 (1977). See 123 CONG. REc. 20835 (June 24,
1977) (statement of Sen. Dole noting that the amendment would have the "symbolic signif-
icance" of voicing objection to the pardon rather than much "practical effect").
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don." 3 While the bill was pending in the Senate, the President sought
unsuccessfully to have the restriction removed. 4 Carter signed the
measure on August 2, 1977, but issued a statement objecting that the
bar was unconstitutional on the grounds that it interfered with the
pardon power, constituted a bill of attainder, and denied due process
of law.445
An executive order implementing the pardon required the Justice
Department to dismiss pending indictments against the pardoned indi-
viduals, to terminate investigations concerning them, and to permit
entry into the United States of aliens who were otherwise excludable
for having violated the Selective Service laws." 6 By the time the bar
took effect on October 1, 1977, the Justice Department had already
dismissed all pending indictments and investigations. 7 However, the
funding restriction was expected to have a severe impact on carrying
out that part of the pardon involving the admission of aliens, many of
them draft resisters who had left the country and renounced their citi-
zenship." 8 It was first rumored that other funds might be available
for these purposes, but the Justice Department later stated that the
limitation would likely prevent it from processing reentry applications
for those who had been pardoned." 9
In the end, the Carter administration ignored the spending re-
striction.450 On November 18, 1977, less than two months after the
ban took effect, the Immigration and Naturalization Service an-
nounced reentry procedures for aliens seeking to take advantage of
the President's pardon.451 In May 1978, it was estimated that
thousands of aliens may have been readmitted under the amnesty pro-
443. Act of Aug. 2, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-86, §706, 91 Stat. 419, 444.
444. Letter from Robert J. Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, to Sen. Mark Hatfield
(June 23, 1977), in 123 CONG. REc. 20834-35 (1977).
445. Statement of Aug. 3, 1977, in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 1409-10 (1978).
446. Exec. Order No. 11,967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (1988).
447. Senate rms Down Funds to Carry Out Carter's Pardon Plan, N.Y. Tnms, June
25, 1977, at 1, col. 5, and at 7, col. 3; 123 CONG. REc. 20834 (1977).
448. 123 CONG. REc. 20834 (1977).
449. House Votes to Bar Funds to Carry Out Carter Pardon Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1977, at 15, col. 1; Senate Turns Down Funds to Carry Out Carter's Pardon Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1977, at 1, col. 5, and 7 col. 3.
450. 54 Interpreter Releases 369 (Maurice A. Roberts ed.) (Oct. 19, 1977) (noting that
despite the limitation stated in P.L. 95-86, the INS was still processing such cases).
451. 42 Fed. Reg. 59562-63 (1977).
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gram.452 There is no evidence that the Justice Department under-
wrote these activities with funds not subject to the funding bar.
By refusing to comply with the spending limitation, Carter effec-
tively precluded judicial review of the spending restriction itself and of
his action ignoring it.453 Had the administration instead complied
with the funding bar by refusing to process reentry papers for aliens
who had been pardoned, the aliens would have had standing to seek a
judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and compelling the
INS to carry out the President's pardon.45 4 The government might
have helped to facilitate the filing of a test case by advising the af-
fected individuals of their right to sue.
The second statute that Carter declined to honor on constitu-
tional grounds was the Public Telecommunications Act which
amended the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.a-5 The President
signed the measure on November 2, 1978, but suggested that §399,
barring public radio and television stations from editorializing, was in-
valid because "public broadcasters should have the same first amend-
ment rights as other broadcasters. 456 A suit challenging the ban was
filed in federal court in October 1979. The Justice Department, steal-
ing a leaf from Franklin Roosevelt's book,4 5 7 notified Congress that it
452. See Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050, 1054-55 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting plaintiffs'
counsel's assertion that thousands of aliens, including former citizens, may have reentered
the country under the pardon).
453. A suit to enjoin implementation of the pardon on various grounds was dismissed
for lack of standing. Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Plaintiffs in-
cluded present and former military personnel, the child of a prisoner of war, a civilian, two
military wives, and two Members of Congress. Id. at 1053. None was found to have al-
leged an injury sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 1058. While plaintiffs did not allege
that implementation of the pardon violated the funding bar, such a claim would also have
been dismissed for lack of standing.
454. While it is unclear to what extent aliens outside the United States have standing to
invoke rights under the Constitution (see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THm FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS OF THE UNrED STATES § 721 cmt. b, § 722 cmt. m & reporter's note 16 (1987); Jules
Lobel, The Constitution Abroad, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTrTUTION 167-75
(Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon & William D. Rogers eds., 1990)), an alien abroad
should have standing to enforce rights expressly given her by a pardon. The situation is
analogous to an overseas alien suing to enforce rights given her by a treaty. See HENIN,
supra note 374, at 416. In such a suit, the pardoned alien, like any other recipient of a
pardon, should have standing to assert that a statute which seeks to defeat the pardon is
invalid. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
455. Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-567, 92 Stat. 2405, amending Act of Nov. 7,
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365.
456. Statement of Nov. 2,1978, in 1978 Pun. PAPERS 1927-28 (1979). The provision was
originally §399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, and
renumbered §399(a) by the 1978 statute.
457. See supra notes 338-342 and accompanying text.
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would not defend the constitutionality of §399.458 The district court
concluded that the administration's hostility to the act went beyond a
mere refusal to defend. The Federal Communications Commission
"represented that it would seek to impose only the most minimal sanc-
tions .... That willingness to enforce the statute solely for the purpose
of test litigation indicates that otherwise the FCC will not enforce the
statute. It is, to the Commission, a nullity."459 The court dismissed
the case on ripeness grounds and for lack of a justiciable controversy.
Because there was a "distinct likelihood that the FCC will not seek to
penalize a broadcaster that violates §399(a)," plaintiffs could not show
that the provision caused them an injury in fact sufficient to confer
standing.460
President Carter's apparent refusal to enforce this law thus effec-
tively prevented the federal courts from reviewing its constitutionality.
Ironically, it was only after the Reagan administration took office and
announced that it would both enforce and defend the editorializing
ban that the federal courts were finally able to entertain a challenge to
§399.461 The Supreme Court ultimately held that the statute was
unconstitutional.
462
The third law which President Carter ignored due to its alleged
unconstitutionality was a provision in an appropriations bill that cre-
ated the San Antonio Missions National Historical Park. The bill di-
rected the Secretary of the Interior "to assure the protection and
preservation of the historical and architectural values of the missions,"
either by acquiring the missions from the Catholic Archdiocese or by
entering into agreements with the Church whereby the government
would reconstruct and rehabilitate them.463 When Carter signed the
bill on November 10, 1978, he objected that this provision "would lead
to unacceptable entanglements of the Federal Government in the op-
erations of active churches," and advised the Secretary "to consider
458. 125 CONG. REc. 35416 (1979); Department of Justice Authorization and Oversight,
1981: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 853-54 (1980) (tes-
timony of Alice Daniel, Ass't Att'y Gen); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
370-71 & n.8 (1984). The Senate then directed counsel to intervene as amicus curiae. Id.
459. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517, 519-20 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
460. Id. at 520.
461. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 382 (C.D. Cal. 1982); see
Brady, supra note 145, at 976 n.21.
462. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
463. Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-629, §201, 92 Stat. 3635, 3636-39. Any agree-
ments with the Catholic Archdiocese of San Antonio were to be submitted to the Justice
Department "for a determination that [they] do not violate the constitutional provisions
regarding the separation of church and state." §201(b), 92 Stat. 3637.
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implementation of the portions of the bill relating to restoration and
maintenance of the Missions only if they pass into secular ownership
and use."4" The Secretary heeded the direction, informing a House
committee that the administration opposed spending federal funds on
the missions because "[t]he structures there are used currently and
steadily and for the primary use of church services. '4 65
The administration gave some thought to acquiring the mission
properties but nothing came of this.46 6 In the meantime no federal
money was spent on the missions. The matter was not finally resolved
until after Carter left office. In 1983, a cooperative agreement was
signed under which the Archbishop of San Antonio assumed full re-
sponsibility for maintaining the missions themselves, while the United
States agreed to repair and maintain the secular buildings and the mis-
sion grounds.467 The statutory scheme whereby the federal govern-
ment itself was to restore and maintain the missions was never
realized.
Carter's decision to disregard this provision of law did not auto-
matically preclude a judicial resolution of the issue. The Archdiocese
of San Antonio might have sued, once it became clear that the Inte-
rior Department would not agree to restore and maintain the mis-
sions. Instead, the Church acquiesced in the government's action.
However, judicial review would have been virtually assured had the
administration implemented the statute. Every single taxpayer in the
United States would then have had standing to challenge this expendi-
ture of federal funds on the ground that it violated the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause.468 By taking the course he did, the
President sharply reduced the chances that judicial review would ever
occur.
The fourth law with which President Carter refused to comply on
constitutional grounds barred him from proceeding with plans to close
464. Statement of Nov. 10, 1978, in 1978 PuB. PAPERS 2001 (1979).
465. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1980: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (Feb. 21,
1979).
466. See 45 Fed. Reg. 49689 (1980); id. at 84159 (1980) (San Antonio Missions Advisory
Committee's agenda includes item on "Status of Archdiocesan Proposal for Conveyance of
Church Properties to National Park Service").
467. Cooperative Agreement, Feb. 20, 1983, Clerk's Office, Bexar County, Texas, file
no. 627684, vol. 3901, at 562-69 (on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
Thanks to Robert C. Amdor, Superintendent, San Antonio Missions National Historical
Park, for providing a copy of this agreement.
468. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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ten United States Consulates abroad, and directed that if any had
been closed they be reopened as soon as possible.469 In a signing
statement issued in August, 1979, Carter declared that because the
provision interfered with the President's "right to decide when and
where an Ambassador or Consul should be appointed," it would be
treated "as a recommendation and not a requirement."4 7 In early
1980, the administration closed 7 of the 10 protected consulates.471
There was probably no one with standing to challenge this act of presi-
dential defiance. If the closing of the consulate at Goteborg, Sweden
was typical, the American personnel who worked there were all trans-
ferred to other posts. The only people to suffer any measurable injury
were the foreign nationals who had been employed as chauffeurs, sec-
retaries, and the like.472 These individuals probably lacked standing
to sue since the law requiring that the consulates remain open was
surely not designed to protect their interests. Yet, had Carter honored
the statute, it is equally difficult to imagine anyone who could have
claimed an injury sufficient to have standing to challenge the law's
requirement that the offices remain open.
The final instance in which the Carter administration elected not
to implement a law on constitutional grounds involved the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation.473 In a December 12, 1980, signing
statement, the President declared that because some of the Council's
members were not appointed in accord with the Appointments
Clause, they "should participate only in the Council's advisory activi-
ties."'474 He was evidently troubled by the fact that while the Presi-
dent appointed 14 Council members, 5 seats were reserved for
designated federal officeholders such as the Capitol Architect and the
Secretary of the Interior.475 The Council honored Carter's concern by
treating the 5 as ex officio members. 76 In theory, the President's ac-
469. Act of Aug. 15, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-60, §108, 93 Stat. 395, 397.
470. Statement of Aug. 15, 1979, in 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1434-35 (1980).
471. 126 CONG. REC. 21515-16, 28513 (1980) (noting closure of consulates in Salzburg,
Bremen, Nice, Turin, Goteborg, Mandalay, and Brisbane). In 1876, President Grant had
issued a statement objecting to a provision directing that he close certain diplomatic offices
abroad. Statement of Aug. 14, 1876, in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 129, at 4331-
32 (regarding Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 288, 19 Stat. 170, 175). However, Grant immedi-
ately complied with the provision. Message of Dec. 5, 1876, in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS,
supra note 129, at 4356.
472. See 126 CONG. REc. 28513 (1980).
473. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, § 301, 94 Stat. 2987, 2998-3000.
474. Statement of Dec. 12, 1980, in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2802-03 (1982).
475. See 94 Stat. 2998, § 301(a); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION,
1981 ANN. REP. 20, 54.
476. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 1981 ANN: REP. 20, 54.
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tion was not insulated from judicial review. The ex officio members
could have sued the Council claiming that the statute gave them a
right to vote, forcing the Council to defend itself on the ground that
the law was unconstitutional. But as a practical matter, these mem-
bers had no incentive to sue, for the expense would far outweigh any
conceivable benefit they might derive from becoming voting members
of the Council. President Carter could have assured a judicial resolu-
tion of the issue if, instead of defying the law, he had ordered the
Attorney General to institute quo warranto proceedings against the
five members, asking the court to hold that their manner of selection
violated the Appointments Clause.
Jimmy Carter's unprecedented willingness to disregard those
parts of statutes that he thought were unconstitutional may have been
influenced by his prior experience as Governor of Georgia, the first
state to give its Chief Executive an item veto.47 Yet, it is interesting
to note that all of the earlier instances where a President signed but
then refused to comply with a law arose in a setting where the opposi-
tion party controlled one or both Houses of Congress, thus limiting
the administration's ability to cure any perceived defects in the legisla-
tion before passage. In Carter's case, this was not so, for the Demo-
crats controlled the House and the Senate during all four years he was
in office.478
Of the twelve incidents of executive noncompliance discussed
here, in only two could it be said that such action was necessary to
secure judicial review of the law in question.479 Review did not occur
in either case, however, in part because the White House did nothing
to facilitate it. In three other instances, judicial review was possible
whether or not the President honored the law, but in each case, the act
of defiance severely reduced the likelihood that judicial review would
occur.480 In the seven remaining cases, the President's determination
that the law was unconstitutional was insulated from judicial review
with the result that his refusal to execute the measure amounted to an
absolute veto. In two of these situations, no one would have had
477. SPI-zER, supra note 40, at 126, 158 n.6; GA. CONsr. art. III, §V. Carter initially
favored giving the President an item veto, but later had doubts about it. SPITZER, supra
note 40, at 158 n.8.
478. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS OF CONGRESS, 1991-1992, at
40-42 (1992).
479. See supra notes 386-387,407 and accompanying text (regarding Presidents
Buchanan and Taft).
480. See supra notes 441, 468, 476 and accompanying text (regarding Presidents Ford
and Carter (2 incidents)).
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standing to challenge the validity of the law, regardless of how the
Executive had responded. 41' In the other five cases, the effect of pres-
idential noncompliance was to foreclose review that might otherwise
have been available.'
C. Constitutional Objections to Statutes Enacted During A Prior
Administration
Presidents have at times refused to honor a law adopted during
an earlier administration and which they thus had no opportunity to
veto or object to through a signing statement. Before examining these
instances, it is important to note that Presidents may have options,
short of noncompliance, for dealing with preexisting laws they believe
to be unconstitutional. One is to ask Congress to repeal the measure.
The Tenure of Office Act, passed in 1867 over Andrew Johnson's veto,
was finally repealed in 1887 after Presidents Grant, Hayes, and Cleve-
land all pressed Congress to take this step." 3 Dwight Eisenhower se-
cured the repeal of a committee approval requirement adopted during
the Truman years, after repeated messages to Congress charged that
the provision was unconstitutional. 4
Another option, albeit one that has generated controversy, is for
the White House to refuse to defend-or even join in the attack-
when such a law is challenged in court.485 During the Kennedy ad-
ministration, the United States intervened in a suit attacking the 1946
Hill-Burton Act to the extent that it allowed the construction of hospi-
tals on a separate-but-equal basis. Throughout the proceeding, the
government joined plaintiffs in arguing that the law was unconstitu-
tional.486 The Department of Justice under President Carter refused
to defend the constitutionality of a statute first adopted in 1905 which
required the Secretary of the Army to sell firearms, at cost, to mem-
bers of the National Rifle Association; the Department later declined
to appeal the district court's decision holding the provision invalid.487
481. See supra notes 423-424, 472 and accompanying text (regarding Presidents Wilson
and Carter).
482. See supra notes 397, 431, 437, 453-454, 461-462 and accompanying text (regarding
Presidents Arthur, Eisenhower, Ford, and Carter (2 incidents)).
483. See supra note 142; FisHER, supra note 319, at 60-61.
484. Separation of Powers Hearings, supra note 328, at 222.
485. See Brady, supra note 145; Miller & Bowman, supra note 124.
486. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 962 (4th Cir. 1963) (en
banc), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 1938 (1964).
487. Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1039, 1043-44 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Congress did not intervene and defend the law's constitutionality. Id. at 1044.
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Finally, statutes may give a President discretion whether or not to
use a constitutionally offensive provision, in which case the Executive
may refrain from acting without being guilty of defying the law. Lyn-
don Johnson avoided committee veto and approval requirements con-
tained in a number of statutes this way. Early in his administration
Johnson objected to the constitutionality of such provisions. 8 Over
the next few years he continued to challenge them by exercising his
veto power,4 89 by objecting in signing statements,49 and by submitting
legislation to repeal these clauses in existing statutes.4 9 1 In none of
these instances did he refuse to comply with the law.
4
9
In mid-1966, however, Johnson announced that beginning in
1967, his administration would no longer undertake public works
projects that were subject to congressional committee veto or ap-
proval requirements.493 Four of the laws involved were on the books
when Johnson took office. Each authorized rather than directed that
the projects be pursued, and no funds were to be appropriated until
after a proposal had been cleared by the designated committees.494
Congress's use of permissive authorization language together with its
failure to appropriate funds suggests that Johnson can not fairly be
charged with having defied the law by not pursuing these projects.
488. See, e.g., Statement of Dec. 31, 1963, in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS, 104 (1965) (ob-
jecting to committee approval requirement in Public Works Appropriation Act).
489. See, e.g., Message of June 7,1965, in 111 CONG. REC. 12669-70 (1965); S. Doc. No.
34, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1965) (veto based on inclusion of committee approval
requirement).
490. See Statement of July 17, 1964, in 1964 PuB. PAPERS 861-62 (1965); Statement of
Oct. 8, 1964, in 1964 PUB. PAPERS 1249-51 (Oct. 8, 1964); Statement of Oct. 14, 1964, in
1964 PuB. PAPERS 1336; Statement of Oct. 26, 1965, in 1965 PuB. PAPERS 1082-84 (1966).
491. See Statement of Nov. 8, 1966, in 1966 PUB. PAPERS 1354 (1967); Separation of
Powers Hearings, supra note 328, at 38, 108-09, 153-55, 214-15.
492. See supra Table 3; Separation of Powers Hearings, supra note 328, at 92.
493. See Separation of Powers Hearings, supra note 328, at 106-07; Statement of Nov. 8,
1966, in 1966 PUB. PAPERS 1354 (1967); S. REP. No. 549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1969).
494. The four existing statutes were the: Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937, ch.
517, 50 Stat. 522 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §1011 (1980)); Watershed Protection and
Flood Prevention Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-566, ch. 656, 68 Stat. 666 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §1002 (1985); Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956, ch. 972, 70
Stat. 1044, 1045 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §422a (1988)); Public Buildings Act of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-249, §7(a), 73 Stat. 479 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §605
(1988)). On the Johnson administration's refusal to pursue projects authorized by these
statutes, see Separation of Powers Hearings, supra note 328, at 81-138, 150-55, 214-15. A
fifth law was signed by Johnson in 1965, at which time he issued a statement objecting to its
committee approval requirement. Statement of Oct. 26, 1965, in 1965 PUB. PAPERS 1082-
84 (1966) (regarding Flood Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073); see
supra notes 327-329 and accompanying text.
Instead, Johnson appears to have acted within the scope of the discre-
tion given to him by statute.
495
Yet not all Presidents chose one of these options, or if they did,
they coupled them with a refusal to comply with the law. We turn
now to a consideration of those cases.
1. Grover Cleveland: The Civil Service Chief Examiner
Grover Cleveland in 1886 confronted the same issue that Presi-
dent Arthur had faced a number of years earlier concerning the Chief
Examiner of the Civil Service Commission. Cleveland's Attorney
General reached the same conclusion that Arthur's had, namely that
the Chief Examiner was an "officer" of the United States who could
not constitutionally be appointed by the Commission itself. 496 Like
his predecessor, Cleveland submitted his own nominee for the posi-
tion to the Senate. The Senate once again acquiesced in this defiance
of the statutory scheme, this time confirming the appointment without
reservation.497 And as before, the practical effect of the President's
action was to foreclose the possibility of judicial review. Cleveland
could have assured a judicial determination of the constitutional issue
by directing the Attorney General to file a quo warranto proceeding
against whomever the Commission appointed to the position.
2. Woodrow Wilson: Removing a Postmaster
On February 2, 1920, President Wilson fired Frank S. Myers from
his position as postmaster at Portland, Oregon, prior to the expiration
of Myers' four-year term.498 By doing so, Wilson ignored an 1876 stat-
ute which provided that such postmasters could be removed by the
President only "with the advice and consent of the Senate." '499 Wilson
never notified the Senate, much less sought its consent °.50  Though he
did not specify that this defiance of the 1876 Act was based on consti-
tutional grounds, it is fair to assume that it was. Many of Wilson's
predecessors, including Andrew Johnson, had opposed attempts by
495. The issue is admittedly a close one. To the extent Johnson did submit projects to
Congress which were then approved by the requisite committees, he was at that point
clearly guilty of defying the law by refusing to spend the appropriated funds. See infra
notes 512-517 and accompanying text.
496. 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 409-10 (1886).
497. 25 J. OF EXEC. PROC. OF U.S. SENATE 601, 683 (1901).
498. Myers v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 199, 199-200 (1923).
499. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, §6, 19 Stat. 78, 80. This act was signed by President
Grant without objection, even though he had urged Congress to repeal the Tenure of Of-
fice Act which imposed similar restrictions with respect to other offices.
500. Myers, 58 Ct. Cf. at 201-202.
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Congress to restrict the President's removal power.501 Several months
after dismissing Myers, Wilson vetoed a budget bill because it made
certain officers removable only by concurrent resolution of the House
and Senate. His veto message declared that "Congress is without con-
stitutional power to limit the appointing power and its incident, the
power of removal derived from the Constitution."5°2
As was true of Andrew Johnson's violation of the Tenure of Of-
fice Act,50 3 no one would have had standing to challenge the validity
of the 1876 law unless the President defied it. The difference was that,
in this case, judicial review occurred, though not due to any efforts on
the part of the administration. °4 A month after Wilson left office,
Myers sued for the balance of his salary in the Court of Claims. The
Justice Department defended the case in part by challenging the valid-
ity of the 1876 Act. The Court of Claims ruled against Myers under
the doctrine of laches.505 The Supreme Court affirmed but on the
ground that the statute was unconstitutional. In an opinion by Chief
Justice Taft, the Court finally resolved the issue that had triggered the
Johnson impeachment, holding that Congress may not reserve for it-
self a role in the process of removing federal officers.
506
3. Franklin Roosevelt. Removing a Commissioner
The President's view as to the scope of his removal powers was
the basis for another act of executive defiance, this time involving
Franklin Roosevelt's refusal to comply with a 1914 law which pro-
vided that the President could remove a Federal Trade Commissioner
from office only "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office."5 7 In 1933, Roosevelt dismissed an FrC Commissioner, Wil-
liam E. Humphrey, who had been appointed by President Hoover508
Roosevelt made clear that his action did not reflect upon Humphrey
or the quality of his services, and that the removal stemmed solely
501. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 168-69 (1926).
502. Message of June 4, 1920, in 65 PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 1362 (Arthur S.
Link ed. 1991); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 169 (1926). Decades earlier, Wilson
had written of the heads of departments: "Once installed, their hold upon their offices does
not depend upon the will of Congress." WILSON, supra note 159, at 272.
503. See supra notes 189-232 and accompanying text.
504. The government might have guaranteed that judicial review would occur by bring-
ing quo warranto proceedings against Myers when he refused to acknowledge the Presi-
dent's removal order. See Myers, 58 Ct. CI. at 200, 202; Myers, 272 U.S. at 107.
505. Myers, 58 Ct. Cl. at 206.
506. Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.
507. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, §1, 38 Stat. 717, 718 (1914).
508. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 259 U.S. 602, 619 (1935).
from a desire to fill the position with someone more supportive of the
administration's policies.5 09 Humphrey sued in the Court of Claims,
which promptly certified the matter to the Supreme Court. There, the
Justice Department argued that the restriction on the President's re-
moval power was unconstitutional. However, the Court upheld the
Act, distinguishing Myers on the basis that the office there was purely
executive, whereas the FTC performs quasi-legislative and quasi-judi-
cial functions.5 10 As in Myers, this judicial resolution of the constitu-
tional dispute between Congress and the President could not have
occurred if the President had complied with the statute in question.
511
4. Lyndon Johnson: Impounding Watershed Funds
After President Johnson announced that he would no longer un-
dertake public works projects that were subject to approval or veto by
congressional committees,512 his administration submitted proposals
to Congress under the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention
Act of 1954, one of the statutes he had objected to because of its com-
mittee approval requirement.1 3 A total of 96 of these projects were
approved by the Agricultural Committees of the House and Senate,
but the President then refused to proceed with them unless Congress
amended the statute. 14 Because the effect of the committees' action
was to make funds available for the approved projects, Johnson's fail-
ure to implement them constituted an impoundment of appropriated
funds and a defiance of the law.
The President's action was not shielded from judicial review.
Any of the local governmental or nonprofit organizations whose pro-
posal had been approved might have sued the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to compel release of the funds. The Secretary might then have
raised the constitutional issue as a defense, arguing that because the
appropriation was in effect made by two congressional committees
rather than by Congress itself, no funds were legally available for the
509. Id. at 618-19.
510. Id. at 627-32.
511. Though the administration apparently took no steps to facilitate judicial review, in
these Depression years the fact that roughly $50,000 was at stake probably made it certain
that a lawsuit would be filed.
512. See supra notes 488-495 and accompanying text.
513. Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of 1954, ch. 656, Pub. L. No. 83-
566, 68 Stat. 666 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §1001 (1985)); Separation of Powers
Hearings, supra note 328, at 82-83, 108-10.
514. 115 CONG. REC. 5923-24 (1969); Separation of Powers Hearings, supra note 328, at
92, 138.
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project.5 15 It does not appear that any such suits were filed or that the
administration did anything to encourage them. The Secretary might
have triggered judicial review himself by filing a declaratory judgment
action against one of these local applicants, asking the court to decide
whether or not the purported appropriation was valid.5 16 Nor was it
even necessary for the President to defy the law in order to clear the
way for judicial review. Instead, the administration might have urged
the applicants whose proposals were not approved by the committees
to bring suit against the Secretary of Agriculture to compel release of
the funds, on the theory that the committee approval provision was
unconstitutional.5 17 As it was, no judicial review occurred. The funds
were later released by President Nixon.5 18
5. Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter: The War Powers Resolution
Perhaps the best-known example of executive defiance of an al-
legedly unconstitutional law involves the War Powers Resolution en-
acted over Richard Nixon's veto in 1973.519 Nixon's successors have
uniformly adhered to his view that the resolution's consultation, re-
porting, and termination provisions infringe upon the President's au-
thority as Commander-in-Chief to use the armed forces as he wishes.
Chief Executives have sometimes complied with section 3 by consult-
ing with Congress.5 20 However, the reporting requirements have been
ignored. Presidents Ford and Carter refused to notify Congress under
section 4(a)(1) when introducing troops into hostilities, thereby avoid-
515. See Separation of Powers Hearings, supra note 328, at 115 (statement of Philip S.
Hughes, Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, making similar argument to a Senate
subcommittee).
516. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988). Because a federal court would have had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993) over a suit by an applicant against the Secretary to compel
compliance with the statute, it could have heard a declaratory action by the Secretary
against the applicant. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 14-17 (1983).
517. See Separation of Powers Hearings, supra note 328, at 92, 99 (noting that some
projects were not approved by the committees). Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(suit against executive agency to invalidate a law that prevented the INS from taking action
favorable to plaintiff, where the INS agreed that law was unconstitutional).
518. FISHER, supra note 134, at 166.
519. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548) (1988); see supra notes 277-283 and accompanying
text.
520. John H. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM.
L. Rsv. 1379, 1400 & n.63 (1988). Section 3 requires the President "to consult with Con-
gress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances ....
50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1988).
ing section 5's command that the forces be withdrawn within 60 days
unless Congress declared war or authorized a longer engagement.
Ford and Carter either gave no formal notice to Congress or failed to
specify that notice was being given under section 4(a)(1).521 Ronald
Reagan exhibited a similar disregard for the War Powers Resolution
in making use of combat forces in Lebanon, Grenada, Central
America, Libya and the Persian Gulf. 22
It has been persuasively argued that the federal judiciary may
hear challenges to a President's failure to comply with the resolu-
tion.5z In the Ford and Carter cases, the uses of force were so brief
that if any lawsuits had been filed challenging the Presidents' failure
to start the 60-day clock, they would probably have been dismissed as
moot.5 24 To date, all such cases have been dismissed either as being
nonjusticiable or under the doctrine of remedial discretion.52 Judicial
review of the War Powers Resolution is even less likely to occur if a
President were to comply with its consulting and reporting provisions,
for it is difficult to conceive of anyone who would then have standing
to challenge their validity.
6. Jimmy Carter: Issuing Vetoed Regulations
When Gerald Ford signed a 1974 omnibus education bill, he ob-
jected that several of its provisions subjected decisions of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare to "various forms of
521. Ely, supra note 520, at 1381 & n.8 (collecting authorities); Zablocki, supra note
283, at 579-87; Michael Ratner & David Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of
the War Powers Resolution, 17 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 715, 742-44 (1984).
522. Ides, supra note 162, at 631-52; Zablocki, supra note 283, at 587-97; Ratner & Cole,
supra note 521, at 744-50; see also DAVID L. HALL, THE REAGAN WARS: A CoNsTIT-
TIONAL PERsPcrrwE ON WAR POWERS AND THE PRESIDENCY 156-59, 197-99, 225-27, 255-
62 (1991) (noting that in some instances Reagan was not required to give notice under
§4(a)(1)).
523. Ely, supra note 520, at 1406-17; Ratner & Cole, supra note 521, at 717.
524. See Zablocki, supra note 283, at 580-86 (describing incidents in which Presidents
Ford and Carter employed military forces).
525. See, e.g., Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990) (Operation Desert Shield -
political question, ripeness and remedial discretion); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141
(D.D.C. 1990) (Operation Desert Shield - ripeness); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333
(D.D.C. 1987) (Persian Gulf War - political question and remedial discretion); Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), affid, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Nicaragua - political question); Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), dis-
missed as moot, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Grenada - remedial discretion); Crockett v.
Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1251 (1984) (El Salvador - political question).
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Congressional review and possible veto. '"526 One of the provisions al-
lowed Congress, by concurrent resolution, to block final regulations
issued by HEW.527 During Ford's presidency, Congress never exer-
cised this two-House legislative veto power. In 1980, however, the last
year of Jimmy Carter's presidency, Congress passed four concurrent
resolutions disapproving regulations issued by the Department of Ed-
ucation.528 On June 5, 1980, the Attorney General advised the Secre-
tary of Education that the legislative veto provision was
unconstitutional and that she was therefore "entitled to implement the
regulations in question in spite of Congress' disapproval."529 The Sec-
retary followed the advice and placed all of the regulations into
effect.5
30
The Attorney General justified his recommended defiance of the
law partly on the ground that to honor the concurrent resolutions
"might well foreclose effective judicial challenge to their constitution-
ality."'531 Yet there was no assurance that anyone harmed by the dis-
approved regulations would sue to have them invalidated. Had the
Secretary instead respected the law by withholding the regulations,
those who would have benefited from them could have sued to have
the legislative veto declared unconstitutional, freeing the Department
to implement the regulations.5 32 As in some of our earlier examples,
the Secretary might even have encouraged the filing of such a lawsuit.
Thus, while this was not a case where the administration's defiance of
the law precluded all judicial review, neither was it one where such
action was necessary in order to make a legal challenge possible.
526. Statement of Aug. 21, 1974, in 1974 PUB. PAPERS 35-37 (1975) (regarding Act of
Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484).
527. Act of Aug. 21, 1974, §509, 88 Stat. 566-68 (amending §431 of the General Educa-
tion Provisions Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1988)).
528. H.R. CON. RFS. 318, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 Stat. 3651 (1980); H.R. CON. Rus.
319, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 Stat. 3651; H.R. CON. R.s. 332, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 Stat.
3652; S. CON. RES. 91, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 Stat. 3653.
529. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 25, at 2 (1980); 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 21-22 (1980).
530. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 100d (Education Appeals Bd.), 134 (Grants for Educational Im-
provement, Resources, and Support), 161c (Arts Education Program), 161g (Law Related
Education Program) (1980). These regulations were revised as of October 1, 1980, and
were identical to those disapproved by Congress. See 45 Fed. Reg. 22634, 22742, 23602,
27880 (1980).
531. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 25, at 11 (1980); 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 21, 29 (1980).
532. Three of the four sets of regulations provided for making educational grants to
public and private nonprofit agencies or organizations. See supra note 530. Entities that
were eligible to apply for funds could have sued to have the regulations put into effect.
D. 1789-1981: A Summary
When one looks at all of the instances where Presidents have ob-
jected to laws as being unconstitutional, the reality is that until quite
recently, the rhetoric of objection has rarely been accompanied by ac-
tual defiance. In the nearly 200 years from 1789 to 1981, the Execu-
tive, through veto messages, signing statements, and other means,
questioned the validity of laws on over 135 occasions.533 In only 20
cases did the President fail to comply with the law.534 The first of
these incidents did not occur until 1860, three-quarters of a century
after the Constitution was framed. This strongly reinforces the argu-
ment that the Founders did not intend the President to possess a
power to suspend laws that he might think unconstitutional. 35 Con-
trary to Judge Easterbrook's claim that "every President in this cen-
tury has used the power of presidential review to refuse to enforce
statutes,"536 Presidents McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Harding,
Coolidge, Hoover, Truman, Kennedy and Nixon never disregarded a
law on these grounds. As recently as 1966, Chief Executives had ig-
nored allegedly unconstitutional laws on only 9 occasions. Not until
the last two decades did executive defiance begin to reach significant
proportions. Of the 20 incidents occurring between 1789 and 1981,
half took place since 1974. Jimmy Carter alone was responsible for
more than a third of the total.
This desultory record could hardly suffice to alter the constitu-
tional limitations established by the Framers. Felix Frankfurter once
suggested that "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pur-
533. This figure includes: 27 measures that were enacted over a President's constitu-
tionally based veto, see supra Table 1 and Part II.A.; 93 laws objected to in signing state-
ments, see supra Table 3; 7 instances of presidential defiance of laws adopted during prior
administrations, see supra Part II.C.; and 10 instances where Presidents objected to previ-
ously adopted laws by seeking their repeal or by failing to defend them in court, see supra
notes 483-495 and accompanying text.
534. This figure includes: Andrew Johnson's defiance of the Tenure of Office Act, see
supra notes 189-233 and accompanying text; 12 cases where laws objected to in signing
statements were ignored, see supra Table 4; and 7 instances where Presidents disregarded
laws adopted during a prior administration, see supra Part II.C.. President Ford's failure
to comply with the War Powers Resolution is treated as one instance of defiance even
though he used the armed forces on several occasions. See Zablocki, supra note 283, at
580-84.
535. Cf Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-76 (1926) (finding 73-year practice
dating from 1789 entitled to great weight in determining meaning of Constitution); Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) ("The relevancy of prior [practices] is limited
largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the draftsmen's intent. Obvi-
ously, therefore, the precedential value of these cases tends to increase in proportion to
their proximity to the Convention in 1787.").
536. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 923.
REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE
Summer 19941
Summer 1994]
978 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:865
sued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned
•.. may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the Presi-
dent." '537 Presidential refusals to honor purportedly unconstitutional
laws have been too few and far between to satisfy Frankfurter's pre-
scription. Nor can Congress be deemed to have acquiesced. When
Andrew Johnson defied the Tenure of Office Act, he was immediately
impeached. 38 Woodrow Wilson's refusal to comply with a treaty ter-
mination provision might have led to impeachment had he not been
on the eve of leaving office.5 3 9 Lyndon Johnson's failure to implement
public works projects that were subject to a committee approval re-
quirement triggered congressional hearings,5 4 as did Gerald Ford's
and Jimmy Carter's disregard of the War Powers Resolution. 41 Other
incidents, such as those involving the transfer, appointment or re-
moval of minor federal officials, may have been deemed so inconse-
quential as not to warrant a response. 42
Moreover, despite earlier suggestions to the contrary, 43 the mod-
em Court has rejected the notion that either Congress or the Presi-
dent may revise the boundaries of the Constitution if the other branch
has acquiesced. 44 In INS v. Chadha,145 the Justices struck down the
537. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
538. See supra text accompanying notes 189-233.
539. See supra text accompanying note 412.
540. Separation of Powers Hearings, supra note 328.
541. See War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacua-
tion of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident, 1975: Hearings
Before The Subcomm. on Int'l Security & Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Int'l
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); War Powers Resolution, 1977: Hearings on the Oper-
ation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). After Jimmy Carter refused to honor the legislative
veto of regulations issued by HEW, a Senate subcommittee insisted that the Attorney
General defend "the Justice Department's assertion that it can deny the validity of Acts of
Congress." Letter from Benjamin R. Civiletti to Senator Max Baucus (July 30, 1980), re-
printed in GAO bid protest hearings, supra note 9, at 745.
542. See supra text accompanying notes 376-87 (aqueduct supervisor); supra notes 388-
397, 496-497 (civil service examiner); supra notes 498-506 (postmaster); supra notes 432-
441, 473-476, 507-511 (members of federal commissions). Cf. Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 170 (1926) (noting that even formal consent to a law or practice that violates the
Constitution does not necessarily signify acquiescence but may reflect other
considerations).
543. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 170-76 (1926); United States v. Mid-
west Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472-73 (1915).
544. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13, 944-45 (1983) (rejecting argument that
presidential approval of hundreds of laws containing legislative vetoes could save a device
that was otherwise unconstitutional); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-37 (1976) (holding
that Congress had infringed upon the President's appointment power despite the Presi-
dent's consent to the statute by signing it into law). See also Powell v. McCormack, 395
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legislative veto as being inconsistent with the clear intent of the Fram-
ers even though the device had been included in some 200 statutes
most of which were approved by the Executive. Writing for the Court
in 1992, Justice O'Connor declared unequivocally that "[t]he Constitu-
tion's division of power among the three Branches is violated where
one Branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the en-
croached-upon Branch approves the encroachment.
546
E. Postscript: A De Facto Item Veto
This study has not attempted to canvass the extent to which Presi-
dents Reagan and Bush ignored those statutes whose validity they
questioned. However, it is clear that they at times did so. Ronald
Reagan defied the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act,547 after issu-
ing a signing statement charging that it gave the Comptroller General,
an officer of Congress, functions which could be performed only by
executive officials.5 48 Reagan specifically objected to an automatic
stay provision which barred the award of government contracts while
the Comptroller General investigated complaints that an agency had
not followed competitive bidding procedures. At the Attorney Gen-
eral's direction, federal agencies disregarded the stay provision.5 49 A
series of lawsuits followed in which the federal courts uniformly re-
jected Reagan's claim that the law was unconstitutional.
55 1
Reagan was also the first President in over a century and only the
second in history to defy a statute that was enacted over his veto. The
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was adopted in 1986,1"' despite
Reagan's claim, set forth in his veto message, that it would "infringe
on the President's constitutional prerogative to articulate the foreign
U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969) ("That an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely
does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.").
545. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
546. New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2431 (1992) (holding that states may
not consent to departures from the constitutional plan by allowing Congress to exceed its
authority).
547. Pub. L. No. 98-369, Title VII, 98 Stat. 494, 1199, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (1988).
548. Statement of July 18, 1984, in 1984 PuB. PAPERs 1053 (1987).
549. See H.R. REP. No. 99-138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-8 (1985); Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 1988). The Bush administration also ignored the
fee-recovery provision of the Competition in Contracting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c) (1988),
on the ground that it was unconstitutional. See United States v. Instruments, S.A., Inc., 807
F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1992).
550. Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th
Cir. 1988); Parola v. City of Monterey, 848 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1988).
551. Act of Oct. 2, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086.
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policy of the United States." '552 From 1986 until 1991 when the sanc-
tions were formally lifted, the Reagan and Bush administrations ex-
ploited loopholes in the law and quietly permitted U.S. companies to
trade with South Africa in violation of the Act's express prohibi-
tions.553 Reagan and Bush also refused to honor a series of laws bar-
ring the government from enforcing nondisclosure agreements with
federal employees who had access to classified material,554 claiming
that these provisions impaired the President's duty to protect national
security.55
5
These incidents of noncompliance may represent only the tip of
an iceberg.556 Ronald Reagan issued statements challenging the valid-
ity of 87 bills he had signed into law;557 George Bush approved 116
laws that he found to be constitutionally objectionable. 5 Together,
they assailed the validity of more than 200 statutes, half again as many
as all of their predecessors combined.
Presidential rhetoric also took on a much bolder tone after 1981.
When Congress in 1980 challenged Jimmy Carter's refusal to honor
four legislative vetoes of Department of Education regulations, the
Justice Department responded in a conciliatory vein. It acknowledged
552. Message of Sept. 26, 1986, in 1986 PUB. PAPERS 1278-80 (1989).
553. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID AcT OF 1986 (1988); Dan Stets, Doing Business with S.
Africa: Loopholes Hobble United States Sanctions, PHILA. INoUIRER, May 13, 1990, re-
printed in 136 CONG. REc.. E2150-01 (June 26, 1990); 134 CONG. REc. H6917 (Aug. 11,
1988) (remarks of Rep. James L. Oberstar); WASH. POST, Aug. 20,1989, at A12. President
Bush formally lifted the sanctions in July 1991. N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1991, at Al, col. 5.
554. Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 630, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-432; Act of
Sept. 22, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-440, § 619, 102 Stat. 1721, 1756; Act of Nov. 3, 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-136, § 618, 103 Stat. 783, 820.
555. Ronald Reagan, Statement of Sept. 22, 1988, in 1988 PUB. PAPERS 204-05 (1991);
Ronald Reagan, Statement of Nov. 3, 1989, in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1448-49 (1990); L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1988, at 2, col. 4; L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1989, at A18, col. 2; National Fed'n
of Fed. Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated sub nom.
American Foreign Service Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (per curiam); American
Foreign Service Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 732 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1990). President Bush also
refused to honor §102 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 &
1991, Pub. L. No. 101-246, §102, 104 Stat. 15, 19 (1990), which barred spending funds to
send a delegation to a negotiating session unless it included members of the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Bush claimed that the provision encroached on his
appointment power. Barr, supra note 104, at 39.
556. For other allegedly unconstitutional laws that President Reagan refused to comply
with, see Christine E. Burgess, When May a President Refuse to Enforce the Law?, Note, 72
TEx. L. REV. 631, 642 n.64 (1994).
557. See supra Table 2. In addition, one bill that Reagan objected to on constitutional
grounds became law over his veto. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
440, 100 Stat. 1086; see supra text accompanying notes 551-553.
558. See supra Table 2.
that "if executive officers were to adopt a policy of ignoring or attack-
ing Acts of Congress whenever they believed them to be in conflict
with the provisions of the Constitution, their conduct in office could
jeopardize the equilibrium established within our constitutional sys-
tem."559 The Attorney General conceded "that the Executive can
rarely defy an Act of Congress," suggesting that this was proper only
when a law is "transparently inconsistent with the Constitution.
'" 560
Five years later, when Congress inquired into the Reagan admin-
istration's refusal to comply with the Competition in Contracting Act,
the Justice Department made the sweeping claim that it is "the duty of
the President to uphold the Constitution in the context of the enforce-
ment of Acts of Congress,"'561 and declared that he may ignore any
law that he deems to be contrary to the Constitution.
Unquestionably, the requirements of the Constitution prevail
over any statute adopted by Congress. Therefore, in the case of
a conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the President's
duty faithfully to execute the laws requires him not to observe a
statute that is in conflict with the Constitution, the fundamental
law of the land.562
While the Attorney General suggested that the case for defiance
would be strengthened if a law encroached on the Presidency or
where noncompliance might facilitate judicial review, neither of these
was a prerequisite to the Executive's right to ignore an allegedly un-
constitutional law.
563
The escalating rhetoric of presidential defiance coincides with
White House efforts to grant the President an item veto. Presidents
Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, each of whom made heavy use of
signing statements to challenge the constitutionality of bills they
signed into law, favored giving the President the authority to veto por-
559. 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 56 (1980).
560. Id. at 55, 58. Though the Carter administration often ignored this standard in re-
fusing to honor allegedly unconstitutional laws, what is significant here is the narrowness of
the administration's claimed right to disregard such measures.
561. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 434 (statement of William French
Smith, Att'y Gen.).
562. Id. at 318 (statement of D. Lowell Jensen, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen.); see also id.
at 299-300, 329. Fred F. Fielding, counsel to President Reagan, stated that:
There are times when the Administration has been accused of ignoring the law.
But remember that the President is sworn to uphold both the Constitution and
the laws. We seek to resolve the conflicts. Strong presidents especially are mind-
ful of their responsibility to those who come after them, and seek to assure that
they do not erode any executive prerogative.
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1985, at A24, col. 3.
563. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 300-01, 322, 434-35, 438.
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tions of a measure while accepting the rest. Reagan and Bush lobbied
hard for a constitutional amendment to this effect.514 The increasing
resort to signing statements during the Reagan and Bush years may
have been part of an "underhanded quest for a de facto item veto." 6 -
Until 1984 when he first urged giving the President an item veto,
566
Ronald Reagan averaged fewer than 6 constitutionally based signing
statements a year; thereafter his average jumped to 14. Like water
dripping steadily on a rock, the stream of White House statements
noting constitutional defects in bills the President has signed may,
with time, make a lasting impression. The phenomenon well illus-
trates Daniel Franklin's observation that
the rhetoric of the presidency has been used to assert the presi-
dent's own interpretation of his administrative and emergency
powers under the Constitution .... This kind of presidential
rhetoric provides a justification for and lays the groundwork for
future executive actions deemed proper pursuant to the presi-
dent's own interpretation of the Constitution.
567
As the public slowly becomes accustomed to the rhetoric of presiden-
tial defiance, the reality of executive nonenforcement may eventually
pass unnoticed.
The Reagan administration acknowledged the link between sign-
ing statements and the item veto, explaining that the Executive's ob-
jection to selected parts of statutes was designed to rectify alleged
congressional inroads on the veto power. The administration's princi-
pal spokesperson on this issue was Douglas Kmiec who worked in,
and for a time headed, the Office of Legal Counsel during the Reagan
years. The OLC drafts signing statements for the President. Kmiec
explained that:
The importance of the signing statement initiative grew as Con-
gress continued the practice of lumping together numerous un-
related provisions in omnibus bills, often inserting the most
controversial provisions in emergency appropriations measures
564. See Line-Item Veto Hearing, supra note 148, at 1-3; SPrrzER, supra note 40, at 121,
158 n.8; FISHER, supra note 319, at 131; 1984 Republican Party Platform, 1984 Cong. Q.
Almanac 43-B (1985); 1988 Republican Party Platform, 1988 Cong. Q. Almanac 50-A
(1989); George Bush, 1989 PuB. PAPERS 1053-54, 1055 (1990); George Bush, 1990 PUB.
PAPERS 1014, 1035,1526,1533, 1548 (1991). Reagan and Bush also explored the possibility
that they already possessed an inherent item veto power but the Office of Legal Counsel
twice rejected the contention. Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 437,455-58 & nn. 46-47(1993); Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opin-
ion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REv.
337, 353-59 (1993); Barr, supra note 104, at 35.
565. H.R. REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1985).
566. Line-Item Veto Hearing, supra note 148, at 1.
567. FRANKLIN, supra note 123, at 66-67.
passed at, or after, the fiscal deadlines. This practice effectively
denied the President his constitutionally provided veto
authority.
568
The "increasing impracticability of a veto," he said, caused the White
House to "place[ ] renewed emphasis upon presidential signing state-
ments to articulate constitutional concerns."569 In point of fact, the
practice of which the Reagan administration complained was 400
years old and was a well-recognized means of restricting the Execu-
tive's ability to exercise the veto power. °
Yet since President Reagan viewed the signing statement as the
equivalent of an item veto rather than as merely a rhetorical device, it
is not surprising that the administration apparently made a practice of
refusing to comply with statutory provisions to which the President
had objected. According to Kmiec:
The approval of legislation with constitutional reservations nec-
essarily means that executive action will not be immediately
taken to enforce the suspect provisions. If such non-enforce-
ment is challenged, whether the president's judgment is ulti-
mately vindicated... will depend on the considered judgment of
the Judiciary.571
568. KmIEc, supra note 210, at 53; see also Douglas W. Kmiec, Of Balkanized Empires
and Cooperative Allies: A Bicentennial Essay on the Separation of Powers, 37 CAT-. U.L.
REv. 73, 81 (1987).
569. Kmiec, supra note 568, at 81. President Bush's Attorney General similarly argued
that the use of signing statements was appropriate where "it would be politically impossi-
ble simply to veto a bill." Barr, supra note 104, at 38-39. See also Burgess, supra note 556,
at 663-65 (arguing that Presidents must be able to deny enforcement to provisions that
invade their domain since it may not be feasible to veto needed laws that make only minor
encroachments upon executive power).
570. See 2 STUBBS, supra note 10, at 570-75; CATHERINE D. BOWEN, THE LION AND
THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND Timss OF SIR EDWARD COKE 33-34 (1957) (noting that in the
late 1600s, the Commons began using the preamble of money bills to set forth "certain
preliminary conditions to their money grant, a haybag dangled before the hungry monar-
chical nose"); Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U.
L. REv. 735, 746-56, 762-66 (1993). From the outset, Congress used omnibus legislation,
and riders were commonplace after the Civil War. Charles J. Cooper, The Line-Item Veto:
The Framers' Intentions, in PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES: THE POLITICS OF THE PRESI-
DENTIAL VETO 29, 33-46 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest ed. 1988); Louis
Fisher, The Presidential Veto: Constitutional Developments, in PORK BARRELS AND PRINCI-
PLEs: THE POLITICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VETo, supra, at 17, 22. But see Sidak & Smith,
supra note 9, at 469-72 (arguing that Framers contemplated the use of omnibus legislation
but might not have disapproved of the selective veto as a response to it); Kmiec, supra note
564, at 353-59 (arguing that prior presidential acquiescence in congressional use of omni-
bus bills and legislative riders cannot estop later Presidents from invoking an item veto
against unconstitutional provisions).
571. Kmiec, supra note 306, at 13 (emphasis added). Though the Reagan administra-
tion at times acknowledged the conclusive role played by the judiciary, compliance with
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The connection between signing statements and the item veto was
also emphasized by the Justice Department in defending Ronald Rea-
gan's defiance of the Competition in Contracting Act. The Attorney
General noted that while the "President's veto power is usually ade-
quate to express and implement his judgment that an Act of Congress
is unconstitutional," at times "the exercise by the President of his veto
power may not be feasible." '572 Another Justice Department spokes-
person referred to nonenforcement as a way to deal with measures
Congress "has made effectively veto-proof. '573  David Stockman,
whose Office of Management and Budget issued the final directive to
ignore the Competition in Contracting Act, bluntly told a House sub-
committee, "We would not be here today if we had a line item veto,
because these two provisions would have been stricken from the act
when we signed it."
5 74
In disregarding the allegedly invalid sections of a law, the Presi-
dent, through self-help, exercises a negative considerably more power-
ful than the proposed item veto. In its most commonly suggested
form, the latter may only be used against line items in an appropria-
tions bill; moreover, the item veto is subject to congressional over-
ride.575 When the Executive refuses to honor the allegedly
unconstitutional provisions of law, it wields a surgical veto which can
be applied to any type of law and which is absolute in nature.
576
lower federal court rulings was not always forthcoming. See Kmiec, supra note 210, at 54;
GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 326-27:
572. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 434.
573. Id. at 334. See, Kmiec, supra note 564, at 355 ("In modem practice, presidents,
aided and abetted by OLC itself, have exercised a de facto item veto, at least in those
limited circumstances where provisions of enrolled bills are manifestly unconstitutional or
they encroach upon executive power.")
574. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 254.
575. See American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Proposals for Line-Item Veto
Authority (1984), reprinted in Line Item Veto Hearing, supra note 148, at 102-36. See also
Rappaport, supra note 570, at 770-71 (noting differences between a selective veto and the
refusal to enforce provisions in a bill).
576. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 9, at 460-61 (The refusal to comply with allegedly
unconstitutional provisions of law amounts to a "power of 'constitutional excision' that
"effectively vetoes legislation without giving Congress an opportunity to override that veto
Thus, even if the use of riders and omnibus bills did constitute a novel and unforeseen
practice that illegitimately restricts the veto power (see supra note 570 and accompanying
text), this would still not justify the Executive's defiance of unconstitutional laws, for such
conduct heavily overcompensates for any congressional inroads on the veto power. It may
be that the Constitution should at times be construed metaphorically rather than literally,
"translating" constitutional principles so as to remain faithful to the Framers' original con-
ception. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. Rv. 1165 (1993); Abner
S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential lawmaking, 61 U. Cm. L. Rv.
Unlike a veto, the claimed authority to ignore unconstitutional
laws is limited in that the President's objection cannot rest merely on
policy grounds. Yet it is not difficult to clothe almost any disagree-
ment in constitutional garb. The Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel reviews all enrolled bills for possible constitutional defects.
577
Its scrutiny is not always neutral, for OLC serves partly as an advocate
for the President's policies.' According to a former head of the of-
fice during the Reagan years, OLC "was asked to include draft signing
statements for the President that would be consistent with administra-
tion policy. This we did .... ,579 Another member of the office at the
time denied that there was a "simple answer" to the question of "to
what extent OLC's decisions reflect Administration policy considera-
tions." The reason was that while the Office "strongly resisted the
temptation to allow political pressures to affect its ability to render the
best possible legal advice," at the same time "good lawyers know or
soon learn... that sophisticated clients will not continue to seek ad-
vice from an attorney whose loyalty is questionable or who fails to
employ legal skills creatively to address the client's legal problems
"580
123, 129-30 (1994). Yet, as applied in this context, "translation" would allow use of a selec-
tive veto only if (1) the offending provision of law was passed as a rider or as part of an
omnibus bill, and (2) Congress is afforded the opportunity to override the Executive's ac-
tion through a two-thirds vote of each House. No President who has claimed the authority
to ignore unconstitutional laws has suggested that the power should be limited in either of
these ways.
577. Robert B. Shanks, Office of Legal Counsel-The President's 'Outside' Law Firm,
in 2 DEPT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, 1-36, 1-43 (1990-1 Supp. 1991); NANCY V. BAKER, CON-
FLICTING LOYALTiES: LAW AND POLrrics IN THE A-oRNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, 1789-
1990, at 10-11 (1992).
578. See BAKER, supra note 577, at 67-125; DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 25-43 (1980); ROSENFELD, supra
note 8, at 150-51; Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 513, 514, 523 (1993) (OLC needs better procedures "to protect its legal
judgments from the winds of political pressure and expediency" and to check "its own
eagerness to please."); GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 42 (statement of San-
ford Levinson noting that OLC opinions sometimes reflect "a process whereby a politically
appointed assistant attorney general writes a memorandum that is designed to accord with
an already adopted position of the President"); id at 52 (statement of Mark Thshnet); id. at
276 (statement of Steven R. Ross and Charles Tiefer). Contra, Barr, supra note 104, at 34-
37 (denying that Office of Legal Counsel tempers its legal advice based on political
considerations).
579. KMIEc, supra note 210, at 52. Kmiec was the head of OLC, and earlier its principal
deputy, under Attorney General Edwin Meese. Id. at xi.
580. Shanks, supra note 577, at 1-42. Accord, Lund, supra note 564, at 486-505 (OLC
has strong incentive to shape its legal advice according to the interests and desires of the
President lest the President turn elsewhere for legal advice); McGinnis, supra note 29, at
420-35 (OLC faces central dilemma between giving advice that is congenial to both the
Summer 19941 REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE
986 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY (Vol. 21:865
A perusal of the more than 200 constitutionally-based statements
issued by Presidents Reagan and Bush illustrates how creative and
accommodating the Office of Legal Counsel can be. In many in-
stances, OLC made it possible for the President to assert the invalidity
of multiple sections of a law; in one case, the number of constitutional
flaws detected reached ten.581 This is not to say that the White House
will necessarily refuse to carry out each of these provisions. But a
loyal and resourceful Justice Department can create an array of op-
tions for executive noncompliance, to be exercised by the President as
he sees fit.582
111. Restraining Presidential Defiance
If we assume that the Constitution did not give Presidents the
authority to suspend the laws whenever they believe them to be un-
constitutional, and if the record of historical practice is not such as to
alter this formal understanding, is the Executive ever justified in refus-
ing to comply with such measures? This Part suggests that presiden-
tial noncompliance with allegedly unconstitutional laws is proper only
if four conditions are satisfied. Because it is far from certain that
Presidents will adhere to these or any other limitations on their au-
thority,583 1 recommend that Congress fashion a number of safeguards
to both discourage, and provide redress for, unwarranted ekecutive
defiance of the law.
A. Principles Governing Executive Noncompliance
One can make a strong argument from the text of the Constitu-
tion and the intent of the Framers that a President may never refuse to
White House and the Attorney General, and at the same time trying to maintain its reputa-
tion as an elite and politically independent institution).
581. See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, Statement of Oct. 27,1986, in 1986 PUB. PAPERS 1450-51
(1989) (4 provisions); Ronald Reagan, Statement of Nov. 14, 1986, in 1986 PUB. PAPERS
1557-58 (1989) (6 provisions); Ronald Reagan, Statement of Sept. 29, 1987, in 1987 PuB.
PAPERS 1096-97 (1989) (4 provisions); George Bush, Statement of Nov. 29, 1989, in 1989
PUB. PAPERS 1599-1600 (1990) (10 provisions); George Bush, Statement of Nov. 30, 1989,
in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1609-11 (1990) (4 provisions).
582. Presidents may also raise constitutional objections on their own, or based on legal
advice from other sources such as White House Counsel. BAKER, supra note 577, at 6-7,
11-15. And see ANTIEAU, supra note 135, at 89-90 ("Presidents have not ordinarily been
trained in law, and with the exceptions of Taft and Wilson, it is doubtful if any of them could
properly claim expertise in constitutional law.").
583. See Monaghan, supra note 74, at 8-9 ("In the environment in which Presidents
must operate, it is not surprising that 'law' of any kind (the Constitution included) can
easily become merely one more factor to be considered, or even an obstacle to be
overcome.").
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enforce a law on the ground that it is unconstitutional.5 14 As was
demonstrated in Part I of this Article, the Executive was not granted a
power to suspend the laws even if he believes that a particular mea-
sure is invalid. The Constitution gave the President other means of
dealing with this situation, most notably by allowing him to exercise a
qualified veto.
Yet the Framers at the same time realized that unconstitutional
laws might be enacted. They provided for judicial review as a check
against just such a malfunctioning of the legislative process. 585 It
would therefore not be incompatible with the original scheme for a
President to ignore a clearly unconstitutional law if there is no other
way for judicial review to occur.58 6 The legislature could otherwise
ignore the Constitution with impunity, a danger the Founders feared
and expressly sought to avoid.587
Presidential defiance under these narrow circumstances would
operate as a safeguard against legislative tyranny, without raising the
specter of executive autocracy. Unlike the rejected suspending power,
the President's refusal to execute the law would be subject to immedi-
ate judicial review. Should the courts uphold the statute the Execu-
tive would be obliged to enforce it, regardless of the President's own
views as to its merits or validity.588  On the other hand, if a lower
federal court were to rule that the law was unconstitutional, a Presi-
dent would then be justified in disregarding the provision until the
584. See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, supra note 52, at 1502-04; CORWIN, supra note 104, at 71-
72; Letter from Arthur S. Miller to Rep. Jack Brooks, Feb. 27, 1985, reprinted in GAO Bid
Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 497-98; Gressman, supra note 124.
585. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
586. This is similar to the position taken by Andrew Johnson at his impeachment trial,
though Johnson's attorneys limited the right of defiance to situations where a law impairs
the President's powers. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201. John Norton Pome-
roy and Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase also endorsed this position. See supra text accom-
panying notes 202-204,210-213. See also Lee, supra note 124, at 1015. Cf BERGER, supra
note 191, at 307-09 (President may ignore laws that infringe on his constitutional powers in
order to have law tested but not limiting this to cases where judicial review would other-
wise be unavailable); Gressman, supra note 124, at 383 & n.17 (arguing that there are
usually "better methods of securing judicial review of those provisions ... than by an
executive refusal" to execute the law).
587. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (Madison); id. Nos. 71, 73 & 78 (Hamilton); WOOD,
supra note 112, at 403-13, 474, 507.
588. See supra note 8; Merrill, supra note 8, at 46-47 ("[T]here is widespread agreement
that the executive has a legal duty to enforce valid final judgments rendered by courts,
regardless of whether the executive agrees with the legal analysis that forms the basis for
the judgment."); see also infra note 666.
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decision was overturned on appeal or a contrary ruling was handed
down by a higher court.58 9
If the Executive does'possess a limited right of noncompliance, to
be invoked properly four principles would have to be satisfied. First,
the unconstitutionality of the law must be clearly indicated from the
text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, or prior rulings of
the Supreme Court. Second, the President must have exhausted all
avenues for redressing the problem through the legislative process.
Third, defiance of the law must for all practical purposes be the only
way to bring the question of its constitutionality before the courts.
And fourth, the Executive must take all possible steps to assure that
judicial review actually occurs. Without these safeguards, the narrow
privilege of noncompliance could easily become a modern equivalent
of the suspending power. Each of the four conditions will be dis-
cussed in turn.
1. A Clearly Unconstitutional Law
When a President opts to veto a bill on the ground that it is un-
constitutional, he acts in a legislative capacity.5 90 Like any member of
the House or Senate, he may cast his vote against the measure be-
cause of genuine doubts as to its validity.591 But when the Executive
refuses to enforce a statute because it is unconstitutional, he is no
longer functioning as a lawmaker. Since there is no independent basis
in the executive power for refusing to carry out such a law, the Presi-
dent's sole justification for noncompliance is that it will enable the
courts to exercise judicial review. Just as "the judiciary has always
given to congressional enactments a presumption of validity,"5-92 so
589. The government could thus acquiesce in the decision by giving the ruling of uncon-
stitutionality effect beyond the immediate parties to the suit, even though it might not be
required to do so. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (federal government
is not subject to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel); TRIBE, supra note 385, at 26-29
& n.11.
590. See Zinn, supra note 48, at 207, 214-15; SPrrZER, supra note 40, at 18.
591. See 49 CONG. REc. 4291-92 (1913) (President Taft's message vetoing Webb-Ken-
yon Act); WILLIAM H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS 19-23 (1916);
SPITzER, supra note 40, at 25-70; MASON, supra note 39, at 129-31; CORWIN, supra note
104, at 319.
592. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 670 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,152-53 & n.4 (1938); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 8, at 39 (statement of
Sanford Levinson). The presumption of constitutionality may of course be overcome.
Thus, if a litigant establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, there arises a pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,241 (1976); Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S 189, 208-11 (1973).
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should the Executive. Unless the grounds for believing a law to be
invalid are strong, the President should execute the measure even
though nonfrivolous arguments can be marshalled against it. 93 With-
out such a presumption, the White House-assisted by creative minds
in the Justice Department-could refuse to honor an endless array of
statutes even though there is little or no chance of their later being
overturned by the courts.
Counsel for various Presidents, including Andrew Johnson,
Woodrow Wilson, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, have asserted
that the Executive may ignore a law that is patently or clearly uncon-
stitutional.5 94 This view has also found support in academic circles.5 95
The trick is figuring out a way to make the condition a meaningful
one. One possibility is to insist that the Executive publicly explain the
basis and legal authority supporting its belief that a law is unconstitu-
tional,596 on the theory that this might discourage Presidents from ad-
vancing tenuous constitutional objections. However, if this entailed
nothing more than obtaining a written opinion from the Office of
Legal Counsel, the requirement would be reduced to a mere formal-
ity. As Arthur S. Miller observed, "Government lawyers always can
be found ... to create a counterpane of putative legality over any
action the President desires." '597 The Justice Department thus assured
Congress that the Competition in Contracting Act was "in clear con-
593. The requirement that a law be clearly unconstitutional, based on the text of the
Constitution, the Founders' intent, or Supreme Court precedent, amounts to a rejection, in
this context, of the position that a President has total autonomy to interpret the Constitu-
tion for himself. See supra note 8. Cf Strauss, supra note 8, at 127-35 (rejecting executive
autonomy view and arguing that the President should act as though he were a Supreme
Court Justice especially where, as here, there is a constitutional disagreement between
Congress and the executive branch).
594. See, e.g., Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Rep. Peter W.
Rodino, Jr. (Feb. 22, 1985), reprinted in GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 8, at 432,
434-35 (quoting and endorsing position taken by Andrew Johnson's defense counsel); Let-
ter from Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti to Senator Max Baucus (July 30, 1980),
reprinted in GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 745, 746 n.*, 749; 31 Op. Att'y
Gen. 475, 489 (1919). Andrew Johnson's attorneys also appeared to argue that even a law
of "doubtful" validity could be defied by the President. See supra note 199.
595. See, e.g., GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 50 (statement of Sanford
Levinson); id. at 50, 55 (statement of Mark Thshnet); Rappaport, supra note 570, at 769-70;
Kmiec, supra note 564, at 347 n.37 ("[O]ccasions for nonenforcement must be strictly lim-
ited to serious constitutional flaws, not policy disagreements .. "); McGinnis, supra note
29, at 387-89 (Once a bill becomes law, "the executive branch's constitutional review
should become at least as deferential as the 'clearly unconstitutional' standard once sug-
gested for judicial review of legislation.").
596. Cf. Rappaport, supra note 570, at 779-83 (urging use of such opinions when a Pres-
ident vetoes a bill on constitutional grounds).
597. Miller, supra note 104, at 405.
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travention of the Constitution, '598 yet CICA was subsequently upheld
by every federal court to rule on the question.5 99 Perhaps the Solicitor
General would be a more trustworthy source for such legal opinions,
as that office has a reputation for greater political independence from
the White House than the Attorney General. °0
It is unlikely that this first requirement, by itself, can serve as a
significant restraint on the Executive's ability to ignore allegedly un-
constitutional statutes. The line between laws that are patently invalid
and those that are only arguably so will often reflect one's convictions
as much as one's ability to decipher the Constitution.0" To suggest, as
some have, that the Executive may, without more, disregard any stat-
ute that is "plainly unconstitutional ' '6° would in effect give the Presi-
dent carte blanche to defy the law. The requirement that a law be
clearly invalid must be viewed as only the first of several conditions,
all of which must be met before the Executive may disregard an act of
Congress.
2. Exhausting Legislative Avenues of Redress
Before a President may take the extreme step of refusing to exe-
cute a statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional, all other avail-
able means for redressing the situation through the lawmaking process
must have been exhausted. This follows from the fact that the only
justification for executive defiance of the law is as an adjunct to judi-
cial review. It has often been recognized that federal courts should
598. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 334-35.
599. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988);
Parola v. City of Monterey, 848 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1988); Universal Shipping Co. v. United
States, 652 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1987).
600. See GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 42-43 (statement of Sanford Lev-
inson) (noting that before 1951, the Justice Department's official opinions were prepared
by the Solicitor General rather than by the Attorney General).
601. On occasion, the distinction may be apparent. After INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), most would agree that a statute containing a one- or two-House legislative veto is
clearly unconstitutional; but see Ely, supra note 520, at 1395-97 (arguing that veto provision
in War Powers Resolution is not necessarily invalid under Chadha). Most lawyers would
also probably agree that the statute barring the President from closing the Navy's dairy
farm at Annapolis was not patently unconstitutional, despite Lyndon Johnson's claim that
it interfered with his powers as Commander-in-Chief. See supra text accompanying notes
362-363.
602. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 50 (statements of Mark Thshnet and
Sanford Levinson); and see Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889
n.11 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that President might have duty to refuse to execute "a patently
unconstitutional law").
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decide constitutional questions only as a matter of last resort. °3 Un-
less the Executive is governed by a similar principle, the Judiciary
could be placed in the position of having to review statutes whose
constitutional defects might have been redressed by other means.
The White House may be able to prevent an allegedly unconstitu-
tional provision from being enacted into law by using its influence to
have the bill amended or defeated in Congress.6 4 If these efforts fail
and the President genuinely believes the measure to be unconstitu-
tional, he has the option of exercising the veto power.6 5 While the
White House in recent years has claimed that exercise of the veto is
often impractical, 06 such policy-based concerns should not suffice to
outweigh a serious constitutional objection. Even in the worst case
scenario, where the offending provision is part of an omnibus bill or is
tacked as a rider to an urgent end-of-the-session appropriations pack-
age, a President committed to the Constitution might still employ the
negative while at the same time submitting a new bill that meets his
objections; if necessary, Congress could be called into special session
to consider the substitute measure.
These efforts may of course fail °.6 7 Nor are the options of work-
ing with Congress or employing the veto available to a President when
the law was passed during a previous administration. In this event,
the avenues for legislative redress narrow. The Executive may, how-
ever, urge that Congress amend or repeal the allegedly invalid statute,
603. See Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909) (federal courts must
refrain from deciding federal constitutional issues if case might be disposed of based on
state law); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (not-
ing that Court has developed a series of rules to avoid unnecessarily deciding constitutional
questions); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (federal
courts should abstain from deciding federal constitutional issues that turn on as yet unset-
tled questions of state law); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
154-55 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Federal courts "do not review issues, especially
constitutional issues, until they have to .... ); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974) (noting policy of "judicial restraint from unnecessary decision of
constitutional issues"). See generally TRIBE, supra note 385, at 67-72.
604. See supra text accompanying notes 133-134.
605. Cf. Rappaport, supra note 570, at 771-76 (arguing that if a President is prepared to
deny enforcement to an allegedly unconstitutional law, the President is obligated to veto
the measure if he has the opportunity to do so); Burgess, supra note 556, at 646, 649-53
(arguing that the President may refuse to enforce a law that violates definitive Supreme
Court precedents involving nonstructural issues only if the offending bill was enacted over
his veto).
606. See, e.g., GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 434 (statement of William
French Smith, Att'y Gen.); and see supra text accompanying notes 568-569.
607. See supra Table 1.
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an approach which has sometimes met with success.608 If no response
is immediately forthcoming, the President may have to repeat the re-
quest before he can be deemed to have exhausted this option. °9
3. Defiance as the Sole Route to Judicial Review
The President is justified in refusing to comply with a law that he
believes to be unconstitutional only when judicial review of the mea-
sure would otherwise be virtually impossible. Except in the rare in-
stances where this requirement is satisfied, the Executive must honor
or enforce the law. It is up to those who may be harmed by the mea-
sure to challenge it, either by filing suit or by raising the constitutional
issue defensively. The administration can encourage such challenges
by notifying potential litigants of their right to sue and the grounds for
doing so. Once the matter is in court, the Executive might decline to
defend the law or join in seeking to have it held unconstitutional.61 0
The President may not even have to depend on others to initiate the
challenge. In the case of an allegedly invalid appointment procedure,
for example, the government might honor the statutory scheme but
then bring a quo warranto proceeding to test the officeholder's right
to the position.61' In other instances, the Executive may be able to
seek a declaratory judgment that a law with which it is presently com-
plying is unconstitutional.
61 2
608. See supra text accompanying notes 142-143.
609. Where compliance with the allegedly unconstitutional law does not cause serious
harm, the requisite exhaustion period may stretch over many years. It took 20 years of
requests by several Presidents before the Tenure of Office Act was repealed. See supra
notes 142 and 483, and accompanying text. Lyndon Johnson sought the repeal of various
committee approval requirements for 3 years before deciding not to pursue any further
projects under the laws in question. See supra text accompanying notes 488-495. While
Johnson arguably met this second requirement, the case did not satisfy the third condition,
for judicial review was available without executive defiance.
610. See Brady, supra note 145; Miller & Bowman, supra note 124. For examples of
such action, see supra notes 338-361, 457-460 and accompanying text. As long as the gov-
ernment intends to honor the statutory provision despite its belief that it is unconstitu-
tional, the action would not qualify as "'a friendly, non-adversary proceeding' requiring
that it be dismissed as a collusive suit. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 n.9 (1983). See TRIBE, supra note 385, at 73-74.
611. See supra text accompanying notes 397, 437, 441, 476 AND 497.
612. See supra text accompanying note 431 (noting Eisenhower's refusal to comply with
restriction on signing executive agreements), and text accompanying note 516 (noting Lyn-
don Johnson's refusal to carry out approved watershed projects). And see infra notes 656-
660 and accompanying text.
REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE
Defiance is appropriate only where it is truly an avenue of last
resort.61 3 Presidents may readily claim that noncompliance is neces-
sary to facilitate judicial review, but such assertions must be closely
scrutinized. The Carter administration, in refusing to honor the legis-
lative veto of Department of Education regulations, stated that with-
out such action a court challenge to the veto provision might be
foreclosed.61a In fact, those who would have benefited from the ve-
toed programs could have sued to compel the Department to imple-
ment the regulations.615 Similarly, the Reagan administration sought
to justify its defiance of the Competition in Contracting Act on the
basis that judicial review was otherwise unlikely to occur.616 As nu-
merous critics pointed out, this assertion was utterly without merit.
617
There have been occasions when defiance of the law was the only
route by which judicial review might have occurred.618 This was true
of the refusals by James Buchanan, Andrew Johnson, Woodrow Wil-
son, and Franklin Roosevelt to comply with statutes limiting their
ability to transfer or remove certain individuals from office.619 The
requirement was also met with respect to the law barring President
Taft from submitting an executive budget to Congress.620
Where noncompliance is indispensable to securing judicial re-
view, the scope of defiance should be no broader than necessary to
attain this goal.62 ' Thus, for example, even if it had been true that the
613. See GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 273 (statement of Steven R. Ross
& Charles Tiefer, noting that the "law must be one which everyone agrees cannot be tested
any other way").
614. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 25, at 11 (1980); 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 21, 29 (1980).
See supra text accompanying note 531.
615. See supra note 532 and accompanying text.
616. Meese, supra note 104, at A26, col. 1 (letter to editor); GAO Bid Protest Hearings,
supra note 9, at 300-01, 322-23 (statement of D. Lowell Jensen, Deputy Att'y Gen.); id. at
438 (statement of Attorney General William French).
617. H.R. REP. No. 99-138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1985); GAO Bid Protest Hearings,
supra note 9, at 52, 81-82 (statement of Eugene Gressman); id. at 56 (statement of Mark
Tushnet); id. at 274-75 (statement of Steven R. Ross & Charles Tiefer); Letter from Peter
W. Rodino to William French Smith (Jan. 31, 1985), reprinted in GAO Bid Protest Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 431. And see infra note 657.
618. See GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 273 (statement of Steven R. Ross
& Charles Tiefer). A President who has complied with a law and whose efforts to have
others challenge the measure have failed might at some point legitimately claim that defi-
ance is the only means of obtaining judicial review; however, these conditions have never
before been met.
619. See supra text accompanying notes 199-205, 386-387, 503-504, 511.
620. See supra text accompanying note 407.
621. For suggestions that the President may defy a law to the extent necessaryto have
its constitutionality tested in court, see, e.g., Letter from Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase to
Gerrit Smith (April 19, 1868), supra note 213 and accompanying text; Pentagon Papers
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Competition in Contracting Act could not be challenged unless the
Reagan administration ignored the statute, this could have been done
in a few selected instances so as to produce a test case, rather than on
an across-the-board basis affecting virtually all government
contracts. 622
4. Assuring That Judicial Review Occurs
Even if the three conditions discussed above have all been met, a
President is still not justified in refusing to honor an allegedly uncon-
stitutional law unless he faithfully takes all steps necessary to secure a
judicial ruling as to the measure's validity. In the eyes of at least some
members of Congress, it was here that Andrew Johnson fell short in
his defiance of the 1867 Tenure of Office Act, for while there was no
other way to bring about a test case, Johnson's attorneys failed to pur-
sue any of the several routes available for obtaining judicial review.
623
In order to satisfy this requirement, it may be possible for the
Executive to initiate a suit that will raise the constitutional issue. This
could occur, for example, if a lower level federal official balked at
carrying out the President's order to disobey the law.6 4 In the Tenure
of Office Act setting, Andrew Johnson's Attorney General might have
Hearings, supra note 155, at 381 (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Ass't Att'y Gen.);
BERGER, supra note 104, at 309; GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 272-74 (state-
ment of Steven R. Ross & Charles Tiefer).
622. H.R. REP. No. 99-138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1985); GAO Bid Protest Hearings,
supra note 9, at 273-74 (statement of Steven R. Ross & Charles Tiefer). The Bush adminis-
tration may have adhered to this principle in testing another section of the Competition in
Contracting Act, i.e., the fee-recovery provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c) (1988). Rather than
paying fees to two disappointed bidders as mandated by the Act, the Justice Department
sued the bidders for a declaratory judgment that § 3552(c) was unconstitutional. While
noncompliance was perhaps necessary to securing judicial review, it is unclear whether the
Excutive's defiance was limited to these two cases; yet even if it was, noncompliance was
improper under our second proposed principle, for Congress was at the time considering a
curative amendment to the statute. See United States v. Instruments, S.A., Inc., 807 F.
Supp. 811, 816 (D.D.C. 1992) (dismissing declaratory action, on ripeness and prudential
grounds, noting inter alia that "Congress itself has been addressing the issue").
623. See supra text accompanying notes 221-232. There is also a question as to whether
the first of our requirements was met, for not until 1926 did the Supreme Court rule that
such restrictions on the removal of executive officers were unconstitutional. Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
624. In the Competition in Contracting Act scenario, for example, the Attorney Gen-
eral or the Office of Management and Budget, both of which issued orders requiring fed-
eral agencies to ignore the Act's stay provisions, might have sued a government
department that refused to defy the law. Such intra-branch disputes are justiciable. See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1973).
but failed to institute quo warranto proceedings against the Secretary
of War after Stanton refused to give up the office. 6'
If the Executive itself is not in a position to trigger judicial re-
view, the President must make every effort to assure that other per-
sons with standing to sue or who are in a position to raise the
constitutional issue in fact do so. In the Tenure of Office Act case, the
attorney whom Johnson hired to represent General Thomas could
thus have challenged the Act's validity either by raising it as a defense
to the pending criminal action, or by filing for habeas corpus.
26
Neither of these avenues was pursued. It may be necessary for the
Executive to notify the affected individuals that they can sue to en-
force their rights under the statute the President has defied. Woodrow
Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, both of whom dismissed appointees
whose positions were protected by law might have advised these indi-
viduals that they could challenge their termination in the Court of
Claims.62 7 In the context of executive defiance of the War Powers
Resolution, this fourth requirement would dictate that the Executive
encourage-rather than attempt to dismiss-lawsuits brought to en-
sure compliance with the Resolution's consultation, notification and
troop withdrawal provisions. 6
It is possible that, despite the Executive's efforts to bring about
judicial review, no one with standing to sue in fact does so. Is the
President then free to continue defying the law indefinitely? One
might argue that the fact no one has sued means that any injury
caused by the noncompliance is de minimis and hence of no con-
cern.629 Yet there may be good reasons why a genuinely aggrieved
individual has not sued, such as the cost of litigation or secondary con-
sequences like the loss of privacy. While Congress may act to alleviate
some of these factors, it can not eliminate all of them. The issue is a
debatable one, but the burden should remain on the Executive to as-
sure that a test case is filed; if none is brought within a reasonable
625. See supra text accompanying notes 227-229.
626. See supra text accompanying notes 226-229.
627. See supra notes 498-511 and accompanying text.
628. See supra note 525 and accompanying text.
629. Cf. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 300 (1986) (Powell, Burger & Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Equal Protection Clause is not
concerned with de minimis variations in treatment); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718, 736 (1982) (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that inability
to attend nursing school near one's home is too inconsequential to trigger violation of
Equal Protection Clause).
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time, presidential defiance of the law should end.63 0 Were the rule
otherwise, the White House might not take seriously its obligation to
make certain that judicial review occurs, thereby giving itself the final
word on whether or not an act of Congress will be enforced.
5. Presidential Practice and the Principles Governing Noncompliance
Unless all four of these conditions are met, a President may not
legitimately refuse to comply with a law, even if he believes it to be
unconstitutional. When measured against these standards, few of the
historical incidents of defiance discussed in Part II of this Article were
proper. Even if we assume arguendo that the first two requirement
were met in all of these cases-that the law was clearly unconstitu-
tional and that the Executive made every effort to obtain redress
through the legislative process631 -in only four instances was defiance
necessary to allow for judicial review.632 Review occurred in two of
these cases-Woodrow Wilson's firing of Postmaster Myers, and
Franklin Roosevelt's removal of Commissioner Humphrey.633 In the
other two, involving Andrew Johnson's dismissal of the Secretary of
War and Taft's submission of a budget to Congress, the Executive
failed to take steps to assure that the constitutional issue would be
resolved by the courts. Johnson ignored three avenues that would
have yielded a test case.634 Taft overlooked a chance to obtain judicial
review by not giving advance notice to those who might be adversely
630. If, on the other hand, Congress and its members have standing in virtually all cases
where the White House refuses to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional law (see infra
notes 676-681 and accompanying text), Congress should share the burden of bringing
about a test case; if it fails to do so, a President might be justified in continuing to ignore
the law in question.
631. Under a strict reading of the second requirement, the 12 cases involving presiden-
tial signing statements discussed in Part II.B.4., supra, were improper because the Presi-
dent failed to object to the measure by exercising the veto power.
632. The 4 instances were: James Buchanan's transfer of Captain Meigs; Andrew John-
son's dismissal of Secretary of War Stanton; Woodrow Wilson's firing of Postmaster Myers;
Franklin Roosevelt's removal of Commissioner Humphrey. See supra notes 199-205, 386-
387, 503-504, 511, and accompanying text.
633. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (invalidating act barring President from
removing postmasters without Senate's consent); Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding statute limiting grounds upon which President could re-
move FTC Commissioner). While it is unknown whether the Wilson and Roosevelt admin-
istrations made any efforts to assure that these lawsuits were filed, from the nature of the
claims involved it is unlikely that special notice was necessary to apprise the aggrieved
individuals of their rights.
634. See supra text accompanying notes 226-229.
affected by his budget recommendations. 635 As a result, no lawsuits
were filed in either case.
Under the proposal advanced here, presidential noncompliance
with an act of Congress is warranted only if it is essential to creating
an opportunity for judicial review. If review will be precluded
whether or not the Executive honors the law, defiance is unjustified.
Of the 20 instances of noncompliance noted in Part II, 4 probably fell
into this category: Woodrow Wilson's refusal to send notices of treaty
termination, 63 6 Jimmy Carter's closure of the U.S. consulates,637 and
the failure of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter to comply with the War
Powers Resolution.6 38 In each of these cases, the President's defiance
in effect suspended the provision in question and amounted to an ab-
solute veto that could not be overturned either by Congress or by the
courts.
This proposal rejects two criteria that are sometimes urged as be-
ing sufficient to warrant presidential noncompliance with the law. The
first involves statutes that are said to intrude upon executive pow-
ers. 639 In defending its defiance of the Competition in Contracting
Act, the Reagan administration argued that the President "has a con-
stitutional duty to protect the Presidency from encroachment by other
branches."" 0 While failure to comply with such laws would be war-
ranted if all four of our requirements were met, the fact that a statute
is perceived as infringing on executive power cannot be sufficient by
itself. If it were, one of the principal reasons for giving the President a
veto power would be rendered largely superfluous. 641 Moreover, this
would open the door wide to selective defiance of the law, for during
the period from 1789 to 1981, 80% of the constitutional objections
635. See supra text accompanying note 407.
636. See supra text accompanying notes 423-424.
637. See supra text accompanying notes 469-472.
638. See supra text accompanying notes 523-525.
639. See, e.g., POMEROY, supra note 202, at 444-45; Rappaport, supra note 570, at 769-
70; Barr, supra note 104, at 39 (taking position that the President may refuse to enforce any
part of a law that encroaches on executive authority); Burgess, supra note 556, at 645-46 &
n.86, 657-65 (arguing that the President may refuse to enforce any law that he in good faith
believes encroaches upon executive power).
640. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 434-35 (statement of William French
Smith, Att'y Gen.); see also id. at 299-300, 322 (statement of D. Lowell Jensen, Deputy
Att'y Gen.).
641. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51. One might argue that the veto would
not be entirely superfluous, for it would still be used where a law as a whole violates rights
of the Executive, while selective defiance would be used against omnibus bills and legisla-
tive riders. However, proponents of the position that a President may ignore any provision
that encroaches on the executive domain do not restrict the power to these situations.
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raised in signing statements claimed that there had been a legislative
encroachment on the executive domain.642 Finally, as Sanford Levin-
son has observed, it is in this area that we should "be least willing to
trust independent presidential decisionmaking, since there is no rea-
son at all to view the President as a genuinely disinterested party.
' 643
A second suggested criterion which this proposal does not adopt
is one that would allow the President to disregard a law whenever it is
perceived as violating basic individual rights.6 " Though intuitively
appealing, the justification for executive defiance is at its weakest in
this class of cases, for judicial review is virtually always available when
such statutes are enforced. At the same time, presidential noncompli-
ance in this setting is especially likely to be immune from judicial scru-
tiny, as the Carter administration found when it declined, on First
Amendment grounds, to enforce a ban against editorializing by public
radio stations.645 Unless the four conditions outlined above are met,
the proper course is for the Executive to comply with the law, while
taking all steps necessary to assure that those whose rights may be
infringed can promptly challenge the measure in court.646 In the rare
case where execution of such a statute might cause irreparable harm,
the individuals affected should be able to obtain immediate injunctive
relief from the courts.647
642. See supra Table 3 and text accompanying notes 318-319. See also Burgess, supra
note 556, at 647-48 & n.92 (estimating that from 1981 through 1991, at least 75% of all
constitutionally-based signing statements claimed an infringement upon executive power).
643. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 44.
644. See, e.g., GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 44, 50 (statement of Sanford
Levinson); id. at 55 (statement of Mark Thshnet); Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps. of
Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889 n.11 (3d Cir. 1986) (dictum); Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's
Power of Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 35, 59 (arguing that the President may refuse to en-
force a law that he believes violates personal liberties or property rights).
645. See supra text accompanying notes 455-462. The same was true of Carter's refusal,
on Establishment Clause grounds, to restore the San Antonio Missions (see supra text
accompanying note 468), and of his failure, on due process and bill of attainder grounds, to
honor a statute barring the use of funds to implement his pardon of Vietnam-era draft
resisters (see supra text accompanying notes 453-454).
646. Franklin Roosevelt pursued this route in response to an appropriations bill rider
barring the government from continuing to employ three named individuals. See supra
text accompanying notes 338-342. As long as the Executive agrees that it is obliged to
follow the law despite its belief that the measure is unconstitutional, the action should not
be dismissed as a friendly or collusive action. See TRIBE, supra note 385, at 74 n.8.
647. It is usually impossible to enjoin a pending criminal case, for "the cost anxiety, and
inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution alone do not con-
stitute 'irreparable injury'," Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975), but injunctive
relief may be available before prosecution if plaintiff can show irreparable harm and likely
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B. The Need for Congressional Action
The mere articulation of principles governing executive enforce-
ment of the law will unlikely have much of an effect on the White
House. Our experience during the past half century has, to para-
phrase Madison, "evinced a powerful tendency in the [Executive] to
absorb all power into its vortex." 8 Four hundred years ago in Eng-
land, Parliament triumphed over the Crown by at last stripping the
king of his prerogative to suspend the laws. In this country today, the
Executive is seeking to establish a similar power for itself. Unless
Congress creates effective deterrents and remedies for presidential de-
fiance of "unconstitutional" laws, we may soon discover that history
has come full circle.
The problem is fortunately a bipartisan one. In this century, nine
Presidents have refused to comply with allegedly unconstitutional
laws; five of them were Republicans, four were Democrats. 649 The
issue is one that transcends party. It is a question of preserving a
finely wrought balance between the legislative and executive
branches.
If Congress fails to act, the problem is unlikely to go away. Dur-
ing his campaign for the Presidency, Bill Clinton asked for an item
veto,650 a power which he previously enjoyed as governor of Arkan-
sas.651 Like some of his recent predecessors who favored the device,
Clinton, too, may exercise a de facto item veto. There is no assurance
that the Supreme Court will take care of the matter by expressly
resolving the question of whether the President may ignore an alleg-
edly unconstitutional law. Of the 20 incidents of presidential defiance
that occurred between 1789 and 1981, only 2 resulted in judicial re-
view. In neither instance did the Court address the issue of the Presi-
dent's refusal to comply with the law; instead, it simply ruled on the
validity of the statute in question.6 52 While it is possible that an occa-
success on the merits. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction against future enforcement of state criminal law).
648. 2 FARRAND, supra note 24, at 74 (Madison noted that, at the state level following
the Revolution, it was the Legislature rather than the Executive that demonstrated this
tendency). On the aggrandizement of presidential power, see SCHLESINGER, supra note 6.
649. The Republicans were Taft, Eisenhower, Ford, Reagan and Bush; the Democrats
were Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Johnson, and Carter.
650. Rappaport, supra note 570, at 740 n.12.
651. ARK. CONsT. art. 6, § 17.
652. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (invalidating act, defied by Woodrow
Wilson, barring removal of postmasters without consent of Senate); Humphrey's Executor
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding law, defied by Franklin Roosevelt, barring
removal of FTC Commissioner). See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1122
Summer 19941
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:865
sion will arise where the Judiciary must resolve the underlying ques-
tion of the Executive's right to ignore "unconstitutional" laws, this has
so far proven unnecessary.653
Detailed discussion of the remedies available to Congress is be-
yond the scope of this Article, but there are three levels at which the
problem might be approached. First, Congress should consider en-
hancing the Executive's access to judicial review of a disputed law,
thereby reducing a President's incentive to engage in noncompli-
ance.654 This could include a statute allowing the Attorney General to
bring quo warranto proceedings against federal officeholders to deter-
mine whether the procedure by Which they were named to office
squares with the requirements of Article J1.655 The absence of such an
express statutory remedy may help explain the Presidents' failure to
n.14 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn in part on other grounds, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc). The Carter administration argued that the Court's silence on this issue constituted
recognition of the President's right to refuse to comply with laws he believes to be uncon-
stitutional. Letter from Benjamin R. Civiletti, Att'y Gen., to Sen. Max Baucus (July 30,
1980), reprinted in GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 750.
653. See GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note 9, at 326-27,338 (statement of D. Lowa-
ell Jensen, Deputy Att'y Gen., suggesting that "the Supreme Court has never been called
upon, and is not likely ever to rule" on this question). In Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842
F.2d 1102, 1121-26 (9th Cir. 1988), sustaining the constitutionality of the Competition in
Contracting Act, the court held that the President may not ignore an allegedly unconstitu-
tional law and ruled that his having done so constituted "bad faith," entitling plaintiff to
the recovery of attorneys' fees. This part of the decision was later withdrawn after the
Court of Appeals ruled that because plaintiff was not a "prevailing party" it was unneces-
sary to resolve the "bad faith" issue. 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
654. Presidents Andrew Johnson, Carter, and Reagan defended their refusal to comply
with the law on the basis that this would help secure a judicial ruling as to the measure's
constitutionality. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4, 199-201, 531-532, 616-617.
655. It is generally recognized that, in a quo warranto proceeding, "[t]he inquiry may go
to the extent of determining the constitutionality of the act creating an office .... " W.F.
BAILEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES 128i
(1913) (citing only state cases); see also, CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, THE PRACTICE OF Ex-
TRAORDINARY REMEDIES: HABEAS CORPUS AND THE OTHER COMMON LAW WRITS 593
(1987). Unlike many states where quo warranto proceedings are authorized by the consti-
tution or by statute, see ANTIEAU, supra, at 592, 619, the only federal law dealing with the
subject is in the District of Columbia Code and does not mention suits to challenge the
validity of the appointment procedure. D.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-3501 to 16-3503 (1989) (Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia may issue a quo warranto "in the name of the
United States against a person who within the District of Columbia... unlawfully holds or
exercises ... a public office of the United States, civil or military."). Before 1963, these
provisions appeared at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 377a-377c. See 4 CHARLES A. WRIHo & A'THUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACICE & PROCEDURE 86-87 (1987). The writ is also said to be
one which federal courts may issue under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988).
ANTEAU, supra, at 619; FORREST G. FERRIS & FORREST G. FERRIS, JR., THE LAW OF
EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 135 (1926). Rule 81(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure also recognizes the federal courts' ability to hear quo warranto proceed-
ings, stating that the Rules apply to them. Yet quo warranto has rarely been used to chal-
1000
use quo warranto in any of the five cases of defiance that rested on the
appointments clause. Congress might also explore the possibility of
permitting the executive branch to seek a declaratory judgment 656 as
to the validity of laws the President believes unconstitutional. 57
While one might object that this would make it too easy for the Exec-
utive to attack legislative enactments,658 through signing statements,
lenge an individual's right to hold federal office, and appears never to have been used to
attack the constitutionality of a federal statutory appointment procedure.
656. As with quo warranto, this remedy might be covered by existing law, but not in
express terms. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988) ("In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such decla-
ration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought . . . ."). In United States v.
Instruments, S.A., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1992), the Department of Justice on be-
half of the United States sought a declaratory judgment that the fee-recovery provision of
the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 31 U.S.C. section 3554(c) (1988), was uncon-
stitutional; the district court dismissed the case on ripeness and prudential grounds after
expressing doubt as to whether it had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the Declaratory
Judgment Act.
657. The Executive could obtain a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a law it is
reluctantly enforcing by suing one or more of the persons who could have sued the govern-
ment if the President had instead defied the law. Federal courts may grant declaratory
relief in cases over which they would have had subject matter jurisdiction had one of the
parties instead sued the other for damages or injunctive relief. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Con-
struction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19 (1983); 10 WRIGr & MILLER, supra note
655, at § 2767 (1983). A suit for damages or injunctive relief by a private party against the
government based on the Executive's refusal to honor a law would arise under the federal
law in question and would thus fall within the jurisdiction of the district courts or the
Claims Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1491 (1988). The court could therefore hear the Execu-
tive's suit for declaratory relief.
Under this rationale, the Reagan administration, rather than defying the Competition
in Contracting Act, might have honored the At's stay provision and at the same time sued
one or more of the companies that filed bid protests, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the provision was unconstitutional. Declaratory relief would have been proper since the
defendant companies could have sued the government in federal court for injunctive relief
if the administration had instead defied the stay requirement, as the companies in fact did.
See supra notes 547-550 and accompanying text.
An executive declaratory relief remedy would be of use in other settings where it is
possible to identify those who will be harmed if the government were to ignore the law.
Had the procedure existed, it could have been invoked by Andrew Johnson, Woodrow
Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt to challenge statutory limitations on their ability to remove
certain individuals from office. See supra text accompanying notes 189 -233, 498-504. The
Attorney General might have brought an action against the officeholders whom the Presi-
dent wished to dismiss, asking the court to declare the removal restriction unconstitutional.
Under the declaratory procedure, Lyndon Johnson might have obtained a ruling as to the
validity of the committee-approval requirement for watershed and flood prevention
projects by filing a suit for declaratory relief against one or more of the project applicants.
See supra text accompanying note 516.
658. See Miller & Bowman, supra note 124, at 70-80 (arguing that neither the President
nor the Justice Department may attack the constitutionality of federal statutes). One
might also contend that rather than making it easier for the Executive to judicially chal-
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recent Presidents have already been challenging the constitutionality
of laws at a rate of nearly 30 per year.6 9 An expanded declaratory
remedy has the potential to shift these disputes from the White
House, where the President has the last word, into an arena where the
Executive's claims will be subject to review.
660
Second, because the mere creation of mechanisms whereby the
President can seek judicial review offers no assurance they will be
used, Congress should explore ways of deterring executive officials
lenge acts of Congress, we should rely on the deterrent effect of remedies such as withhold-
ing funds, impeachment, and civil damages actions. See infra notes 661-665 and
accompanying text. However, because most of these remedies are effectively unavailable
against the President, it is necessary to encourage presidential compliance in settings where
the President could otherwise defy a law on his own without needing to secure the cooper-
ation of other executive officials. See infra note 663.
659. See supra Table 2.
660. A federal court could hear such a suit only if the plaintiff has standing. The Presi-
dent would need to show that by enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional law, he suffers a
concrete injury that is distinct from that felt by citizens at large. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). The mere awareness or observation of unconstitu-
tional conduct does not constitute an "injury in fact," even if plaintiff's distress is real.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982). However, when the Executive carries out an "unconstitu-
tional" law, he suffers an injury that is far more personal than that incurred by a citizen
bystander. When faced with a law that he genuinely believes is invalid, the Chief Execu-
tive is put in a difficult position. He can not defy the measure without violating his consti-
tutional duty as President. Yet by honoring the statute he suffers an injury of conscience,
for he has taken an oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States." U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 8. Such a Hobson's choice gives the President a
unique stake in the outcome of the litigation. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
241 n.5 (1968) (School board members have standing to seek declaratory judgment that a
state law they were required to enforce violated the First Amendment because "they are in
the position of having to choose between violating their oath [to support the Constitution]
and taking a step-refusal to comply with [the law]-that would be likely to bring their
expulsion from office and also a reduction in state funds for their school districts."); JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSnTTUTONAL LAW 87-88 (4th ed. 1991). But see
City of Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 449 U.S. 1039, 1039-42
(1980) (White & Marlisall, JJ., dissenting) (noting with disapproval that some Courts of
Appeals have refused to follow Allen). Moreover, to the extent that a law usurps executive
power, compliance causes a unique injury to the Presidency. Though the Framers did not
view either of these injuries as sufficient to warrant executive defiance of the law, these
injuries should suffice to give the President standing to challenge the measure in court.
In such a proceeding, because the executive branch would be asking to have an act of
Congress declared unconstitutional, the task of defending the law must fall to others.
While the private defendant has an interest in seeing the statute upheld, she may lack the
resources or incentive to mount a vigorous defense. The court should therefore notify the
House and the Senate of the pendency of the suit, giving them an opportunity to intervene
for the purpose of defending the law. See Brady, supra note 145; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 929-30 n.5 (1983) (allowing House and Senate to intervene in action to defend validity
of legislative veto provision after executive branch agreed with plaintiff that law was
unconstitutional).
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from carrying out orders to defy the law. One possibility is to with-
hold or cut off funds to executive departments that direct or engage in
noncompliance.661 The House and Senate could also announce by
concurrent resolution that the deliberate refusal of a government offi-
cial to comply with a statute is an impeachable offense. 62 In addition,
Congress might make federal employees and officials663 personally lia-
ble in damages to anyone injured by their willful failure to comply
with a federal law. 64 In both the impeachment and civil liability set-
tings, an official who seeks to defend herself on the ground that the
661. In the wake of the Reagan administration's defiance of the Competition in Con-
tracting Act, a House committee recommended cutting funding for the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget and for the Justice Department (the two agencies responsible for the
directives not to comply) until they agreed to enforce the Act. H.R. Rm,. No. 99-138, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1985). The report also proposed that appropriations for procure-
ment by all executive departments be conditioned on their compliance with the Competi-
tion in Contracting Act procedures. Id.
662. It would then be imperative that Congress invoke the impeachment remedy in
appropriate cases; otherwise, the desired deterrent effect would quickly vanish.
663. This remedy may not be available against the President who might have an abso-
lute constitutional immunity from civil damages liability. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731 (1982) (recognizing President's absolute immunity from damages liability and implying
that this is required by separation of powers). But see TRIBE, supra note 385, at 272-74,
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 660, at 234 (arguing that Congress could make the Presi-
dent civilly liable for damages). In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812-13 (1982), the
Court suggested that the same absolute immunity might cover presidential aides "en-
trusted with discretionary authority in such sensitive areas as national security or foreign
policy," but it later ruled that the Attorney General did not enjoy absolute immunity in
ordering warrantless "national security" wiretaps. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520
(1985). Other executive officials, including department heads, have at most a qualified
immunity that shields them only if they demonstrate that there were reasonable grounds
for believing their conduct to have been lawful. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JU-
RISDIcTION 402-19 (1989). The Court has suggested that this qualified immunity is not
constitutionally based and that Congress could make such officials absolutely liable.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.31.
664. There is no general cause of action against federal officials who violate a person's
rights under federal law. This contrasts with 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1988), which creates a cause
against state officials who violate a person's federal rights. Nor have courts been particu-
larly willing to imply a private right of action where none is conferred by statute. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 663, at 315-22, 453-58. They have been especially reluctant to
imply a private right of action for statutory violations by federal officials, in contrast to
statutory violations by private parties and constitutional violations by federal officials.
Compare Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) (refusing to imply cause of action for
statutory violation by federal official) with Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375 (1983) (implying cause of action against private party for violation of Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implying private cause of action for constitutional violation by federal
officials). When a federal law is violated, damages are sometimes recoverable from the
United States itself, see CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 475-88 (discussing damages remedies
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Thcker Act), but this avenue is not available in
most cases where federal officials refuse to carry out a law; nor do remedies against the
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law was 'unconstitutional should be required to show that the law was
previously invalidated by a federal court, or that noncompliance was
pursuant to a presidential order that satisfied the four principles de-
scribed above.
6 65
Third, Congress might expand the availability of judicial review
where a President defies a statute on the ground that it is unconstitu-
tional.666 Before such a lawsuit can be filed, the public must know of
the President's decision to ignore the law. 67 Accordingly, the Execu-
tive might be required 68 promptly to inform Congress whenever 669 it
government discourage noncompliance as effectively as the threat of damages actions
against federal officials themselves.
665. Congress could also make it a crime for an executive official to defy the law, for
with the possible exception of the President, executive officials enjoy no immunity from
criminal suit. See TRIBE, supra note 385, at 268-69. However, the Justice Department is
unlikely to prosecute officials for having followed a presidential directive that was likely
based on the Department's own conclusion that the law was unconstitutional. While in-
dependent counsel might be used in such cases, the Attorney General would still have
ultimate control over whether or not prosecution occurs. See Ethics in Government Act of
1978, 28 U.S.C. § 592 (1988); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694-96 (1988) (upholding
use of independent counsel partly on basis that they may be named only at the Attorney
General's request, whose decision not to use such counsel is unreviewable).
666. Even the Reagan administration agreed to abide by a final judicial determination;
however, in the case of the Competition in Contracting Act, the administration said it
would not abandon its defiance of the statute based merely on adverse lower court rulings,
but insisted that the matter be litigated through the appellate courts. GAO Bid Protest
Hearings, supra note 9, at 327-28 (statement of D. Lowell Jensen, Deputy Att'y Gen.);
H.R. REP. No. 99-138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 38 (1985); Meese, supra note 104, at A26, col.
1.
667. This notice is distinct from the President's having merely announced his constitu-
tional disagreement with the law, for the fact that the Executive may have indicated in a
veto message or signing statement that he believes the measure to be invalid does not
necessarily mean the White House will defy the law. (See supra Table 1 and Table 3).
668. There is precedent for imposing such a notice obligation. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 22,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1988) (executive agreements); War
Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148,87 Stat. 555,50 U.S.C. §§ 1541,1543 (1988)
(use of armed forces); Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297,
2 U.S.C. §§ 683, 684 (1988) (impoundment of funds). Similarly, the Justice Department is
under a duty to notify Congress if it decides not to comply with an allegedly unconstitu-
tional law. This requirement, which applies also to decisions not to defend a law, has been
included in Justice Department appropriations acts since 1978. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 9,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-624, §13, 92 Stat. 3464; Act of Nov. 30, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-132, §21,
93 Stat. 1049; Act of Oct. 28,1991, Pub. L. No. 102-140, §102(a), 105 Stat. 791. It was under
these provisions that the Reagan administration notified Congress that it would not comply
with or defend the Competition in Contracting Act. GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra note
9, at 429; H.R. REP. No. 99-138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1985). The duty should be made
permanent and should be broadened to apply to every executive department.
669. Reporting requirements have at times been problematic. For one thing, a Presi-
dent may simply refuse to comply with them. This was true of the 1972 Case Act, requiring
the Secretary of State to report executive agreements to Congress. Act of Aug. 22, 1972, .
Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1988). To improve compliance, Congress
resolves not to implement a law.670 Once notice is given, anyone in-
jured or threatened with imminent harm by the President's action
could sue in federal court67' for declaratory and injunctive relief to
broadened the scope of the reporting duty and added a funding cut-off mechanism.
FIsrsR, supra note 319, at 241-43. There were similar failures to report under the War
Powers Resolution. See supra text accompanying notes 521-522. At the other extreme,
compliance with notice requirements may be so extensive as to overwhelm Congress. See
TRIBE, supra note 385, at 260 n.17 (noting this problem with the notice requirement in the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 2 U.S.C. §§ 683-85 (1988), which
gave Congress the opportunity to respond to the report by passing a resolution requiring
expenditure of the impounded funds).
In the present setting, even if adherence to the requirement were incomplete, some
disclosure is better than none. Nor is the opposite danger likely to occur, for even during
the peak years of the Bush administration the number of constitutionally based signing
statements remained within manageable limits. See supra Table 2. The most constitution-
ally-based signing statements issued in one year was 40. See U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News (1992) Table 4A (listing 80 statements, of which half were constitutionally based).
Even if a large number of reports were submitted, Congress need not take specific action
on them; rather, the goal is to provide public disclosure, enabling those who may have
standing to seek judicial review. The situation thus contrasts with the Impoundment Con-
trol Act, where a major purpose of the reporting requirement was to give Congress an
opportunity to pass a resolution compelling expenditure of the impounded funds.
670. The requirement should cover all cases of noncompliance, not just those based on
the Constitution. A President could otherwise evade the reporting requirement by claim-
ing that defiance rested on nonconstitutional grounds. See Ely, supra note 520, at 1404-05
(noting similar problems under the War Powers Resolution). The notice should identify
the reasons for the decision. If the Executive contends that the provision is unconstitu-
tional, its report should: (a) explain the basis for that conclusion and the authority support-
ing it; (b) describe any efforts that were made to cure the defect through the legislative
process; (c) indicate whether and why defiance is necessary to secure judicial review of the
provision; and (d) set forth the steps the administration plans to take to assure that judicial
review occurs. By insisting on disclosure of this specific information, Congress will make
clear that it recognizes only a narrow right of noncompliance, dispelling any inference that
it has ratified a broad presidential power to suspend the laws. See Letter from Arthur S.
Miller to Rep. Jack Brooks (Feb. 27, 1985), reprinted in GAO Bid Protest Hearings, supra
note 9, at 498 (opposing notice requirement as conceding power to the Executive). But see
H.R. REP. No. 99-138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 n.31 (1985) (stating that the reporting re-
quirement "was in no way intended to ratify that practice").
671. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) allows judicial review in cases brought
by "person[s] suffering legal wrong because of agency action" where it is claimed that a
federal "agency or officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity
or under color of legal authority .... 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Subject matter jurisdiction
exists in such cases because plaintiff's claim arises under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1988); see Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1988). However, the APA
does not authorize judicial review of presidential action where it is claimed that the Presi-
dent has abused his statutory authority. Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719, 1725-27 (1994);
Franklin v. Massachusets, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2775-76 (1992). Constitutional claims are not
precluded by the APA, Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2776, but not "every action by the President
... in excess of his statutory authority is ipso facto in violation of the Constitution." Dal-
ton, 114 S. Ct. at 1726. One would hope that a President's flat refusal to execute a law
would not be categorized as a mere abuse of statutory discretion. Yet, to assure the availa-
bility of judicial review where the President rather than some other executive officer is
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halt further defiance.672 To encourage such suits, Congress might al-
low plaintiffs to recover attorneys fees whether or not they prevail on
the merits.61 3 Nevertheless, there will be times when no private plain-
tiff has suffered a sufficient injury from executive noncompliance to
meet normal standing requirements.674 Congress might provide that
any citizen may sue a federal agency or official who refuses to comply
with an "invalid" law, with a victorious plaintiff entitled to a cash
bounty, as well as costs and attorneys fees.675
directly responsible for failing to honor an allegedly unconstitutional law, Congress should
expressly authorize such suits by statute. See Dalton, 114 S. Ct. at 1728 ("[O]ur conclusion
that judicial review is not available... follows from our interpretation of an Act of Con-
gress ...."); Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2775 ("We would require an express statement by
Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance of his statutory duties to
be reviewed for abuse of discretion.").
672. These suits differ from the damages remedy discussed above in two respects. First,
the purpose of the declaratory or injunctive action is to prevent a federal officer from
continuing to violate the law; no damages are sought. Second, it is a complete defense to
this suit that the law is invalid. Thus, in contrast to the damages remedy, these actions are
likely to resolve the issue of the law's constitutionality. A damages action is unlikely to
yield such a ruling because to prevail, a defendant must show that all four conditions of
noncompliance were met. In many instances a court could dispose of the case by finding
that defiance was unnecessary to securing judicial review, or that the President did not
exhaust legislative avenues of redress, thereby avoiding the question of whether the law
was constitutional.
673. Under existing law, even a prevailing plaintiff would not necessarily recover attor-
neys fees in an action of this type. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(b), 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988); Lear
Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1115-26 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn in part, 893 F.2d
205 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the goal is to bring the constitutional issue before the courts,
a plaintiff who accomplishes this by bringing a nonfrivolous action should recover attor-
neys fees even if the statute is held to be valid. Without such a provision, potential plain-
tiffs might not risk suit, particularly given the uncertainty that surrounds most
constitutional issues. To further discourage executive officials from carrying out presiden-
tial directives to defy the law, such fees might be paid out of funds appropriated for the
department or agency in question. See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4)
(1988) (attorneys fees payable from agency appropriations). Congress might also provide
that actions of this type shall not be dismissed on discretionary grounds such as ripeness or
exhaustion of remedies. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 663, at 98-109; TRIBE, supra note
385, at 77-82.
674. This was probably true, for example, of Woodrow Wilson's refusal to terminate
certain treaties, and of Jimmy Carter's decision to close seven protected U.S. consulates.
See supra text accompanying notes 423-424, 472.
675. The modern Supreme Court has rejected the citizen suit even where it has been
authorized by Congress. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 217 (1974); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990); Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2142-46 (1992). Yet the Court has noted that the defect in such
actions is that plaintiff is "seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him
than it does the public at large. .. ." Id. at 2143. See also Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634
(1937); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171, 176-77 (1974). By awarding a cash
bounty to a successful plaintiff, her interest in the outcome of the case becomes tangible
and distinctive. The Court in Lujan acknowledged that "providing a cash bounty for the
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Judicial review could be further facilitated if Congress were to
authorize its individual members to challenge executive defiance of
"unconstitutional" laws.676 While standing may be statutorily con-
ferred only on those who have suffered a "distinctive concrete
harm,"677 this requirement would be met here. When the Executive
victorious plaintiff" will "create[ ] a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit." 112
S. Ct. at 2143. Though the Court spoke of a cash bounty in the context of "a suit against a
private party," the defendant's identity does not alter plaintiff's interest in the outcome of
the case. The Court has indicated that its antipathy to citizen suits also stems from a sepa-
ration of powers concern that federal judges not "become virtually continuing monitors of
the wisdom and soundness of Executive action," id. at 2145 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted), but it has recognized that judges may oversee and compel executive
compliance with the law in cases where plaintiff has met the concrete injury requirement,
id. at 2137-42, as is the case when a cash bounty is at stake. See Sunstein, supra note 375, at
231-34 (urging use of cash bounties to create standing in the wake of Lujan). This remedy
builds directly on early American precedents allowing "stranger suits" and "informers' ac-
tions," in which citizens who lacked a direct personal stake were allowed to sue govern-
ment officials on behalf of the public to enforce compliance with the law. Sunstein, supra
note 375, at 170-79; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1394-1417 (1988); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in
Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe,
Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1269-82 (1961).
There is probably no need in such actions to award plaintiffs attorneys fees regardless of
the outcome of the suit, for the promise of a bounty and the fact that the class of potential
plaintiffs includes millions of people virtually assure that someone will sue. As in the pri-
vate action for declaratory and/or injunctive relief, Congress might provide that any
bounty or attorneys fees be paid from funds allocated to the offending executive depart-
ment or agency.
676. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the propriety of congressional standing.
See, e.g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361,364 n.* (1987) (assuming "arguendo, that a House
of Congress suffers a judicially cognizable injury when the votes it has cast.., have been
nullified by action on the part of the Executive Branch"); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
721 (1986) ("We... need not consider the standing issue as to... Members of Congress"
because others have standing.); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 929-30 n.5 (1983) (ruling that
the House and Senate were proper parties to defend the validity of a statute, but without
addressing the standing issue); Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028, 1028-29 (1978)
(Rehnquist, I., concurring) (Summary affirmance of a district court decision dismissing suit
by Member of Congress on the merits could either reflect the Court's agreement with the
ruling on the merits or "our conclusion that appellant lacked standing to litigate the merits
... ."). See generally, Brady, supra note 145, at 985-89; Jonathan Wagner, Note, The Jus-
ticiability of Congressional-Plaintiff Suits, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 526 (1982); Raul R. Tapia et
al., Note, Congress Versus the Executive: The Role of the Courts, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 352
(1974); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 663, at 90-95.
677. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2145 (Congress may not "convert the undifferentiated public
interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable
in the courts .... "). Prior to Lujan, the enactment of a statute conferring standing sufficed
to allow those parties to sue. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("The... injury
required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion
of which creates standing.... ."' (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3
(1973)); Ely, supra note 520, at 1413. Once the injury requirement was thus met, "persons
to whom Congress has granted a right of action ... may have standing to seek relief on the
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suspends an allegedly invalid law, it causes unique harm to Senators
and Representatives by undermining their vote as legislators.678 Con-
gress might also provide that the House or the Senate may permit suit
to be brought on behalf of either body67 9 for the purpose of challeng-
ing the President's refusal to honor an allegedly "unconstitutional"
basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public
interest in support of their claim." Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
678. Lower federal courts have held that Members of Congress have standing to chal-
lenge presidential conduct that has the effect of nullifying or denying their legislative vote.
See, e.g., Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147-48 (D.D.C. 1990); Goldwater v. Carter,
617 F.2d 697,702 & n.12 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (distinguishing between a "past vote" and a
right to vote in the future), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Kennedy v.
Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Ely, supra note 520, at 1412-13; Brady,
supra note 145, at 986-89; TRIE, supra note 385, at 150-54. Courts have held that mem-
bers of Congress lack standing to challenge executive improprieties in the interpretation or
administration of a statute. See, e.g., Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050, 1057-58 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 213-15 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
A President's refusal to honor an "unconstitutional" law undermines a legislator's
vote in two senses. First, it amounts to an absolute veto, depriving members of their vote
to override the President's action. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 9, at 454. Such action is
technically distinct from a formal veto in that the Executive may later decide to enforce the
provision; moreover, the refusal is not subject to override by Congress and is often applied
only to parts of a bill. Yet a Member of Congress may still claim that presidential action
having the same effect as a veto must comport with Art. I, §7 procedures, and that the
failure to do so causes her an injury that is distinct from that suffered by others. Second,
the flat refusal to comply with a statute is tantamount to a unilateral repeal, denying Mem-
bers of Congress their vote on the question of rescinding the measure. See GAO Bid Pro-
test Hearings, supra note 9, at 51 (statement of Eugene Gressman). While this is not
literally a repeal, because the President could later decide to enforce the provision, the
practical effect is the same. However, one court has held that while congressional plaintiffs
have standing to sue the Executive for a declaratory judgment that a law is constitutional,
if the law is upheld, they lack standing to obtain an injunction forcing compliance with the
law, on the ground that their "interest in its enforcement is no more than that of the aver-
age citizen." Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 888 (3d Cir. 1986).
679. Congress has authorized the Comptroller General tobring a civil action in federal
court against an executive officer or agency to force the expenditure of funds the President
has impounded. 2 U.S.C. §687 (1988). It has also permitted Senate Legal Counsel "to
intervene or appear as amicus curiae in the name of the Senate ... in any legal action ... in
which the powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution... are placed in
issue," but this provision does not permit suit to be initiated by the Senate. 2 U.S.C.
§ 288e(a) (1988). The House has employed counsel on a case-by-case basis to represent it
as an intervenor or amicus. Brady, supra note 145, at 971 n.3.
Even if both Houses are given standing to sue, it is still important that individual
members also have standing, as it may be difficult to persuade a majority of either House
to confront the Executive if the President's party controls Congress or if the issue is politi-
cally charged. See Ely, supra note 520, at 1412; Brady, supra note 145, at 996-97 n. 94. The
Senate thus took no action on a recommendation that it intervene in Goldwater v. Carter,
617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), a suit that was filed by a number of
individual Senators.
law. 680 Though congressional standing is not free of difficulties, 68 1 it
would be well worth exploring in this setting.
680. For standing to exist, it is necessary to show that the House or Senate suffered a
distinct harm. This requirement is met in two respects. See Brady, supra note 145, at 986-
89. First, when the Executive disregards all or part of a law, it nullifies the vote of both
Houses of Congress, each of which gave its corporate approval to the measure. In at least
one case where individual Senators claimed standing to challenge presidential action that
allegedly nullified their votes, the Justice Department conceded that the Senate as a whole
would have standing in such a case. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 434 & n.13 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). Second, such noncompliance represents an attempt by the Executive "to in-
crease its own powers at the expense of the [Legislative] Branch," Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 694 (1988), thereby injuring the House and Senate in their institutional capacities.
In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 929-30 n. 5 (1983), the Court noted and did not question
the fact that the House and Senate were allowed to intervene as parties in a suit challeng-
ing the validity of a legislative veto. The injury there was direct, for if the law were struck
down, each House would lose the veto conferred on it by the act. Yet the Court suggested
that a broader standing principle was at work, stating that "Congress is the proper party to
defend the validity of a statute when [the government] agrees with plaintiffs that the stat-
ute is inapplicable or unconstitutional." Id. at 940. If the House and Senate have standing
as defendants to protect a law against a claim that it is unconstitutional, they should also
have standing to protect that law as plaintiffs if the Executive has refused to honor it. The
lower federal courts have thus allowed the House and Senate to intervene as plaintiffs in
suits challenging executive refusals to comply with an allegedly unconstitutional law. See,
e.g., Ameron v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 607 F. Supp. 962, 963 (D. NJ. 1985), aff d, 787
F.2d 875, 880 (3d Cir.), affd, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918
(1988) (suit to compel compliance with Competition in Contracting Act); Lear Siegler, Inc.
v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn in part on other grounds, 893
F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (same).
681. There are several potential obstacles to suits by members of Congress. One is the
doctrine of equitable or remedial discretion under which courts will dismiss a suit if "a
congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the
enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute." Riegle v. Federal Open Market Comm.,
656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 663, at 93-94. This
should pose no problem here, for even if a legislator could persuade Congress to reenact
(perhaps over the President's veto) the same statute that the Executive refused to enforce,
the President would presumably still refuse to comply, again claiming that the law was
unconstitutional. See Ely, supra note 520, at 1414-16.
A second doctrine, ripeness, should not be the obstacle here that it has been in some
other suits by members of Congress. See, e.g., Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1149-52
(D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing suit by members of Congress to compel presidential compliance
with War Powers Resolution as not ripe because neither Congress nor the President had
taken formal action to create a constitutional impasse); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,
997-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (dismissing suit by members of Congress challenging
President's unilateral termination of a treaty as not ripe because neither House nor Senate
had officially rejected the President's claimed authority). By contrast, the posture of the
cases at issue here assures that they are ripe because Congress and the President will have
formally confronted each other on the issue before the court, Le., the validity of the law in
question. Congress, by approving the law, implicitly concluded that it was constitutional.
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1871); PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CON-
sTrrUTiONAL DECISIONMAKING 44-45 (1975). The President, in refusing to comply with the
measure, has pronounced it unconstitutional. Where the "political branches [have thus]
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Conclusion
In recent years, American Presidents have asserted that they have
the right to disregard any statute that they believe to be unconstitu-
tional. Through these claims, the White House seeks to resurrect for
its own use the royal prerogative of suspending the laws, a prerogative
that was abolished in England, after centuries of struggle, by the Bill
of Rights of 1689.
The Constitution does not expressly deny this authority to the
President, yet it is clear that the Founders did not intend to confer
such a power on the Chief Executive of the United States. The Presi-
dent's duty to insure that the laws are "faithfully executed," the as-
sumption in Article I, §9 that the suspending power belongs to
Congress, the Convention's decision to give the President a qualified
rather than an absolute veto, the Framers' concept of the "executive
power," and the fact that not even the Antifederalists insisted upon
including a ban against the suspending power in the Bill of Rights, all
support the conclusion that the Constitution did not give the Execu-
tive a power to suspend the laws.
For nearly three-quarters of a century, Presidents respected this
original understanding; while the Executive at times suggested that a
statute was unconstitutional, it nevertheless performed its duty faith-
fully to execute the law. During the ensuing years, Presidents occa-
sionally refused to carry out an "unconstitutional" law. Yet as
recently as 1971, such noncompliance had occurred on only 10 occa-
sions. In the last two decades, however, both the rhetoric and the
reality of presidential defiance have escalated dramatically. From
reach[ed] a constitutional impasse," Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring), a case is ripe.
Finally, while suits by Congress or its Members against the executive branch literally
involve interbranch disputes, they should rarely present a political question. The issue
before the court will not be whether a President may refuse to comply with an allegedly
unconstitutional law, but rather the more common one of whether the law the Executive
has refused to honor is constitutional. See supra text accompanying notes 652-653. The
issue is identical to that which would be posed if the case had been filed by a private
plaintiff. The identity of the parties, while relevant to the existence of standing, in no way
alters the nature of the question presented. See Tapia et al., supra note 676, at 398-99;
Douglas R. Prince, Note, Should Congress Defend Its Own Interests Before the Courts, 33
STAN. L. Rav. 715, 730-32 (1981). Thus, if a suit by a defense contractor to compel en-
forcement of the Competition in Contracting Act does not pose a political question, see
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn in part, 893 F.2d 205
(9th Cir. 1989) (adjudicating claim by private defense contractor against Secretary of Navy
to compel compliance with Competition in Contracting Act), neither should the same suit
filed by a Member of Congress. Political questions may occasionally be involved, but no
more often than in ordinary constitutional litigation.
1789 through 1971, Presidents objected to the validity of roughly 80
statutes. In the 20-year period between 1971 and 1991 they chal-
lenged the constitutionality of more the 250 laws. Of the 20 incidents
of actual defiance that occurred in the period from 1789 to 1981, half
occurred during the final ten years.
If the President is ever justified in ignoring an allegedly unconsti-
tutional law, it is only in rare cases where a statute is patently invalid
and where noncompliance is the only way to bring about judicial re-
view. Few of the historical incidents of defiance satisfied these
conditions.
Unless Congress takes steps to check presidential refusals to
honor "unconstitutional" laws, we may find that through a subtle pro-
cess of accretion, the Executive has acquired a suspending power that
is both selective and absolute. There are several avenues Congress
might pursue, including: providing the Executive with improved
means of obtaining judicial review as an alternative to defiance, dis-
couraging lower level executive officials from carrying out directives
to ignore the law, and increasing access to the courts for those who
wish to challenge noncompliance when and if it occurs.
The Constitution gives to Congress the power to suspend the
laws; if a statute is to be abrogated, the same procedure must be fol-
lowed that led to its enactment. The Executive's efforts to usurp this
power will surely continue unless Congress takes steps to protect its
authority. As Justice Jackson once wrote, "If not good law, there was
worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that 'The tools
belong to the man who can use them.' We may say that power...
belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent
power from slipping through its fingers." '682
682. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
Summer 19941 REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE

